Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties: only groups with sufficient structure—call them ‘collectives’—have the necessary agency. Moreover, if duties imply ability then moral agents (of both the individual and collectives varieties) can bear duties only over actions they are able to perform. It is thus doubtful that individual agents can bear duties to perform actions that only a collective could perform. This appears to leave us at a loss (...) when assigning duties in circumstances where only a collective could perform some morally desirable action and no collective exists. But, I argue, we are not at a loss. This article outlines a new way of assigning duties over collective acts when there is no collective. Specifically, we should assign collectivisation duties to individuals. These are individual duties to take steps towards forming a collective, which then incurs a duty over the action. I give criteria for when individuals have collectivisation duties and discuss the demands these duties place on their bearers. (shrink)

Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what (...) they all-things-considered ought to do. We argue for parity on both counts. (shrink)

A collective duty gap arises when a group has caused harm that requires remedying but no member did harm that can justify the imposition of individual remedial duties. Examples range from airplane crashes to climate change. How might collective duty gaps be filled? This paper starts by examining two promising proposals for filling them. Both proposals are found inadequate. Thus, while gap-filling duties can be defended against objections from unfairness and demandingness, we need a substantive justification for their existence. I (...) argue that substantive justification can be found in the normative force of commitments individuals make to others with regard to ends. Along the way, I argue that gap-filling duties must be conceptualized differently in group agents, as compared to non-agent groups: in the former, gap-filling duties can be understood as duties to “take up the slack”; in the latter, this would be a category error. (shrink)

A standard objection to socioeconomic human rights is that they are not claimable as human rights: their correlative duties are not owed to each human, independently of specific institutional arrangements, in an enforceable manner. I consider recent responses to this ‘claimability objection,’ and argue that none succeeds. There are no human rights to socioeconomic goods. But all is not lost: there are, I suggest, human rights to ‘socioeconomic consideration’. I propose a detailed structure for these rights and their correlative duties, (...) while remaining neutral on substantive moral debates. I argue that socioeconomic-consideration human rights are satisfactorily claimable and sufficiently practical. (shrink)

Individuals sometimes pass their duties on to collectives, which is one way in which collectives can come to have duties. The collective discharges its duties by acting through its members, which involves distributing duties back out to individuals. Individuals put duties in and get (transformed) duties out. In this paper we consider whether (and if so, to what extent) this general account can make sense of states' duties. Do some of the duties we typically take states to have come from (...) individuals having passed on certain individual duties? There are complications: states can discharge their duties by contracting fulfilment out to non-members; states seem able to dissolve the duties of non-members; and some of states' duties are not derived in this way. We demonstrate that these complicate, but do not undermine, the general account and its application to states. And the application has an interesting upshot: by asking which individuals robustly participate in this process of duty transfer-and-transformation with a given state, we can begin to get a grip on who counts as a member of that state. (shrink)

In order for states to fulfil (many of) their moral obligations, costs must be passed to individuals. This paper asks how these costs should be distributed. I advocate the common-sense answer: the distribution of costs should, insofar as possible, track the reasons behind the state’s duty. This answer faces a number of problems, which I attempt to solve.

In this reply to an article of Toni Erskine's, I argue that coalitions of the willing are moral agents. They can therefore bear responsibility in their own right.

Why, morally speaking, ought we do more for our family and friends than for strangers? In other words, what is the justification of special duties? According to partialists, the answer to this question cannot be reduced to impartial moral principles. According to impartialists, it can. This paper briefly argues in favour of impartialism, before drawing out an implication of the impartialist view: in addition to justifying some currently recognised special duties, impartialism also generates new special duties that are not yet (...) widely recognised. Specifically, in certain situations, impartial principles generate duties to take actions and adopt attitudes in our personal lives that increase the chance of new or different special relationships being formed—new or different friendships, family-like relationships, relationships akin to co-nationality, and so on. In fact, even if one thinks partialism is the best justification of the duties we have once in special relationships, impartialist justifications for taking steps to form such relationships should have some sway. Moreover, a little reflection shows that these duties are not as demanding or counterintuitive as one might expect. (shrink)

Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective and three kinds of responsibility. It then explains how gaps—i.e. cases where we cannot attribute the responsibility we might want to—appear to arise within each type of collective responsibility. It argues some of these gaps (...) do not exist on closer inspection, at least for some collectives and some of the time. (shrink)

Is the state a collective agent? Are citizens responsible for what their states do? If not citizens, then who, if anyone, is responsible for what the state does? Many different sub-disciplines of philosophy are relevant for answering these questions. We need to know what “the state” is, who or what it's composed of, and what relation the parts stand in to the whole. Once we know what it is, we need to know whether that thing is an agent, in particular (...) a moral agent capable of taking moral responsibility for its actions. We have to know what it takes for it to be capable of moral responsibility, e.g., what the functional equivalents in groups are of knowledge, intention, foreseeability, recklessness, and so on. And once we've established that it is an agent, and is responsible for what it does, we have to explain whether and in what way this implicates members, i.e., whether state responsibility distributes to the members of states, whoever they may be. Answers to these questions come from metaphysics, social ontology, action theory, epistemology, political theory, and ethics. In what follows, we'll give an outline of some different ways of answering these questions. (shrink)

