The study of social values has its origins in the study of both cross cultural and within cultural differences in latent or manifest definitions of the right social order to achieve the good life. To this extent, the social scientific literature is replete with references to them. Yet, researchers either use the term values Social values are often used interchangeably with that of attitudes or treated as a post-hoc explanatory concept. When values are the focal research point, such endeavours predominantly (...) depart from universal and reductionist understandings of their functions, meanings and structures. Through tracing the roots of key theoretical and empirical investigations in values, originating in the work of Charles Morris, Gordon Allport, Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Strodtbeck, Milton Rokeach and Shalom Schwartz, we reveal the common as well as the different tenets underpinning their work. It will be shown that these accounts have lost sight of the importance of plurality and context. We claim that a renewed program of research in values is needed, which should be characterised by methodological pluralism in order to investigate a) value plurality, b) value specificity and c) values as properties and as processes. (shrink)
Departing from Richard Florida's theory of the Creative Class, this article attempts to delineate the Greek creative ethos. The research involved in-depth interviews with knowledge and service workers in Greece. Adopting an existential view of creativity, which emphasizes the natural human inclination to create and engage with one's acts, and using valuing processes as tools to analyze workers? discourses opens up the elements that underpin workers? efforts to experience authenticity across life spheres and construct the meaning of work and good (...) living. These efforts were sketched against a backdrop of adverse lived realities and intersected with anxious, alienated, and disempowered constructions of selfhood. Contrary to Florida's claims, the present article goes beyond positions of more or less creative workers and examines the various meanings of creativity underpinned by different lived realities. (shrink)
Fiction is often characterized by way of a contrast with truth, as, for example, in the familiar couplet “Truth is always strange/ Stranger than fiction" (Byron 1824). And yet, those who would maintain that “we will always learn more about human life and human personality from novels than from scientific psychology” (Chomsky 1988: 159) hold that some truth is best encountered via fiction. The scrupulous novelist points out that her work depicts no actual person, either living or dead; nonetheless, we (...) use names from fiction in ways that suggest that we take these names to refer. Philosophers who investigate fiction aim to reconcile such apparently incompatible phenomena, and, in general, to account for the myriad ways that we talk, think, and feel about fiction. (shrink)
Gottlob Frege maintained that two name-containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a=a and a=b,can both be true in virtue of the same object’s self-identity but nonetheless, puzzlingly, differ in their epistemic profiles. Frege eventually resolved his puzzlement by locating the source of the purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences in a difference in the Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. -/- Thus, Frege portrayed himself as describing a puzzle that can be posed prior to (...) and independently of any particular theoretical position regarding names, and then resolving that puzzle with his theory of Sinn and Bedeutung. In this paper, I suggest that Frege’s presentation is problematic. If attempt is made to characterize the epistemic status of true identity sentences without appeal to Frege’s theoretical commitments, then what initially seemed puzzling largely dissolves. It turns out that, in order to generate puzzlement, Frege must invoke the theoretical account that he uses the puzzle to establish the purported necessity of. (shrink)
Direct reference theorists tell us that proper names have no semantic value other than their bearers, and that the connection between name and bearer is unmediated by descriptions or descriptive information. And yet, these theorists also acknowledge that we produce our name-containing utterances with descriptions on our minds. After arguing that direct reference proponents have failed to give descriptions their due, I show that appeal to speaker-associated descriptions is required if the direct reference portrayal of speakers wielding and referring with (...) public names is to succeed. (shrink)
This study focuses upon identifying and classifying prospective teachers' perceptions of self‐competence in teaching after a four‐year university course on primary education and the relationship between their personal well‐being, views, emotions and stress about teaching and their teaching competencies during their undergraduate school teaching practice. Data collection was obtained by questionnaires from two cohorts of final‐year student teachers in a Greek university department of primary education . The findings revealed that prospective teachers rated their general teaching skills above moderate levels (...) indicating that they felt just competent to start teaching, their personal well‐being was not strongly affected by the teaching itself and did not indicate high levels of stress. This study contributes to the ongoing discussion about developing positive teaching experiences and effective teaching competencies for prospective teachers. (shrink)
According to Scott Soames, proper names have no descriptive meaning. Nonetheless, Soames maintains that proper names are typically used to make descriptive assertions. In this paper, I challenge Soames’ division between meaning and what is asserted, first by arguing that competent speakers always make descriptive assertions with name-containing sentences, and then by defending an account of proper name meaning that accommodates this fact.
This is a response to Stavroula Glezakos’ commentary on my paper, in which I address three main points: (1) whether Berkeley is entitled to argue via inference to the best explanation, (2) whether Berkeley’s likeness principle might be too strict, and (3) whether the texts support my reading.
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a comprehensive concept that aims at the promotion of responsible business practices closely linked to the strategy of enterprises. Although there is no single accepted definition of CSR, it remains an inspiring, challenging and strategic development that is becoming an increasingly important priority for companies of all sizes and types, particularly in Europe. Promotion of well-being at work is an essential component of CSR; however, the link between CSR, working conditions and work organisation is still (...) found to be unfamiliar to stakeholders. As CSR is strategic and is regarded by many companies and corporate leaders as an important development, it offers opportunities for psychosocial risk management, an area that is currently among the top priorities in working environment and well-being at work debates. However, the link between CSR and psychosocial risk management has not been addressed clearly before. This paper aims to explore the potential role of CSR in promoting well-being at work through the development of a framework for the management of psychosocial risks. As part of the research, key stakeholders [including the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA), the European Commission (EC), employers’ associations, trade unions and other policy experts] across Europe participated in a survey, interviews and focus groups to assess and clarify the link between CSR and psychosocial risk management. On the basis of the findings, a CSR-inspired approach to the management of psychosocial issues at work is proposed. Such an approach can be a useful tool in contexts where, up until now, expertise and tradition in dealing with psychosocial issues have been lacking. (shrink)
The European Union’s increasing attention to social and cultural matters has been expressed through the notions of European citizenship and identity which are to be developed among children, adolescents and adults. Whether, and if so, how, children perceive a European identity to coexist with national identities is a challenging and relatively under‐studied question. This paper presents part of the findings of a study conducted in December 2000 which explored the ways in which 140 10‐year‐old Greek‐Cypriot pupils constructed their national and (...) European identities. Results indicated that, despite positive attitudes towards Europe, pupils attributed little significance to the European identity, whereas national identities were extremely important. The discourse developed revealed essentialist and a‐historical representations of national identity, and an instrumentalist approach to Europe. Social psychological insights from self‐categorization theory are employed to explore whether the two identities were construed as in the same or different typical levels of abstraction. These findings are discussed within the broader socio‐political context of Cyprus and European integration. (shrink)
The central question that I address in this dissertation is: how should we explain our connection with the language that we use? I show that the way that one answers the question depends upon the characterization that one gives of the nature of language. ;I argue that philosophers of language who theorize about words as in-the-world entities with a history have largely failed to explain how we use such words. To fill in this gap, I offer a positive account of (...) the cognitive value of language. In particular, I argue that cognitive value must be for a user, and that it allows for the explanation of how distinct individuals use a language held in common. (shrink)
Stavroula Glezakos (2009) argues that Frege himself could not pose Frege’s puzzle without relying on the distinction between sense and reference, a distinction that the puzzle was supposed to motivate, not presuppose. In this paper I argue that there are still some puzzling questions about the informativeness of identity sentences, and I discuss a problem generated by the Fregean contention that one and the same proper name can have different senses for different speakers an issue that, in my view, (...) Frege should have puzzled more about. (shrink)