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Stephen Andrew Butterfill [34]Stephen A. Butterfill [17]Stephen Butterfill [10]
  1. Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
    The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...)
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  2. How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.
    What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...)
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  3. Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
    Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, (...)
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  4.  92
    Psychological research on joint action : theory and data.Günther Knoblich, Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Natalie Sebanz - unknown
    When two or more people coordinate their actions in space and time to produce a joint outcome, they perform a joint action. The perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes that enable individuals to coordinate their actions with others have been receiving increasing attention during the last decade, complementing earlier work on shared intentionality and discourse. This chapter reviews current theoretical concepts and empirical findings in order to provide a structured overview of the state of the art in joint action research. We (...)
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  5. Joint action goals reduce visuomotor interference effects from a partner’s incongruent actions.Sam Clarke, Luke McEllin, Anna Francová, Marcell Székely, Stephen Andrew Butterfill & John Michael - 2019 - Scientific Reports 9 (1).
    Joint actions often require agents to track others’ actions while planning and executing physically incongruent actions of their own. Previous research has indicated that this can lead to visuomotor interference effects when it occurs outside of joint action. How is this avoided or overcome in joint actions? We hypothesized that when joint action partners represent their actions as interrelated components of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, each partner’s movements need not be represented in relation to distinct, (...)
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  6.  85
    Joint Action and Development.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):23-47.
    Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman's, says it is. For on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different kind of joint action, an account compatible (...)
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  7. Interacting mindreaders.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.
    Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader’s target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions (...)
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  8. Seeing causings and hearing gestures.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):405-428.
    Can humans see causal interactions? Evidence on the visual perception of causal interactions, from Michotte to contemporary work, is best interpreted as showing that we can see some causal interactions in the same sense as that in which we can hear speech. Causal perception, like speech perception, is a form of categorical perception.
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  9.  38
    Motor representation in acting together.Corrado Sinigaglia & Stephen A. Butterfill - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-16.
    People walk, build, paint and otherwise act together with a purpose in myriad ways. What is the relation between the actions people perform in acting together with a purpose and the outcome, or outcomes, to which their actions are directed? We argue that fully characterising this relation will require appeal not only to intention, knowledge and other familiar philosophical paraphernalia but also to another kind of representation involved in preparing and executing actions, namely motor representation. If we are right, motor (...)
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  10.  28
    Drawn together: When motor representations ground joint actions.Francesco Della Gatta, Francesca Garbarini, Marco Rabuffetti, Luca Viganò, Stephen A. Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2017 - Cognition 165 (C):53-60.
    What enables individuals to act together? Recent discoveries suggest that a variety of mechanisms are involved. But something fundamental is yet to be investigated. In joint action, agents represent a collective goal, or so it is often assumed. But how, if at all, are collective goals represented in joint action and how do such representations impact performance? To investigate this question we adapted a bimanual paradigm, the circle-line drawing paradigm, to contrast two agents acting in parallel with two agents performing (...)
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  11.  38
    Towards a Mechanistically Neutral Account of Acting Jointly: The Notion of a Collective Goal.Stephen A. Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):1-29.
    Many of the things we do are, or could be, done with others. Mundane examples favoured by philosophers include painting a house together (Bratman 1992), lifting.
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  12.  59
    Perceiving expressions of emotion: What evidence could bear on questions about perceptual experience of mental states?Stephen A. Butterfill - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:438-451.
  13.  29
    Are there signature limits in early theory of mind?Ella Fizke, Stephen A. Butterfill, Lea van de Loo, Eva Reindl & Hannes Rakoczy - 2017 - Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 162:209-224.
    Current theory-of-mind research faces the challenge of reconciling two sets of seemingly incompatible findings: Whereas children come to solve explicit verbal false belief tasks from around 4years of age, recent studies with various less explicit measures such as looking time, anticipatory looking, and spontaneous behavior suggest that even infants can succeed on some FB tasks. In response to this tension, two-systems theories propose to distinguish between an early-developing system, tracking simple forms of mental states, and a later-developing system, based on (...)
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  14.  73
    Tool Use and Causal Cognition.Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl & Stephen Butterfill (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    What cognitive abilities underpin the use of tools, and how are tools and their properties represented or understood by tool-users? Does the study of tool use provide us with a unique or distinctive source of information about the causal cognition of tool-users? -/- Tool use is a topic of major interest to all those interested in animal cognition, because it implies that the animal has knowledge of the relationship between objects and their effects. There are countless examples of animals developing (...)
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  15. On a puzzle about relations between thought, experience and the motoric.Corrado Sinigaglia & Stephen A. Butterfill - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1923-1936.
    Motor representations live a kind of double life. Although paradigmatically involved in performing actions, they also occur when merely observing others act and sometimes influence thoughts about the goals of observed actions. Further, these influences are content-respecting: what you think about an action sometimes depends in part on how that action is represented motorically in you. The existence of such content-respecting influences is puzzling. After all, motor representations do not feature alongside beliefs or intentions in reasoning about action; indeed, thoughts (...)
