Results for 'Stakes'

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  1. Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes.Wesley Buckwalter & Jonathan Schaffer - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):201–234.
    According to a prominent claim in recent epistemology, people are less likely to ascribe knowledge to a high stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are severe, than to a low stakes subject for whom the practical consequences of error are slight. We offer an opinionated "state of the art" on experimental research about the role of stakes in knowledge judgments. We draw on a first wave of empirical studies--due to Feltz & Zarpentine (2010), May (...)
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  2. Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.
    Several authors have recently endorsed the thesis that there is what has been called pragmatic encroachment on knowledge—in other words, that two people who are in the same situation with respect to truth-related factors may differ in whether they know something, due to a difference in their practical circumstances. This paper aims not to defend this thesis, but to explore how it could be true. What I aim to do, is to show how practical factors could play a role in (...)
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  3. Stakes and Kidneys: Why Markets in Human Body Parts Are Morally Imperative.James Stacey Taylor - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):627-629.
     
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  4.  12
    Stakes, Scales, and Skepticism.Kathryn Francis, Philip Beaman & Nat Hansen - unknown
    There is conflicting experimental evidence about whether the “stakes” or importance of being wrong affect judgments about whether a subject knows a proposition. To date, judgments about stakes effects on knowledge have been investigated using binary paradigms: responses to “low” stakes cases are compared with responses to “high stakes” cases. However, stakes or importance are not binary properties—they are scalar: whether a situation is “high” or “low” stakes is a matter of degree. So far, (...)
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  5.  53
    Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.Charity Anderson & John Hawthorne - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    Defenses of pragmatic encroachment commonly rely on two thoughts: first, that the gap between one’s strength of epistemic position on p and perfect strength sometimes makes a difference to what one is justified in doing, and second, that the higher the stakes, the harder it is to know. It is often assumed that these ideas complement each other. This chapter shows that these ideas are far from complementary. Along the way, a variety of strategies for regimenting the somewhat inchoate (...)
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  6. Knowledge, Stakes and Error: A Psychological Account.Alexander Dinges - 2019 - Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland: Klostermann.
    The term “know” is one of the ten most common verbs in English, and yet a central aspect of its usage remains mysterious. Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on epistemic factors such as the quality of our evidence. It also depends on seemingly non-epistemic factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once our attention is drawn to possible sources of error. Accounts of this phenomenon proliferate, but no (...)
     
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  7. Two Kinds of Stakes.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):307-324.
    I distinguish two different kinds of practical stakes associated with propositions. The W-stakes track what is at stake with respect to whether the proposition is true or false. The A-stakes track what is at stake with respect to whether an agent believes the proposition. This poses a dilemma for those who claim that whether a proposition is known can depend on the stakes associated with it. Only the W-stakes reading of this view preserves intuitions about (...)
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  8. Stakes and Beliefs.Brad Armendt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87.
    The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea and treat belief as (...)
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  9. Small Stakes Give You the Blues: The Skeptical Costs of Pragmatic Encroachment.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía.
    According to the fallibilist, it is possible for us to know things when our evidence doesn't entail that our beliefs are correct. Even if there is some chance that we're mistaken about p, we might still know that p is true. Fallibilists will tell you that an important virtue of their view is that infallibilism leads to skepticism. In this paper, we'll see that fallibilist impurism has considerable skeptical consequences of its own. We've missed this because we've focused our attention (...)
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  10.  36
    Small Stakes Give You the Blues: The Skeptical Costs of Pragmatic Encroachment.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (4):31-38.
    ABSTRACT According to the fallibilist, it is possible for us to know things when our evidence doesn't entail that our beliefs are correct. Even if there is some chance that we're mistaken about p, we might still know that p is true. Fallibilists will tell you that an important virtue of their view is that infallibilism leads to skepticism. In this paper, we'll see that fallibilist impurism has considerable skeptical consequences of its own. We've missed this because we've focused our (...)
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  11. The Mystery of Stakes and Error in Ascriber Intuitions.Wesley Buckwalter - 2014 - In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. Bloomsbury Academic.
    Research in experimental epistemology has revealed a great, yet unsolved mystery: why do ordinary evaluations of knowledge ascribing sentences involving stakes and error appear to diverge so systematically from the predictions professional epistemologists make about them? Two recent solutions to this mystery by Keith DeRose (2011) and N. Ángel Pinillos (2012) argue that these differences arise due to specific problems with the designs of past experimental studies. This paper presents two new experiments to directly test these responses. Results vindicate (...)
