About the Author:Stan van Hooft is associate professor, philosophy, Deakin University , and the author of Life, Death, and Subjectivity: Moral Sources in Bioethics.
The argument of this article is framed by a debate between the principle of humanity and the principle of justice. Whereas the principle of humanity requires us to care about others and to want to help them meet their vital needs, and so to be partial towards those others, the principle of justice requires us to consider their needs without the intrusion of our subjective interests or emotions so that we can act with impartiality. I argue that a deep form (...) of caring lies behind both approaches and so unites them. In the course of the argument, I reject Michael Slote’s sentimentalist form of an ethics of care, and expound Thomas Nagel’s moral theory, which seems to lie at the opposite end of a spectrum ranging from moral sentiments to impersonal objectivity. Nevertheless, Nagel’s theory of normative realism provides unexpected support for the thesis that a deep and subjective form of caring lies at the base of even our most objective moral reasons. (shrink)
Taking as its starting point a recent statement of the Goals of Medicine published by the Hastings Centre, this paper argues against the dualistic distinction between pain and suffering. It uses an Aristotelian conception of the person to suggest that malady, pain, and disablement are objective forms of suffering not dependent upon any state of consciousness of the victim. As a result, medicine effectively relieves suffering when it cures malady and relieves pain. There is no medical mission to confront the (...) spiritual condition of the patient. (shrink)
From the now iconic Barack Obama 'Hope' poster of the 2008 presidential campaign to the pit-head 'Camp Hope' of the families of the trapped Chilean miners, the language of hope can be hugely powerful as it draws on resources that are uniquely human and universal. We are beings who hope. But what does that say about us? What is hope and what role does it play in our lives? In his fascinating and thought-provoking investigation into the meaning of hope, Stan (...) van Hooft shows that hope is a fundamental structure of the way we live our lives. For Aristotle being hopeful was part of a well-lived life, a virtue. For Aquinas it was a fundamentally theological virtue and for Kant a basic moral motivation. It shapes how we view ourselves and the world in which we live. Whether we hope for a life after death or for good weather tomorrow - whether our hopes are grand or humble - hoping is part of our outlook on life. What we hope for defines who we are. Drawing on everyday examples as well as more detailed discussion of hope in the arenas of medicine, politics and religion, van Hooft shows how hopefulness in not the same as hope and offers a convincing and powerful defense of the need for realism. There are few contemporary philosophical discussions of hope and Stan van Hooft's book offers an accessible and insightful discussion of the topic that shows the relevance of philosophical thinking and distinctions to this important aspect of human life. (shrink)
Taking as its starting point a recent statement of the Goals of Medicine published by the Hastings Centre, this paper argues against the dualistic distinction between pain and suffering. It uses an Aristotelian conception of the person to suggest that malady, pain, and disablement are objective forms of suffering not dependent upon any state of consciousness of the victim. As a result, medicine effectively relieves suffering when it cures malady and relieves pain. There is no medical mission to confront the (...) spiritual condition of the patient. (shrink)
It is the thesis of the authors that the caring ethic and moral state of being of nurses ideally suffuses their professional caring and is thus implicit in their ethical decision making. Socratic dialogue is a technique that allows such moral attitudes to be made explicit. This article describes a Socratic dialogue conducted with nurses on the topic: 'What is love in nursing?' The conclusions drawn were based on the belief that the current western-style health care system restricts the practice (...) of nursing in such a way as to limit professional caring and loving possibilities. Nurses who love in the practice of caring go beyond the role definition of the duty of care; they are people who are prepared to think differently about their practice as professionals, and are identified as competent risk takers committed to the betterment of the other. From this dialogue, 'love in nursing' was understood as the willingness and commitment of the nurse to want the good of the other before the self, without reciprocity. (shrink)