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  16. Planning for Collective Agency.Stephen Butterfill - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
  17.  18
    The Developing Mind: A Philosophical Introduction.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2017 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    The development of children’s minds raises fundamental psychological and scientific questions, from how we are able to know about and describe basic aspects of the world such as words, numbers and colours to how we come to grasp causes, actions and intentions. This is the first book to properly introduce and examine philosophical questions concerning children’s cognitive development and considers the implications of scientific breakthroughs for the philosophy of developmental psychology. Each chapter explores a central topic in developmental psychology from (...)
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  18. Cue competition effects and young children's causal and counterfactual inferences.Teresa McCormack, Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Christoph Hoerl & Patrick Burns - 2009 - Developmental Psychology 45 (6):1563-1575.
    The authors examined cue competition effects in young children using the blicket detector paradigm, in which objects are placed either singly or in pairs on a novel machine and children must judge which objects have the causal power to make the machine work. Cue competition effects were found in a 5- to 6-year-old group but not in a 4-year-old group. Equivalent levels of forward and backward blocking were found in the former group. Children's counterfactual judgments were subsequently examined by asking (...)
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  19.  14
    Visibly constraining an agent modulates observers' automatic false-belief tracking.Jason Low, Katheryn Edwards & Stephen A. Butterfill - forthcoming - Scientific Reports.
    Our motor system can generate representations which carry information about the goals of another agent's actions. However, it is not known whether motor representations play a deeper role in social understanding, and, in particular, whether they enable tracking others' beliefs. Here we show that, for adult observers, reliably manifesting an ability to track another's false belief critically depends on representing the agent's potential actions motorically. One signature of motor representations is that they can be disrupted by constraints on an observed (...)
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  20.  46
    Is goal ascription possible in minimal mindreading?Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (2):228-233.
    In this response to the commentary by Michael and Christensen, we first explain how minimal mindreading is compatible with the development of increasingly sophisticated mindreading behaviours that involve both executive functions and general knowledge, and then sketch one approach to a minimal account of goal ascription.
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  21. Two kinds of purposive action.Stephen Butterfill - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):141–165.
    It is normally assumed that there is only one kind of purposive action. This article argues that there are two kinds of purposive action, which require different models of explanation. One kind of action is done without awareness of reasons; another kind of action is done because the agent is aware of reasons for that action. The argument starts by noting that philosophers disagree about what explains action. Some claim that actions are explained by impersonal facts, such as facts about (...)
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  22. 11. What Does Knowledge Explain? Commentary on Jennifer Nagel,'Knowledge as a Mental State'.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:309.
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  23.  93
    What are modules and what is their role in development?Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):450–473.
    Modules are widely held to play a central role in explaining mental development and in accounts of the mind generally. But there is much disagreement about what modules are, which shows that we do not adequately understand modularity. This paper outlines a Fodoresque approach to understanding one type of modularity. It suggests that we can distinguish modular from nonmodular cognition by reference to the kinds of process involved, and that modular cognition differs from nonmodular forms of cognition in being a (...)
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  24. Tool use and causal cognition: An introduction.Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl & Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2011 - In Teresa McCormack, Christoph Hoerl & Stephen Butterfill (eds.), Tool Use and Causal Cognition. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-17.
    This chapter begins with a discussion of the significance of studies of aspects of tool use in understanding causal cognition. It argues that tool use studies reveal the most basic type or causal understanding being put to use, in a way that studies that focus on learning statistical relationships between cause and effect or studies of perceptual causation do not. An overview of the subsequent chapters is also presented.
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  25.  12
    Two Kinds of Purposive Action.Stephen Butterfill - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):141-165.
    It is normally assumed that there is only one kind of purposive action. This article argues that there are two kinds of purposive action, which require different models of explanation. One kind of action is done without awareness of reasons; another kind of action is done because the agent is aware of reasons for that action. The argument starts by noting that philosophers disagree about what explains action. Some claim that actions are explained by impersonal facts, such as facts about (...)
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  26.  34
    Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World, written by M. Gilbert.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (4):475-478.
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  27.  24
    Mindreading in the balance : adults' mediolateral leaning and anticipatory looking foretell others' action preparation in a false-belief interactive task.Giovanni Zani, Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Jason Low - 2020 - Royal Society Open Science 7.
    Anticipatory looking on mindreading tasks can indicate our expectation of an agent's action. The challenge is that social situations are often more complex, involving instances where we need to track an agent's false belief to successfully identify the outcome to which an action is directed. If motor processes can guide how action goals are understood, it is conceivable— where that kind of goal ascription occurs in false-belief tasks— for motor representations to account for someone's belief-like state. Testing adults (N = (...)
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  28.  30
    Goals and targets: a developmental puzzle about sensitivity to others’ actions.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):3969-3990.