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  12.  45
    High Stakes and Acceptance Behavior in Ultimatum Bargaining.Bertrand Munier & Costin Zaharia - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (3):187-207.
    This paper presents the results of a within-subject experiment testing whether an increase in the monetary stakes by a factor of 50 – which had never been done before – influences individual behavior in a simple ultimatum bargaining game. Contrary to current wisdom, we found that lowest acceptable offers stated by the responder are proportionally lower in the high-stake condition than in the low-stake condition. This result may be interpreted in terms of the type of utility functions which characterize (...)
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  13. Evidence That Stakes Don't Matter for Evidence.Mark Phelan - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (4):1-25.
  14.  15
    Beyond High-Stakes Exam: A Neo-Confucian Educational Programme and its Contemporary Implications.Charlene Tan - 2019 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 52 (2):137-148.
    This article seeks to clarify the purpose of high-stakes exam and its relationship with teaching and learning by elucidating the educational thought of the eminent neo-Confucian thinker Zhu...
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  15. Radical Moral Encroachment: The Moral Stakes of Racist Beliefs.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):9-23.
    Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a paradigmatically (...)
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  16.  7
    Technology Changes the Ethical Stakes in HIV Surveillance and Prevention: Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “Reassessing the Ethics of Molecular HIV Surveillance in the Era of Cluster Detection and Response”.Stephen Molldrem & Anthony K. J. Smith - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (10):W1-W3.
    Volume 20, Issue 10, October 2020, Page W1-W3.
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  17.  97
    Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.
    It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S ’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p . I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of epistemic support that is (...)
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  18.  41
    The Stakes in Bayh-Dole: Public Values Beyond the Pace of Innovation.Walter D. Valdivia - 2011 - Minerva 49 (1):25-46.
    Evaluation studies of the Bayh-Dole Act are generally concerned with the pace of innovation or the transgressions to the independence of research. While these concerns are important, I propose here to expand the range of public values considered in assessing Bayh-Dole and formulating future reforms. To this end, I first examine the changes in the terms of the Bayh-Dole debate and the drift in its design. Neoliberal ideas have had a definitive influence on U.S. innovation policy for the last thirty (...)
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  19. Collateral Damage: How High-Stakes Testing Corrupts America's Schools.Sharon L. Nichols, David C. Berliner & Nel Noddings - 2007 - Harvard Education Press.
    Drawing on their extensive research, Nichols and Berliner document and categorize the ways that high-stakes testing threatens the purposes and ideals of the American education system. For more than a decade, the debate over high-stakes testing has dominated the field of education. This passionate and provocative book provides a fresh perspective on the issue and powerful ammunition for opponents of high-stakes tests. Their analysis is grounded in the application of Campbell’s Law, which posits that the greater the (...)
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  20. Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
    Why do our intuitive knowledge ascriptions shift when a subject's practical interests are mentioned? Many efforts to answer this question have focused on empirical linguistic evidence for context sensitivity in knowledge claims, but the empirical psychology of belief formation and attribution also merits attention. The present paper examines a major psychological factor (called ?need-for-closure?) relevant to ascriptions involving practical interests. Need-for-closure plays an important role in determining whether one has a settled belief; it also influences the accuracy of one's cognition. (...)
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  21.  96
    The Natural Cyborg: The Stakes of Bergson's Philosophy of Evolution.Paola Marrati - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (s1):3-17.
    Bergson's engagement with evolutionary theory was remarkably up to date with the science of his time. One century later, the scientific and social landscape is undoubtedly quite different, but some of his insights remain of critical importance for the present. This paper aims at discussing three related aspects of Bergson's philosophy of evolution and their relevance for contemporary debates: first, the stark distinction between the affirmation of the reality of change and becoming, on the one hand, and any notion of (...)
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  22.  14
    Evidence That Stakes Don’T Matter for Evidence.Mark Phelan - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):488-512.
  23.  28
    High-Stakes Gambling with Unknown Outcomes: Justifying the Precautionary Principle.Anton Petrenko & Dan McArthur - 2011 - Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (4):346-362.
  24.  27
    High Stakes Testing and the Structure of the Mind: A Reply to Randall Curren.Andrew Davis - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 40 (1):1–16.
