In recent years, interest in pre-reflective self-consciousness has increased significantly. One of the central points of inquiry is whether pre-reflective self-consciousness ubiquitously accompanies phenomenal consciousness. This paper explores a phenomenological justification for the thesis that pre-reflective self-consciousness ubiquitously accompanies phenomenal consciousness. Allegedly, the ubiquity of pre-reflective self-consciousness can be proved on the basis of phenomenological description. The aim of this paper is to develop a new objection against this justification of the ubiquity thesis.

This essay develops a new interpretation of Moses Mendelssohn’s ontological argument in the Morning Hours: Lectures on God’s Existence. At the beginning, Immanuel Kant’s famous criticism of the ontological proof of God’s existence in the Critique of Pure Reason is presented. Then I offer an in-depth analysis of Mendelssohn’s original ontological argument in the Morning Hours. It is shown that with Mendelssohn’s new proof of God, Kant’s objections are answered. Finally, it is explained why Mendelssohn does not succeed in completely (...) refuting Kant’s objections. (shrink)

Drawing on the work of Robert Nozick and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, the author argues that human self-consciousness cannot be explained in naturalistic terms. Instead, it is a spontaneous phenomenon.

: In this essay I make an attempt at sketching the outlines of Fichte’s method of philosophical construction in intuition and try to explore the rationality of his concept of deduction. I discuss the relationship between Fichte’s method of philosophical construction and Kant’s concept of construction of geometrical figures in pure intuition. I offer in-depth analysis of Fichte’s deduction of concepts in his Foundations of Natural Rights and in the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. However, I argue that Fichte’s deduction of practical (...) spontaneity is not successful. Finally, I consider and reject some objections to my interpretation. (shrink)

K.L. Reinhold’s interpretation of deduction plays a seminal role in the development of German Idealism. However, as yet Reinhold’s concept of deduction has not been sufficiently explained. The goals of this paper are to analyze Reinhold’s notion of deduction in his Neue Darstellung der Hauptmomente der Elementarphilosophie, to reconstruct his deduction of a priori forms of representation and to discuss his deduction critically. In doing so, I will present Reinhold’s objections against Immanuel Kant’s method in the Critique of Pure Reason.

This essay argues that persons not only have nonconceptual bodily self-awareness and nonconceptual mental anonymous self-awareness but also, at least if they produce the expression ‘I’, nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. It contains information of ‘I’ being produced by oneself. It is argued that this can be seen if we examine the constitution of referential self-consciousness, i.e. the consciousness of being the referent of ‘I’ oneself. The main argument is: A. It is not possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness (...) if it is not assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. B. It is possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness if it is assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. C. Thus it is reasonable to assume that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. The justification of the thesis that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness is presented while discussing Tomis Kapitan’s analysis of conceptual egological self-consciousness. Conceptual egological self-consciousness contains infor­mation of being a subject oneself. It is argued that it is not possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness with the help of Kapitan’s interpretation of conceptual self-consciousness. However, it is possible to ex­plain the constitution of referential self-consciousness within the framework of Kapitan’s account if it is assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. (shrink)

Among the central debates within the classical German philosophy after I. Kant is the question of how intentional self-consciousness is possible. In the following discourse, Schelling's concept of self-consciousness in System of Transcendental Idealism will be examined and critically discussed. The central theses are, first of all, that for Schelling self-consciousness is a case of intentional consciousness; secondly, that Schelling develops a performative interpretation of intentional self-consciousness; and thirdly, Schelling fails to completely explain intentional self-consciousness.

Die klassische deutsche Philosophie zählt zu den bedeutendsten und wirkmächtigsten Diskursformationen. Die Beiträge bieten eine grundlegende Orientierung sowie systematische Analysen zu Schlüsselbegriffen und Grundproblemen der praktischen Philosophie dieser Epoche. Neben den Klassikern wie Kant, Fichte und Hegel werden auch Beziehungen zu aktuellen Debatten behandelt und analysiert.

Die klassische deutsche Philosophie zählt zu den bedeutendsten und wirkmächtigsten Diskursformationen. Die Beiträge bieten eine grundlegende Orientierung sowie systematische Analysen zu Schlüsselbegriffen und Grundproblemen der praktischen Philosophie dieser Epoche. Neben den Klassikern wie Kant, Fichte und Hegel werden auch Beziehungen zu aktuellen Debatten behandelt und analysiert.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 6 Seiten: 1022-1047.

Bd 1. Haupt- und Abendvorträge, Sektion 1 -- Bd. 2. Sektionen 2-6 -- Bd. 3. Sektionen 7-9 -- Bd. 4. Sektionen 10-12.