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Stephen Andrew Butterfill [32]Stephen A. Butterfill [12]
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Stephen Andrew Butterfill
University of Warwick
  1. Do Humans Have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like States?Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
    The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...)
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  2. How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.
    What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...)
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  3. Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
    Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, (...)
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  4.  48
    Psychological Research on Joint Action : Theory and Data.Günther Knoblich, Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Natalie Sebanz - unknown
    When two or more people coordinate their actions in space and time to produce a joint outcome, they perform a joint action. The perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes that enable individuals to coordinate their actions with others have been receiving increasing attention during the last decade, complementing earlier work on shared intentionality and discourse. This chapter reviews current theoretical concepts and empirical findings in order to provide a structured overview of the state of the art in joint action research. We (...)
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  5.  38
    Joint Action Goals Reduce Visuomotor Interference Effects From a Partner’s Incongruent Actions.Sam Clarke, Luke McEllin, Anna Francová, Marcell Székely, Stephen Andrew Butterfill & John Michael - forthcoming - Scientific Reports.
    Joint actions often require agents to track others’ actions while planning and executing physically incongruent actions of their own. Previous research has indicated that this can lead to visuomotor interference effects when it occurs outside of joint action. How is this avoided or overcome in joint actions? We hypothesized that when joint action partners represent their actions as interrelated components of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, each partner’s movements need not be represented in relation to distinct, (...)
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  6. Joint Action and Development.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):23-47.
    Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman's, says it is. For on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different kind of joint action, an account compatible (...)
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  7. Interacting Mindreaders.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.
    Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader’s target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions (...)
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  8. Seeing Causings and Hearing Gestures.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):405-428.
    Can humans see causal interactions? Evidence on the visual perception of causal interactions, from Michotte to contemporary work, is best interpreted as showing that we can see some causal interactions in the same sense as that in which we can hear speech. Causal perception, like speech perception, is a form of categorical perception.
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  9.  9
    Drawn Together: When Motor Representations Ground Joint Actions.Francesco Della Gatta, Francesca Garbarini, Marco Rabuffetti, Luca Viganò, Stephen A. Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2017 - Cognition 165:53-60.
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  10. On a Puzzle About Relations Between Thought, Experience and the Motoric.Corrado Sinigaglia & Stephen A. Butterfill - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1923-1936.
    Motor representations live a kind of double life. Although paradigmatically involved in performing actions, they also occur when merely observing others act and sometimes influence thoughts about the goals of observed actions. Further, these influences are content-respecting: what you think about an action sometimes depends in part on how that action is represented motorically in you. The existence of such content-respecting influences is puzzling. After all, motor representations do not feature alongside beliefs or intentions in reasoning about action; indeed, thoughts (...)
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  11. Is Goal Ascription Possible in Minimal Mindreading?Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (2):228-233.
    In this response to the commentary by Michael and Christensen, we first explain how minimal mindreading is compatible with the development of increasingly sophisticated mindreading behaviours that involve both executive functions and general knowledge, and then sketch one approach to a minimal account of goal ascription.
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  12.  6
    Tracking and Representing Others’ Mental States.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2017 - In K. Andrews & J. Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 269-279.
    Few things matter more than the mental states of those nearby. Their ignorance defines limits on cooperation and presents opportunities to exploit in competition. What others feel, see and know can also provide information about events otherwise beyond your ken. It’s no surprise, then, that abilities to track others’ mental states are widespread. Many animals, including scrub jays, ravens, goats, dogs, ring-tailed lemurs, monkeys and chimpanzees, reliably vary their actions in ways that are appropriate given facts about another’s mental states. (...)
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  13.  70
    Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared? [REVIEW]Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Natalie Sebanz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):137-146.
    Editorial: Joint Action: What Is Shared? Content Type Journal Article Pages 137-146 DOI 10.1007/s13164-011-0062-3 Authors Stephen A. Butterfill, Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK Natalie Sebanz, Centre for Cognition, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition, & Behaviour, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Journal Review of Philosophy and Psychology Online ISSN 1878-5166 Print ISSN 1878-5158 Journal Volume Volume 2 Journal Issue Volume 2, Number 2.
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  14.  22
    Perceiving Expressions of Emotion: What Evidence Could Bear on Questions About Perceptual Experience of Mental States?Stephen A. Butterfill - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:438-451.
  15.  83
    11. What Does Knowledge Explain? Commentary on Jennifer Nagel,'Knowledge as a Mental State'.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:309.
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  16.  75
    Two Kinds of Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):141–165.
    It is normally assumed that there is only one kind of purposive action. This article argues that there are two kinds of purposive action, which require different models of explanation. One kind of action is done without awareness of reasons; another kind of action is done because the agent is aware of reasons for that action. The argument starts by noting that philosophers disagree about what explains action. Some claim that actions are explained by impersonal facts, such as facts about (...)
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  17. Cue Competition Effects and Young Children's Causal and Counterfactual Inferences.Teresa McCormack, Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Christoph Hoerl & Patrick Burns - 2009 - Developmental Psychology 45 (6):1563-1575.
