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Stephanie Collins
Australian Catholic University
  1.  8
    Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals.Stephanie Collins - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. Does this make conceptual sense or is this merely political rhetoric? And what are the implications for these individuals within groups? Collins outlines a Tripartite Model of group duties that can target political demands at the right entities, in the right way and for the right reasons.
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  2. Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231-248.
    Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss (...)
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  3. The Core of Care Ethics.Stephanie Collins - 2015 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Chapter 1 Introduction This chapter briefly explains what care ethics is, what care ethics is not, and how much work there still is to be done in establishing care ethics’ scope. The chapter elaborates on care ethics’ relationship to political philosophy, ethics, feminism, and the history of philosophy. The upshot of these discussions is the suggestion that we need a unified, precise statement of care ethics’ normative core. The chapter concludes by giving an overview of the chapters to come: Chapters (...)
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  4. Filling Collective Duty Gaps.Stephanie Collins - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (11):573-591.
    A collective duty gap arises when a group has caused harm that requires remedying but no member did harm that can justify the imposition of individual remedial duties. Examples range from airplane crashes to climate change. How might collective duty gaps be filled? This paper starts by examining two promising proposals for filling them. Both proposals are found inadequate. Thus, while gap-filling duties can be defended against objections from unfairness and demandingness, we need a substantive justification for their existence. I (...)
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  5.  48
    Collective Responsibility Gaps.Stephanie Collins - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 154 (4):943-954.
    Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective and three kinds of responsibility. It then explains how gaps—i.e. cases where we cannot attribute the responsibility we might want to—appear to arise within each type of collective responsibility. It argues some of these gaps (...)
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  6. Collectives’ and Individuals’ Obligations: A Parity Argument.Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):38-58.
    Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what (...)
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  7.  72
    Duties of Group Agents and Group Members.Stephanie Collins - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (1):38-57.
  8. The Transfer of Duties: From Individuals to States and Back Again.Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2016 - In Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups. Oxford University Press. pp. 150-172.
    Individuals sometimes pass their duties on to collectives, which is one way in which collectives can come to have duties. The collective discharges its duties by acting through its members, which involves distributing duties back out to individuals. Individuals put duties in and get (transformed) duties out. In this paper we consider whether (and if so, to what extent) this general account can make sense of states' duties. Do some of the duties we typically take states to have come from (...)
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  9. The Claims and Duties of Socioeconomic Human Rights.Stephanie Collins - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):701-722.
    A standard objection to socioeconomic human rights is that they are not claimable as human rights: their correlative duties are not owed to each human, independently of specific institutional arrangements, in an enforceable manner. I consider recent responses to this ‘claimability objection,’ and argue that none succeeds. There are no human rights to socioeconomic goods. But all is not lost: there are, I suggest, human rights to ‘socioeconomic consideration’. I propose a detailed structure for these rights and their correlative duties, (...)
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  10. Duties to Make Friends.Stephanie Collins - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):907-921.
    Why, morally speaking, ought we do more for our family and friends than for strangers? In other words, what is the justification of special duties? According to partialists, the answer to this question cannot be reduced to impartial moral principles. According to impartialists, it can. This paper briefly argues in favour of impartialism, before drawing out an implication of the impartialist view: in addition to justifying some currently recognised special duties, impartialism also generates new special duties that are not yet (...)
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  11. Distributing States' Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2015 - Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (3):344-366.
    In order for states to fulfil (many of) their moral obligations, costs must be passed to individuals. This paper asks how these costs should be distributed. I advocate the common-sense answer: the distribution of costs should, insofar as possible, track the reasons behind the state’s duty. This answer faces a number of problems, which I attempt to solve.
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  12.  24
    When Does ‘Can’ Imply ‘Ought’?Stephanie Collins - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):354-375.
    ABSTRACTThe Assistance Principle is common currency to a wide range of moral theories. Roughly, this principle states: if you can fulfil important interests, at not too high a cost, then you have a moral duty to do so. I argue that, in determining whether the ‘not too high a cost’ clause of this principle is met, we must consider three distinct costs: ‘agent-relative costs’, ‘recipient-relative costs’ and ‘ideal-relative costs’.