Cosmopolitanism is a demanding and contentious moral position. It urges us to embrace the whole world into our moral concerns and to apply the standards of impartiality and equity across boundaries of nationality, race, religion or gender in a way that would have been unheard of even fifty years ago. It suggests a range of virtues which the cosmopolitan individual should display: virtues such as tolerance, justice, pity, righteous indignation at injustice, generosity toward the poor and starving, care for the (...) global environment, and the willingness to take responsibility for change on a global scale. This book explains and espouses the values of cosmopolitanism, adjudicates between various forms of cosmopolitanism, and defends it against its critics.Cosmopolitanism has relevance for international distributive justice; peace; human rights; environmental sustainability; protection for minorities, refugees and other oppressed groups; democratic participation; and inter cultural tolerance. The book does not aim to impart factual information about global issues or to offer prescriptions for the solution of global problems. Rather, it highlights the ethical issues inherent in them and identifies the moral obligations that individuals, multinational corporations and governments might have in relation to them.While espousing a cosmopolitan form of global ethics, a liberal form of politics, sustainable and just forms of business practice, and an internationalist approach to global conflict and governance, it seeks to present as many sides of the ethical debates as can be supported by reasonable argument. Discussing the work of Kwame Anthony Appiah, Seyla Benhabib, Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Pogge, John Rawls, Amartya Sen, Henry Shue, Peter Singer and others, this book provides a clear and accessible survey of cosmopolitanism and analyses the reality of the rights and responsibilities that it espouses. (shrink)
It is frequently said that pain is incommunicable and even that it destroys language . This paper offers a phenomenological account of pain and then explores and critiques this view. It suggests not only that pain is communicable to an adequate degree for clinical purposes, but also that it is itself a form of communication through which the person in pain appeals to the empathy and ethical goodness of the clinician. To explain this latter idea and its ethical implications, reference (...) is made to the writings of Emmanuel Levinas. (shrink)
This paper reflects on a critique of cosmopolitanism mounted by Tom Campbell, who argues that cosmopolitans place undue stress on the issue of global justice. Campbell argues that aid for the impoverished needy in the third world, for example, should be given on the Principle of Humanity rather than on the Principle of Justice. This line of thought is also pursued by ?Liberal Nationalists? like Yael Tamir and David Miller. Thomas Nagel makes a similar distinction and questions whether the ideal (...) of justice can even be meaningfully applied on a global scale. The paper explores whether the distinction between the Principle of Humanity and the Principle of Justice might be a false dichotomy in that both principles could be involved in humanitarian assistance. It will suggest that both principles might be grounded in an ethics of caring and that the ethics of caring cannot be so sharply distinguished from the discourse of justice and of rights. As a result, the Principle of Humanity and the Principle of Justice cannot be so sharply distinguished either. It is because we care about others as human beings (Principle of Humanity) that we pursue justice for them (Principle of Justice) and the alleviation of their avoidable suffering. (shrink)
The author challenges the recently argued position of Helga Kuhse that caring is merely a preparatory stage to moral action and that impartial, principled thinking is required to make action moral, by suggesting a notion of caring as virtue. If caring is a virtue then acting from that virtue will be acting well. Acting from the virtue of caring involves eight features, which include not only that of being sensitive to, and concerned about, the patient, but also that of being (...) aware of, and sensitive to, the relevant ethical principles. In this way, caring is seen as an overarching quality that gives action its moral character. The moral character of an action does not derive only from its having been performed in the light of principles. (shrink)