    The authors examined cue competition effects in young children using the blicket detector paradigm, in which objects are placed either singly or in pairs on a novel machine and children must judge which objects have the causal power to make the machine work. Cue competition effects were found in a 5- to 6-year-old group but not in a 4-year-old group. Equivalent levels of forward and backward blocking were found in the former group. Children's counterfactual judgments were subsequently examined by asking (...)
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  18.  90
    Tool Use and Causal Cognition: An Introduction.Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl & Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2011 - In Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl & Stephen Andrew Butterfill (eds.), Tool Use and Causal Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-17.
    This chapter begins with a discussion of the significance of studies of aspects of tool use in understanding causal cognition. It argues that tool use studies reveal the most basic type or causal understanding being put to use, in a way that studies that focus on learning statistical relationships between cause and effect or studies of perceptual causation do not. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.
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  19.  41
    Joint Action Without Shared Intention.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  20.  72
    What Are Modules and What is Their Role in Development?Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):450–473.
    Modules are widely held to play a central role in explaining mental development and in accounts of the mind generally. But there is much disagreement about what modules are, which shows that we do not adequately understand modularity. This paper outlines a Fodoresque approach to understanding one type of modularity. It suggests that we can distinguish modular from nonmodular cognition by reference to the kinds of process involved, and that modular cognition differs from nonmodular forms of cognition in being a (...)
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  21.  6
    Goals and Targets: A Developmental Puzzle About Sensitivity to Others’ Actions.Stephen A. Butterfill - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    Sensitivity to others’ actions is essential for social animals like humans and a fundamental requirement for any kind of social cognition. Unsurprisingly, it is present in humans from early in the first year of life. But what processes underpin infants’ sensitivity to others’ actions? Any attempt to answer this question must solve twin puzzles about the development of goal tracking. Why does some, but not all, of infants’ goal tracking appear to be limited by their abilities to represent the observed (...)
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  22. Review: Ruth M. J. Byrne: The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality. [REVIEW]Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):1065-1069.
  23.  21
    Minimal Theory of Mind.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  24.  17
    Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World, Written by M. Gilbert.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (4):475-478.
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  25.  80
    Children’s Selective Learning From Others.Erika Nurmsoo, Elizabeth Robinson & Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):551-561.
    Psychological research into children’s sensitivity to testimony has primarily focused on their ability to judge the likely reliability of speakers. However, verbal testimony is only one means by which children learn from others. We review recent research exploring children’s early social referencing and imitation, as well as their sensitivity to speakers’ knowledge, beliefs, and biases, to argue that children treat information and informants with reasonable scepticism. As children’s understanding of mental states develops, they become ever more able to critically evaluate (...)
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  26.  71
    Infants' Representations of Causation.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):126-127.
    It is consistent with the evidence in The Origin of Concepts to conjecture that infants' causal representations, like their numerical representations, are not continuous with adults', so that bootstrapping is needed in both cases.
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  27.  69
    Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification * By SANFORD C. GOLDBERG. [REVIEW]Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):582-585.
    Reflection on testimony provides novel arguments for anti-individualism. What is anti-individualism? Sanford Goldberg's book defends three main claims under this heading: first, facts about the contents of beliefs do not supervene on individualistic facts about the believers ; second, an individual's epistemic entitlement to accept a piece of testimony depends on facts about her peers ; third, processes by which some humans acquire knowledge from testimony includes activities performed for them by others . Each of these three claims is argued (...)
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  28.  8
    Are There Signature Limits in Early Theory of Mind?Ella Fizke, Stephen A. Butterfill, Lea van de Loo, Eva Reindl & Hannes Rakoczy - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 162:209-224.
    Current theory-of-mind research faces the challenge of reconciling two sets of seemingly incompatible findings: Whereas children come to solve explicit verbal false belief tasks from around 4years of age, recent studies with various less explicit measures such as looking time, anticipatory looking, and spontaneous behavior suggest that even infants can succeed on some FB tasks. In response to this tension, two-systems theories propose to distinguish between an early-developing system, tracking simple forms of mental states, and a later-developing system, based on (...)
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  29.  38
    Pluralism About Joint Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
    Shared Emotions, Joint Attention and Joint Action, Centre for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Denmark, 26 October 2010.
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  30.  36
    Joint Action : Shared Intentions and Collective Goals.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  31.  32
    Joint Action and Knowing Others' Minds.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  32.  29
    Mindreading and Joint Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  33.  25
    Joint Action and the Emergence of Mindreading.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  34.  23
    Categorical Perception : Not What It Seems.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  35.  21
    Which Joint Actions Ground Social Cognition.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  36.  18
    Review of Anti-Individualism : Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification, by Goldberg, S. C. [REVIEW]Stephen A. Butterfill - unknown
  37.  20
    Joint Action : Conceptual Tools for Scientific Research.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  38.  19
    Minimal Theory of Mind and Joint Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  39.  16
    Review of The Rational Imagination : How People Create Alternatives to Reality, by Byrn, R. M. J. [REVIEW]Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  40.  25
    Self-Knowing Agents. [REVIEW]Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):413-415.
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  41.  13
    Does Eve Need Adam? (Reply to Guenther Knoblich).Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  42.  10
    Review of Self-Knowing Agents by O'Brien, L. [REVIEW]Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  43.  8
    Talking About and Seeing Blue.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  44. Truth Theories and Action Explanation.Stephen A. Butterfill - 1999
     
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