7 found
  1. Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases.Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B. M. de Waal - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):1-20.
    There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model, (...)
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  2. The Many Faces of Empathy: Parsing Emathic Phenomena through a Proximate, Dynamic-Systems View Reprsenting the Other in the Self.Stephanie D. Preston & Alicia J. Hofelich - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):24-33.
    A surfeit of research confirms that people activate personal, affective, and conceptual representations when perceiving the states of others. However, researchers continue to debate the role of self–other overlap in empathy due to a failure to dissociate neural overlap, subjective resonance, and personal distress. A perception–action view posits that neural-level overlap is necessary during early processing for all social understanding, but need not be conscious or aversive. This neural overlap can subsequently produce a variety of states depending on the context (...)
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  3. Darwin and the Situation of Emotion Research.Daniel M. Gross & Stephanie D. Preston - 2020 - Emotion Review 12 (3):179-190.
    This article demonstrates how researchers from both the sciences and the humanities can learn from Charles Darwin’s mixed methodology. We identify two basic challenges that face emotion research in the sciences, namely a mismatch between experiment design and the complexity of life that we aim to explain, and problematic efforts to bridge the gap, including invalid inferences from constrained study designs, and equivocal use of terms like “sympathy” and “empathy” that poorly reflect such methodological constraints. We argue that Darwin’s mixed (...)
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    The meaning in empathy: Distinguishing conceptual encoding from facial mimicry, trait empathy, and attention to emotion.Alicia J. Hofelich & Stephanie D. Preston - 2012 - Cognition and Emotion 26 (1):119-128.
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    Empathy: Each is in the right – hopefully, not all in the wrong.Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B. M. de Waal - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):49-58.
    Only a broad theory that looks across levels of analysis can encompass the many perspectives on the phenomenon of empathy. We address the major points of our commentators by emphasizing that the basic perception-action process, while automatic, is subject to control and modulation, and is greatly affected by experience and context because of the role of representations. The model can explain why empathy seems phenomenologically more effortful than reflexive, and why there are different levels of empathy across individuals, ages, and (...)
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    Author reply: Understanding Empathy by Modeling Rather Than Organizing Its Contents.Stephanie D. Preston & Alicia J. Hofelich - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):38-39.
    Perception–action approaches are sometimes criticized because empathy takes cognitive forms and people do not overtly imitate or feel all observed states. These complaints reflect a misunderstanding of the framework, which we tried to clarify through a review that bridged social and neuroscientific views. Far from “simple fixes,” these misunderstandings appear to reflect deeply rooted differences in the way that each discipline conceptualizes science and the mind. We address the important points made by the commentators and reiterate the need to incorporate (...)
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    Putting the subjective back into intersubjective: The importance of person-specific, distributed, neural representations in perception-action mechanisms.Stephanie D. Preston - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):36-37.
    The shared circuits model (SCM) relies on well-regarded theories of perception-action, mirror neurons, and forward models, but the functional/informational level of the model limits its ability to explain complex behavior such as true imitation. Data from our lab and others confirm the more general details of the model, accepted by most, but specify the neural mechanisms involved in perception-action processes.
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