Although Aristotle did not mention it, integrity can be understood in an Aristotelian framework. Seeing it in these terms will show that it is an executive virtue which concerns the existential well being of an agent. This analysis is not offered as an exegesis of Aristotle's text, but as an attempt to use an Aristotelian framework to understand a virtue deemed important today. This account will have the benefit of solving some problems relating to motivational internalism and, as such, will (...) contribute to that recent current of thought which has been highlighting the importance of virtue thinking in moral theory. I will distinguish moral judgement from decision and show that moral judgement is dependent upon virtue more strongly than it is upon impartial rationality. I will suggest that integrity is the virtue to which moral judgement gives expression and is the virtue which links judgement to decision so as to overcome akrasia. (shrink)
This paper explores cosmopolitanism, not as a position within political philosophy or international relations, but as a virtuous stance taken by individuals who see their responsibilities as extending globally. Taking as its cue some recent writing by Kwame Anthony Appiah, it argues for a number of virtues that are inherent in, and required by, such a stance. It is critical of what it sees as a limited scope in Appiah's conception and enriches it with Nigel Dower's concept of 'global citizenship'. (...) It then seeks to overcome a distinction that Appiah draws between a 'thin' moral conception of justice and a 'thick' ethical conception of our obligations to those with whom we have identity-forming relationships. It argues that a richer conception of the virtue of justice, as suggested by Raimond Gaita, can fully articulate the ideals of cosmopolitanism. (shrink)
Marguerite La Caze has recently published a stimulating analysis of the emotions of envy and resentment in which she argues that to envy others for a benefit they have received or to resent them for such a reason can be ethically acceptable in cases where that benefit has been unjustly obtained (La Caze, 2001). I question this on the ground that the judgement that the benefit has been unjustly obtained plays a more complex role in the structure of envy and (...) resentment than La Caze allows and should alter the nature of the feeling that is evoked. From the perspective of virtue ethics there is nothing creditable about still feeling envy or resentment in such circumstances. (shrink)
This article reviews a number of recent books and practices that address a renewed interest in the role that philosophy might play in the living of a rich and fulfilling life. The review looks at books addressed to the general public as well as books which discuss such classical and Hellenistic philosophers as took their task to be helping people achieve happiness in life. It then turns to contemporary studies of the self and of wisdom and turns finally to some (...) newly emerging philosophical practices such as philosophical counselling and philosophical discussion groups of various kinds in order to explore whether philosophy can still be a source of consolation or guidance in contemporary life. (shrink)
This paper argues that everyday virtuous behavior does not arise from a principle or explicit process of thought but is instead the expression of a prereflexive structure of character. On this account, the implicit micro-judgments that characterize everyday virtue are expressions of what is morally salient in everyday situations. Rather than arguing for this claim in a theoretical way, the paper illustrates this position by describing a day-long, Socratic conversation on the topic of “What is Interpersonal Love?” The results of (...) this conversation are that the basis of everyday virtuous behavior concerning interpersonal love is located in the implicit understanding, everyday behavior, and practical decisions that individuals make in the context of their lives. (shrink)
This is a review of Gillian Brock’s new book, Global justice: a cosmopolitan account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) which sets out the central theses of the book and then offers a critical appraisal of its central arguments. My specific concern is that Brock gives an insufficiently robust account of human rights with which to define the nature of global justice and thereby leaves cosmopolitanism too vulnerable to the normative pull of local and traditional moral conceptions that fall short of (...) the universalism that cosmopolitans should be able to embrace. Keywords: cosmopolitanism; human rights; global justice; Rawls; humanitarian intervention; global governance; liberal nationalism; democracy; equality; immigration (Published: 4 December 2009) Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2009, pp. 369–382. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v2i4.2107. (shrink)
This is a review of John Caputo’s recent Routledge book on religion. Caputo’s central idea is captured by the phrase ‘religion without religion’, by which he means a religious stance or attitude that is not circumscribed by allegiance to any specific creed.
Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Part 1 Health Care, Virtue and Education -- 1 Caring and Professional Commitment -- 2 Moral Education for Nursing Decisions -- 3 Bioethics and Caring -- 4 Towards a Theory of Caring -- 5 Acting from the Virtue of Caring -- 6 Socratic Dialogue and the Virtuous Clinician -- Part 2 The Objects of Health Care -- 7 The Body and Well-Being -- 8 Health and Subjectivity -- 9 (...) Disease and Subjectivity -- 10 Suffering and the Goals of Medicine -- 11 Pain and Communication -- 12 The Meanings of Suffering -- Bibliography -- Index. (shrink)
In a recent study, Damian Cox, Marguerite La Coze and Michael P. Levine argue for a complex conception of integrity. But they leave two questions unanswered The first is whether integrity is of greater importance to the agent's own sense of themselves or whether it is a virtue that is of social significance. The bulk of the literature on this virtue stresses its existential import. However, considerable weight should be given to its social significance. It should be linked to the (...) essentially social reaction of shame, as opposed to the existential and personal reaction of guilt. The second question is whether the virtue of integrity has been analysed in such general terms that no specific meaning can be given to the virtue. Being a person of integrity might just collapse into being a virtuous person. This essay offers a distinctive account of integrity by asking what it is to act firom the virtue in particular contexts that require public trust. (shrink)
THE PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE IS TO SHOW THE RELEVANCE OF\nGENERAL SYSTEM THEORY TO THE PROBLEMATIC OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S\nTHOUGHT. IF MERLEAU-PONTY HAS SHOWN THAT THE REALM OF\nEXISTENCE, INSOFAR AS IT IS GROUNDED IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD\nGRASPED PREOBJECTIVELY, IS NOT ONTOLOGICALLY REMOVED FROM\nTHE REALM IN WHICH CAUSAL EXPLANATION HAS ITS PLACE, NAMELY\nTHE OBJECTIVE WORLD, THEN HE MUST ALSO BE ABLE TO BRIDGE\nTHE EPISTEMOLOGICAL GAP THAT IS INVOLVED. I SUGGEST THAT HE\nCAN DO THIS IF THE DESCRIPTIONS OF INTENTIONALITY AS THEY\nAPPLY TO CONSCIOUSNESS AND (...) TO BODILY SUBJECTIVITY WERE\nRELATED AS ELEMENTS IN A SYSTEM SO AS TO PROVIDE A\nCOMMUNICATIVE AND DYNAMIC INTERFACE BETWEEN THOSE LEVELS. (shrink)
In this essay I elaborate on the theoretical framework – that of Millian liberalism – that Max Charlesworth brought to many public issues, including that of the relation between education and religion. I will then apply this framework to a debate in which I have been recently involved myself: a debate around the provision of religious instruction in public schools. In the first section I expound Charlesworth’s rejection of secularism in education in a liberal pluralist state and his defence of (...) faith-based schooling. In the second section I uncover the religious motivations behind the Victorian government’s 1950 amendments to the apparently secularist Victorian Education Act of 1872. In section three, I explore the notion of secularism more fully and suggest that the struggle between those who espouse religious instruction in state schools and those who oppose it while advocating a more general form of education about religion is a symptom of a deeper tension between liberalism and communitarianism within the culture of modernist, liberal states. (shrink)
This paper argues that everyday virtuous behavior does not arise from a principle or explicit process of thought but is instead the expression of a prereflexive structure of character. On this account, the implicit micro-judgments that characterize everyday virtue are expressions of what is morally salient in everyday situations. Rather than arguing for this claim in a theoretical way, the paper illustrates this position by describing a day-long, Socratic conversation on the topic of “What is Interpersonal Love?” The results of (...) this conversation are that the basis of everyday virtuous behavior concerning interpersonal love is located in the implicit understanding, everyday behavior, and practical decisions that individuals make in the context of their lives. (shrink)
In the last chapter of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy , Bernard Williams brings to a conclusion a sustained attack on the pretensions of moral theory by arguing against the allegedly objective reality of moral obligation. It had been a theme of the book that, while there can be answers to the questions of how one should live and order one's social relationships—answers which, in a given culture, go to make up its ethics —there is no place for a (...) morality or a moral theory which would claim to give externally binding answers to such questions. We will be explaining the notion of an ‘externally binding answer’ later in this paper, but for the moment we can take such an answer to be one that applies to people irrespective of their beliefs or desires. Williams considers Kant to have been the main proponent of the notion of morality in this sense, with the latter's stress on obligation as central to the institution of morality. (shrink)