Chapter 1 Introduction This chapter briefly explains what care ethics is, what care ethics is not, and how much work there still is to be done in establishing care ethics’ scope. The chapter elaborates on care ethics’ relationship to political philosophy, ethics, feminism, and the history of philosophy. The upshot of these discussions is the suggestion that we need a unified, precise statement of care ethics’ normative core. The chapter concludes by giving an overview of the chapters to come: Chapters (...) 2 to 5 will each develop concise statement of one of four key care ethical claims, while Chapters 6 to 8 will unify, specify, and justify those four claims under a new principle : the dependency principle. -/- Chapter 2 Scepticism about Principles Care ethicists tend to be sceptical that there is any useful role for general, abstract principles or rule in moral theory and practice. This chapter assesses this scepticism. It argues for the importance of maintaining a distinction between, on the one hand, scepticism about principles as a tool in deliberation, and, on the other hand, scepticism about principles as a ground of moral rightness. It surveys and assesses the statements made by care ethicists against principles. The conclusion is that care ethicists are correct to be somewhat sceptical about the use of principles in deliberation, but that this scepticism should not extend to principles as the source of moral rightness. -/- Chapter 3 The Value of Relationships Amongst care, a special place is often made for personal relationships. This chapter delimits and justifies this. First, it distinguishes three kinds of importance personal relationships are attributed by care ethicists –as moral paradigms, as goods to be preserved, and as sources of weighty duties. Next, it suggests such ‘relationship importance’ is not justified by the nature of personal relationships or the value of their relatives. It concludes that any personal relationship has importance in proportion to the value the relationship has to its participants. Crucially, this source of importance – a relationship’s value to participants – holds also for non-personal relationships. This allows us to understand how care ethics extends relationship importance to our relations with distant others. -/- Chapter 4 Caring Attitudes Care ethics calls upon agents to care about and for others. This chapter focus on the “about” aspect of caring: on caring attitudes. Caring attitudes are defined as pro-attitudes to the fulfilment of some entity’s interests. The moral value of these attitudes—particularly in emotions like love—is elaborated upon. However, attitudes do not seem under our voluntary control, so do not seem to be something we can be morally instructed to bear. This objection is responded to, with the explanation that we have long-term control over our attitudes and that moral theories can legitimately call upon agents to do things they cannot immediately control. Ultimately, then, care ethics’ injunction that agents hold caring attitudes is both defined and vindicated. -/- Chapter 5 Caring Actions This chapter starts by comparing and assessing the numerous definitions of care found in care ethics literature—distinguishing care, good care, bad care, and non- care. Caring actions are defined as having the intention to fulfil something’s perceived interests. The moral value of such actions is interrogated and found to be a combination off the intention’s value and the action’s consequences’ value. The chapter considers whether acknowledgment of care by the care recipient adds value to caring actions. It is suggested that such ‘ care receiving’ often, but not always, adds value to caring actions, and should not be part of the definition of care. Thus, care ethics’ imploration of agents to perform caring actions is defined. -/- Chapter 6 The Dependency Principle This chapter develops the dependency principle. This principle asserts that a moral agent, A, has a responsibility when: moral person B has an important interest that is unfulfilled; A is sufficiently capable of fulfilling that interest; and A’s most efficacious measure for fulfilling the interest will be not too costly. A incurs a weighty responsibility if ¬ to are true and A’s most efficacious measure for fulfilling the interest will be the least costly of anyone’s most efficacious measure for fulfilling B’s interest. Each of components to is elaborated on in turn. We arrive at a precise, comprehensive statement of the principle that will be used to unify, specify, and justify care ethics. -/- Chapter 7 Collective Dependency Duties It is impossible to do justice to care ethics without discussing the duties of groups—especially groups such as families and nation-states. This chapter defends the claim that the responsibilities produces by the dependency principle are, in many cases, responsibilities of groups. It develops permissive conditions that a group must meet in order to be a prospective responsibility-bearer, and explains how it is that groups’ responsibilities distribute to their individual members. This model of group responsibility is applied to states. This allows us to make sense of how the dependency principle can unify a care ethics that is greatly concerned with social and political outcomes. -/- Chapter 8 Unifying, Specifying, and Justifying Care Ethics Can the abstract, formalised ‘dependency principle ’—developed in Chapter 6 – serve as a compelling justification of the heterogeneous theory of care ethics? This chapter argues that it can. Each of the four claims of care ethics—developed in Chapters 2 to 5—is assessed in turn. Three questions are asked with regard to each. First, does the dependency principle generate some responsibilities of the relevant kind? Second, does the dependency principle generate enough responsibilities of the relevant kind? And third, does the dependency principle give the right explanation of these responsibilities? The answer each time, it is argued, is “yes”. Along the way, this answer produces some new results regarding both care ethics and the dependency principle. (shrink)