The relationship between political judgment and science-based expertise is a troubled one. In the media three cliché images compete. The business-as-usual political story is that, in spite of appearances to the contrary, politics is safely ‘on top’ and experts are still ‘on tap’. The story told by scientists is that power-less but inventive scholars only ‘speak truth to power’. But there is plenty of room for a more cynical interpretation. It sees scientific advisers as following their own interests, unless better (...) paid by other interests, and politicians as asking for advice only to support and legitimize their pre-formed political decisions. To the extent this cynical perspective gains ascendancy, politics and science lose credibility. If we think the three clichés cloak a more complex reality, we should embark upon a quest for other, possibly better models of the science/politics nexus. That is exactly the purpose of this article. Its claim is that a mutual transgression of the knowledge utilization strand of research in policy studies and the study of science, technology and society will provide us with more sophisticated images of science/politics boundary arrangements. Building upon Habermas’ well-known distinctions and Wittrock’s historical-institutional approach in the construction of a property space, eight models are presented. We should try to discover the conditions under which some of these models may claim greater verisimilitude. This may allow us to rethink the role of scientific expertise in policymaking and generate a model that guides experts and policymakers in their day-to-day boundary work. (shrink)
This article reports on considerable variety and diversity among discourses on their own jobs of boundary workers of several major Dutch institutes for science-based policy advice. Except for enlightenment, all types of boundary arrangements/work in the Wittrock -typology Social sciences and modern states: national experiences and theoretical crossroads. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991) do occur. âDivergersâ experience a gap between science and politics/policymaking; and it is their self-evident task to act as a bridge. They spread over four discourses: ârational facilitatorsâ, (...) âknowledge brokersâ, âmegapolicy strategistsâ, and âpolicy analystsâ. Others aspire to âconvergenceâ; they believe science and politics ought to be natural allies in preparing collective decisions. But âpolicy advisorsâ excepted, âpostnormalistsâ and âdeliberative proceduralistsâ find this very hard to achieve. (shrink)
In this paper, first, I want to clarify the nature and function of private property. Second, I want to clarify the distinction between “common” goods and property and “public” goods and property, and explain the construction error inherent in the institution of public goods and property. Third, I want to explain the rationale and principle of privatization.
Marxism from a false starting point. Finally, I will demonstrate how Austrianism in the Mises—Rothbard tradition can give a correct but categorically different explanation of their validity. bet me begin with the hard core of the Marxist belief system: (1) "The history of mankind is the history of class struggles."2 It is the history of struggles between a relatively small ruling class and a larger class of the exploited. The primary form of exploitation is economic: The ruling class expropriates part (...) of t.he productive output of the exploited or, as Marxists say, ‘it appropriates a social surplus product" and uses it for its own consumptive.. (shrink)
In the course of history, the doctrine of just war has proven to be susceptible to political misuse. Furthermore, it features a number of conceptual deficiencies. In the leading perspective of ‘just peace’, peace ethics primarily emphasises the task of violence prevention, for which the realisation and protection of human rights gain central importance. Even the traditional term ‘common good’ can be reformulated in this context. The concept of ‘just peace’ critically confronts the discussion on the legitimacy of pre-emptive wars. (...) With regard to ‘humanitarian interventions’, it calls for a sophisticated catalogue of criteria that helps to define the presuppositions under which such interventions can be deemed legitimate. (shrink)
One so-called paradox of blackmail concerns the fact that “two legal whites together make a black.” That is, it is licit to threaten to reveal a person’s secret, and it is separately lawful to ask him for money; but when both are undertaken at once, together, this act iscalled blackmail and is prohibited. A second so-called paradox is that if the blackmailer initiates the act, this is seen by jurists asblackmail and illicit, while if the blackmailee (the person blackmailed) originates (...) the contract, this is commonly interpreted as bribery and is not illicit.But these are paradoxes only for legal theorists innocent of libertarian theory. The authors use that perspective to reject the claim thatblackmail should be unlawful. If this act were legalized, then both paradoxes would disappear, precisely their contention. (shrink)
If it can be agreed that health care resources are finite, it follows that choices between competing needs must be made. Cost utility analysis is an application of decision theory which has been proposed as a strategy for making difficult social decisions about health resource allocations. This method is heavily dependent upon the measurement of social utilities for various health outcomes. Recent work in cognitive psychology suggests that there are important sources of distortion in such measurement. Ethical implications of application (...) of cost utility analysis to health resource allocations are discussed. (shrink)