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  13.  7
    Precis of Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals.Stephanie Collins - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):85-89.
    This paper provides an overview of Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals.
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  14.  23
    Distributing States' Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2016 - Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (3):344-366.
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  15.  57
    Responsibility for States' Actions: Normative Issues at the Intersection of Collective Agency and State Responsibility.Holly Lawford-Smith & Stephanie Collins - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (11):e12456.
    Is the state a collective agent? Are citizens responsible for what their states do? If not citizens, then who, if anyone, is responsible for what the state does? Many different sub-disciplines of philosophy are relevant for answering these questions. We need to know what “the state” is, who or what it's composed of, and what relation the parts stand in to the whole. Once we know what it is, we need to know whether that thing is an agent, in particular (...)
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  16.  4
    Abilities and Obligations: Lessons from Non-agentive Groups.Stephanie Collins - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Philosophers often talk as though each ability is held by exactly one agent. This paper begins by arguing that abilities can be held by groups of agents, where the group is not an agent. I provide a new argument for—and a new analysis of—non-agentive groups’ abilities. I then provide a new argument that, surprisingly, obligations are different: non-agentive groups cannot bear obligations, at least not if those groups are large-scale such as ‘humanity’ or ‘carbon emitters.’ This pair of conclusions is (...)
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  17. Are 'Coalitions of the Willing' Moral Agents?Stephanie Collins - 2014 - Ethics and International Affairs 28 (1):online only.
    In this reply to an article of Toni Erskine's, I argue that coalitions of the willing are moral agents. They can therefore bear responsibility in their own right.
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  18.  7
    Being Sure of Each Other: An Essay on Social Rights and Freedoms, by Kimberley Brownlee. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 256. [REVIEW]Stephanie Collins - forthcoming - Mind:fzaa095.
    Being Sure of Each Other: An Essay on Social Rights and Freedoms, by KimberleyBrownlee. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. 256.
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  19. Care Ethics: The Four Key Claims.Stephanie Collins - 2017 - In David R. Morrow (ed.), Moral Reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  20.  14
    How Much Can We Ask of Collective Agents?Stephanie Collins - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (7):815-831.
    Are obligations of collective agents—such as states, businesses, and non-profits—ever overdemanding? I argue they are not. I consider two seemingly attractive routes to collective overdemandingness: that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would be overdemanding for members; and that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would frustrate the collective’s permissible deep preferences. I reject these. Instead, collective overdemandingness complaints should be reinterpreted as complaints about inability or third-party costs. These are (...)
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  21.  46
    Interconnected Blameworthiness.Stephanie Collins & Niels de Haan - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):195-209.
    This paper investigates agents’ blameworthiness when they are part of a group that does harm. We analyse three factors that affect the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness in these cases: shared intentionality, interpersonal influence, and common knowledge. Each factor involves circumstantial luck. The more each factor is present, the greater is the scope of each agent’s vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents’ contributions to the harm. We then consider an agent’s degree of blameworthiness, as distinct from her scope of blameworthiness. (...)
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  22.  7
    I, Volkswagen.Stephanie Collins - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Philosophers increasingly argue that collective agents can be blameworthy for wrongdoing. Advocates tend to endorse functionalism, on which collectives are analogous to complicated robots. This is puzzling: we don’t hold robots blameworthy. I argue we don’t hold robots blameworthy because blameworthiness presupposes the capacity for a mental state I call ‘moral self-awareness’. This raises a new problem for collective blameworthiness: collectives seem to lack the capacity for moral self-awareness. I solve the problem by giving an account of how collectives have (...)
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  23.  3
    Response to Critics.Stephanie Collins - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):141-157.
    This is a response to the critial comments by Anne Schwenkenbecher, Olle Blomberg, Bill Wringe and Gunnar Björnsson.
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  24. We the People: Is the Polity the State?Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):78-97.
    When a liberal-democratic state signs a treaty or wages a war, does its whole polity do those things? In this article, we approach this question via the recent social ontological literature on collective agency. We provide arguments that it does and that it does not. The arguments are presented via three considerations: the polity's control over what the state does; the polity's unity; and the influence of individual polity members. We suggest that the answer to our question differs for different (...)
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