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  1. Too Much Substance, Not Enough Cognition.Vincent C. Müller & Stephanie Kelter - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):80-80.
    Millikan's account of substance concepts is based on a notion of “substance” expanded from realist notions of individuals and natural kinds. Her metaphysical notion, based on “inductive potential,” is shown to be too puristic and needs to incorporate cognizing subjects. This could preserve the realist/nondescriptionist insight that the extension of substances is determined by the world.
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  2.  12
    Conceptual Impairment in Aphasia.Rudolf Cohen, Stephanie Kelter & Gerhild Woll - 1979 - In Rainer Bäuerle, Urs Egli & Arnim von Stechow (eds.), Semantics From Different Points of View. Springer Verlag. pp. 353--363.
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    Embodied Representations Are Part of a Grouping of Representations.Christopher Habel, Barbara Kaup & Stephanie Kelter - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):26-26.
    Glenberg argues for embodied representations relevant to action. In contrast, we propose a grouping of representations, not necessarily all being directly embodied. Without assuming the existence of representations that are not directly embodied, one cannot account for the use of knowledge abstracted from direct experience.
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