  25.  33
    Stakes and Kidneys: Why Markets in Human Body Parts Are Morally Imperative.David Resnik - 2008 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (1):169-170.
  26.  29
    Principles of Stakes Fairness in Sport.Alexander Brown - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (2):152-186.
    Fairness in sport is not just about assigning the top prizes to the worthiest competitors. It is also about the way the prize structure itself is organised. For many sporting competitions, although it may be acceptable for winners to receive more than losers, it can seem unfair for winners to take everything and for losers to get nothing. Yet this insight leaves unanswered some difficult questions about what stakes fairness requires and which principles of stakes fairness are appropriate (...)
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  27. Against the Iterated Knowledge Account of High-Stakes Cases.Jie Gao - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):92-107.
    One challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowledge to subjects in high stakes when the target propositions seem to be inappropriate premises for practical reasoning. According to an account suggested by Williamson, our intuitive judgments are erroneous due to an alleged failure to acknowledge the distinction between first-order and higher-order knowledge: the high-stakes subject lacks the latter but possesses the former. In this paper, I provide three objections to Williamson’s account: i) his (...)
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  28.  6
    Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesia, 37 ECON.Lisa A. Cameron - 1999 - Economic Inquiry 37 (1).
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  29.  28
    Stakes-Shifting Cases Reconsidered—What Shifts? Epistemic Standards or Position?Kok Yong Lee - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):53-76.
    It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases are best explained by standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases. I argue that the only way to preserve our initial intuitions regarding such cases is to endorse position variantism, the view that (...)
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  30.  95
    Assertion, Stakes and Expected Blameworthiness: An Insensitive Invariantist Solution to the Bank Cases.Brandon Yip - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists often cite the knowledge norm of assertion as part of their argument. They claim that the knowledge norms in conjunction with our intuitions about when a subject is properly asserting in low or high stakes contexts provides strong evidence that what counts as knowledge depends on practical factors. In this paper, I present new data to suggest they are mistaken in the way they think about cases involving high and low stakes and I (...)
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  31. Stakes, Scales, and Skepticism.Kathryn Francis, Philip Beaman & Nat Hansen - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:427--487.
    There is conflicting experimental evidence about whether the “stakes” or importance of being wrong affect judgments about whether a subject knows a proposition. To date, judgments about stakes effects on knowledge have been investigated using binary paradigms: responses to “low” stakes cases are compared with responses to “high stakes” cases. However, stakes or importance are not binary properties—they are scalar: whether a situation is “high” or “low” stakes is a matter of degree. So far, (...)
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  32.  18
    Mindfulness, Anxiety, and High-Stakes Mathematics Performance in the Laboratory and Classroom.David B. Bellinger, Marci S. DeCaro & Patricia A. S. Ralston - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 37:123-132.
  33.  44
    Agency and Other Stakes of Poverty.Jiwei Ci - 2013 - Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2):125-150.
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  34.  54
    Agency and Other Stakes of Poverty.C. I. Jiwei - 2013 - Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2):125-150.
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  35.  16
    Upping the Stakes: A Response to John Hasnas on the Normative Viability of the Stockholder and Stakeholder Theories.Daniel E. Palmer - 1999 - Business Ethics Quarterly 9 (4):699-706.
    This essay responds to Hasnas’s recent article “The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed” in Business Ethics Quarterly. Hasnas claims that the stockholder theory is more plausible than commonly supposed and that the stakeholder theory is prone to significant difficulties. I argue that Hasnas’s reasons for favoring the stockholder over the stakeholder theory are not asstrong as he suggests. Following Hasnas, I examine both theories in light of two sets of normative considerations: utilitarian anddeontological. First, I (...)
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  36.  12
    Upping the Stakes.Daniel E. Palmer - 1999 - Business Ethics Quarterly 9 (4):699-706.
    This essay responds to Hasnas’s recent article “The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed” in Business Ethics Quarterly. Hasnas claims that the stockholder theory is more plausible than commonly supposed and that the stakeholder theory is prone to significant difficulties. I argue that Hasnas’s reasons for favoring the stockholder over the stakeholder theory are not asstrong as he suggests. Following Hasnas, I examine both theories in light of two sets of normative considerations: utilitarian anddeontological. First, I (...)