    Sensitivity to others’ actions is essential for social animals like humans and a fundamental requirement for any kind of social cognition. Unsurprisingly, it is present in humans from early in the first year of life. But what processes underpin infants’ sensitivity to others’ actions? Any attempt to answer this question must solve twin puzzles about the development of goal tracking. Why does some, but not all, of infants’ goal tracking appear to be limited by their abilities to represent the observed (...)
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  29.  64
    Joint action without shared intention.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
  30.  18
    Tracking and representing others’ mental states.Stephen A. Butterfill - 2017 - In Kristin Andrews & Jacob Beck (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds. Routledge. pp. 269-279.
    Few things matter more than the mental states of those nearby. Their ignorance defines limits on cooperation and presents opportunities to exploit in competition. What others feel, see and know can also provide information about events otherwise beyond your ken. It’s no surprise, then, that abilities to track others’ mental states are widespread. Many animals, including scrub jays, ravens, goats, dogs, ring-tailed lemurs, monkeys and chimpanzees, reliably vary their actions in ways that are appropriate given facts about another’s mental states. (...)
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  31.  18
    A view from mindreading on fast-and-slow thinking.Jason Low, Stephen A. Butterfill & John Michael - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e130.
    De Neys's incisive critique of empirical and theoretical research on the exclusivity feature underscores the depth of the challenge of explaining the interplay of fast and slow processes. We argue that a closer look at research on mindreading reveals abundant evidence for the exclusivity feature – as well as methodological and theoretical perspectives that could inform research on fast and slow thinking.
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  32.  32
    Intuitions about joint commitment.John Michael & Stephen Butterfill - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    ABSTRACT In what sense is commitment essential to joint action, and do the participants in a joint action themselves perceive commitment as essential? Attempts to answer this question have so far been hampered by clashes of intuition. Perhaps this is because the intuitions in question have mostly been investigated using informal methods only. To explore this possibility, we adopted a more formal approach to testing intuitions about joint action, sampling naïve participants’ intuitions about experimentally controlled scenarios. This approach did reveal (...)
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  33.  18
    Towards a mechanistically neutral account of acting jointly : the notion of a collective goal.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - forthcoming - .
    Anyone who has ever walked, cooked or crafted with a friend is in a position to know that acting jointly is not just acting side-by-side. But what distinguishes acting jointly from acting in parallel yet merely individually? Four decades of philosophical research have yielded broad consensus on a strategy for answering this question. This strategy is \emph{mechanistically committed}; that is, it hinges on invoking states of the agents who are acting jointly (often dubbed ‘shared’, ‘we-’ or ‘collective’ intentions). Despite the (...)
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  34.  53
    Joint action : shared intentions and collective goals.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
  35.  28
    Joint action : conceptual tools for scientific research.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  36.  54
    Symposium on S. Butterfill and I. Apperly, "How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind".Stephen Butterfill, Ian Apperly, Hannes Rakoczy, Shannon Spaulding & Tadeusz Zawidzki - 2013 - Mind and Language Symposia at the Brains Blog.
  37.  35
    Minimal theory of mind.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  38. Awareness of belief.Stephen Butterfill - manuscript
    Are these different requirements, in the sense that someone could satisfy one without satisfying the other? No one could meet the Truth Requirement without meeting the Variation Requirement, because understanding that a belief is false involves realising one should not believe it and appreciating the possibility of having other beliefs in its place. But could someone meet the Variation Requirement without meeting the Truth Requirement? In other words, is it possible to be aware of beliefs which are inconsistent without being (...)
     
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  39.  29
    Categorical perception : not what it seems.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  40.  20
    Does Eve need Adam? (reply to Guenther Knoblich).Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  41.  89
    Infants' representations of causation.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):126-127.
    It is consistent with the evidence in The Origin of Concepts to conjecture that infants' causal representations, like their numerical representations, are not continuous with adults', so that bootstrapping is needed in both cases.
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  42.  42
    Joint action and knowing others' minds.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  43.  34
    Joint action and the emergence of mindreading.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  44.  37
    Mindreading and joint action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  45.  28
    Minimal theory of mind and joint action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  46.  53
    Pluralism about joint action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
    Shared Emotions, Joint Attention and Joint Action, Centre for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Denmark, 26 October 2010.
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  47.  17
    Talking about and seeing blue.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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  48. Truth Theories and Action Explanation.Stephen A. Butterfill - 1999
  49. Using and understanding maps.Stephen Butterfill - unknown
    Many philosophers who advocate broadly pragmatist accounts of belief or language treat maps as paradigm examples of representation and they often assume that a pragmatic account of representation is obviously correct for maps (e.g. Dewey, Dretske, Millikan, Putnam and Ramsey). By examining mapping activities and the representational properties of maps in detail, this paper argues that no single notion of representation can fit every map or every mapping activity. This is bad news for pragmatists: if there are maps they can’t (...)
     
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  50.  33
    Which joint actions ground social cognition.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - unknown
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