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  37.  42
    Connoisseurship and the Stakes of Style.Richard Neer - 2005 - Critical Inquiry 32 (1):1.
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  38.  67
    The High Stakes of Temporality: Nicolas De Warren: Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009, 309 Pp, Hardcover, US$90.00, ISBN 978-0-521-87679-7.Andrea Staiti - 2011 - Continental Philosophy Review 44 (1):131-140.
  39.  17
    Stakes Sensitivity and Credit Rating: A New Challenge for Regulators.Anthony Booth & Boudewijn de Bruin - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 169 (1):169-179.
    The ethical practices of credit rating agencies, particularly following the 2008 financial crisis, have been subject to extensive analysis by economists, ethicists, and policymakers. We raise a novel issue facing CRAs that has to do with a problem concerning the transmission of epistemic status of ratings from CRAs to the beneficiaries of the ratings, and use it to provide a new challenge for regulators. Building on recent work in philosophy, we argue that since CRAs have different stakes than the (...)
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  40.  60
    Stakes Sensitivity and Transformative Experience.Rachel Elizabeth Fraser - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):34-39.
    I trace the relationship between the view that knowledge is stakes sensitive and Laurie Paul’s account of the epistemology of transformative experience. The view that knowledge is stakes sensitive comes in different flavours: one can go for subjective or objective conceptions of stakes, where subjective views of stakes take stakes to be a function of an agent’s non-factive mental states, and objective views of stakes do not. I argue that there is a tension between (...)
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  41.  16
    Stakes, Practical Adequacy, and the Epistemic Significance of Double-Checking.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    In their chapter “Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes,” Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne present several challenges to the doctrine of pragmatic encroachment. In this brief reply to their chapter two things are aimed at. First, the chapter argues that there is a sense in which their case against pragmatic encroachment is a bit weaker, and another sense in which that case is much stronger, than Anderson and Hawthorne’s own argument would suggest. Second, the chapter highlights and then builds upon (...)
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  42.  15
    High Stakes Instrumentalism.John Halstead - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):295-311.
    In this paper, I aim to establish that, according to almost all democratic theories, instrumentalist considerations often dominate intrinsic proceduralist considerations in our decisions about whether to make extensive use of undemocratic procedures. The reason for this is that almost all democratic theorists, including philosophers commonly thought to be intrinsic proceduralists, accept ‘High Stakes Instrumentalism’. According to HSI, we ought to use undemocratic procedures in order to prevent high stakes errors - very substantively bad or unjust outcomes. However, (...)
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  43. Small Stakes Risk Aversion in the Laboratory: A Reconsideration.Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, Don Ross & J. Todd Swarthout - unknown
    Evidence of risk aversion in laboratory settings over small stakes leads to a priori implausible levels of risk aversion over large stakes under certain assumptions. One core assumption in statements of this calibration puzzle is that small-stakes risk aversion is observed over all levels of wealth, or over a â sufficiently largeâ range of wealth. Although this assumption is viewed as self-evident from the vast experimental literature showing risk aversion over laboratory stakes, it actually requires that (...)
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  44.  18
    High‐Stakes Decision‐Making Within Complex Social Environments: A Computational Model of Belief Systems in the Arab Spring.Stephanie Dornschneider - 2019 - Cognitive Science 43 (7).
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  45.  7
    Individual Stakes and Collective Ideology in Tension: Looking at Physical and Spatial Obstacles From an Experiential Perspective.Kathrina Mazurik, Michel Desjardins, Ève de Grosbois, Tiiu Poldma & Jan Gelech - 2014 - Alter - European Journal of Disability Research / Revue Européenne de Recherche Sur le Handicap 8 (3):194-205.
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  46. Stakes and States: Sexual Discourses From New Delhi.Jyoti Puri - 2006 - Feminist Review 83 (1):139-148.
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  47.  22
    Stakes of the Game: Life and Death in Siberian Shamanism.Roberte N. Hamayon - 1992 - Diogenes 40 (158):69-85.
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  48.  15
    Stakes, Fetishes, Merchandise.Michel Serres & Raymond Federman - 1985 - Substance 14 (1):3.
  49.  27
    High Stakes: Inertia or Transformation?Henry Shue - 2016 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 40 (1):63-75.
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  50.  17
    The Stakes Are Not Very High in This Game.Stuart J. Youngner - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (4):42 – 43.
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