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Stephen Darwall [115]Stephen L. Darwall [48]Stephen Leicester Darwall [1]
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Stephen Darwall
Yale University
  1. The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen L. Darwall - 2006 - Harvard University Press.
    The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority--an account that ...
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  2. Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Cornell University Press.
  3.  55
    Welfare and Rational Care.Stephen Darwall - 2002 - Princeton University Press.
    What kind of life best ensures human welfare? Since the ancient Greeks, this question has been as central to ethical philosophy as to ordinary reflection. But what exactly is welfare? This question has suffered from relative neglect. And, as Stephen Darwall shows, it has done so at a price. Presenting a provocative new "rational care theory of welfare," Darwall proves that a proper understanding of welfare fundamentally changes how we think about what is best for people.Most philosophers have assumed that (...)
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  4. Two Kinds of Respect.Stephen L. Darwall - 1977 - Ethics 88 (1):36-49.
    S. 39: "My project in this paper is to develop the initial distinction which I have drawn between recognition and appraisal respect into a more detailed and specific account of each. These accounts will not merely be of intrinsic interest. Ultimately I will use them to illuminate the puzzles with which this paper began and to understand the idea of self-respect." 42 " Thus, insofar as respect within such a pursuit will depend on an appraisal of the participant from the (...)
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  5. Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends.Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard & Peter Railton - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (1):115-189.
  6. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches.Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    What are ethical judgments about? And what is their relation to practice? How can ethical judgment aspire to objectivity? The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in metaethics, placing questions such as these about the nature and status of ethical judgment at the very center of contemporary moral philosophy. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches is a unique anthology which collects important recent work, much of which is not easily available elsewhere, on core metaethical issues. Reinvigorated (...)
     
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  7.  30
    “Second-Personal Morality” and Morality.Stephen Darwall - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (5):804-816.
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  8. Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second‐Personal.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Ethics 120 (2):257-278.
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  9. Empathy, Sympathy, Care.Stephen Darwall - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3):261–282.
    In what follows, I wish to discuss empathy and sympathy’s relevance to ethics, taking recent findings into account. In particular, I want to consider sympathy’s relation to the idea of a person’s good or well-being. It is obvious and uncontroversial that sympathetic concern for a person involves some concern for her good and some desire to promote it. What I want to suggest is that the concept of a person’s good or well-being is one we have because we are capable (...)
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  10. Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I.Stephen Darwall - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Stephen Darwall presents a series of essays that explore the view that morality is second-personal, entailing mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He illustrates the power of the second-personal framework to illuminate a wide variety of issues in moral, political, and legal philosophy.
     
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  11. Precis: The Second-Person Standpoint. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):216-228.
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  12. Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace, and Watson.Stephen Darwall - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):52-69.
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  13. Morality and Practical Reason: A Kantian Approach.Stephen Darwall - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 282--320.
    A central theme of Kant’s approach to moral philosophy is that moral obligations are categorical, by which he means that they provide supremely authoritative reasons for acting independently of an agent’s ends or interests. Kant argues that this is a reflection of our distinctive freedom or autonomy, as he calls it, as moral agents. A less, well- appreciated aspect of the Kantian picture of morality and respect for the dignity of each individual person is the idea of reciprocal accountability, that (...)
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  14. The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will.Stephen Darwall - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):263-284.
    It is a commonplace that ‘autonomy’ has several different senses in contemporary moral and political discussion. The term’s original meaning was political: a right assumed by states to administer their own affairs. It was not until the nineteenth century that ‘autonomy’ came (in English) to refer also to the conduct of individuals, and even then there were, as now, different meanings.1 Odd as it may seem from our perspective, one that was in play from the beginning was Kant’s notion of (...)
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  15. Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint.Stephen Darwall - 2004 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 78 (2):43 - 59.
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  16.  25
    Bi-Polar Obligation.Stephen Darwall - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7:333.
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  17. Moral Psychology as Accountability.Brendan Dill & Stephen Darwall - 2014 - In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson (ed.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 40-83.
    Recent work in moral philosophy has emphasized the foundational role played by interpersonal accountability in the analysis of moral concepts such as moral right and wrong, moral obligation and duty, blameworthiness, and moral responsibility (Darwall 2006; 2013a; 2013b). Extending this framework to the field of moral psychology, we hypothesize that our moral attitudes, emotions, and motives are also best understood as based in accountability. Drawing on a large body of empirical evidence, we argue that the implicit aim of the central (...)
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  18.  82
    Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith.Stephen Darwall - 1999 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (2):139-164.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http: //www.jstor.org/about/terms. html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
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  19. Philosophical Ethics.Stephen Darwall - 1998 - Westview Press.
    Why is ethics part of philosophy? Stephen Darwall's Philosophical Ethics introduces students to ethics from a distinctively philosophical perspective, one that weaves together central ethical questions such as "What has value?" and "What are our moral obligations?" with fundamental philosophical issues such as "What is value?" and "What can a moral obligation consist in?"With one eye on contemporary discussions and another on classical texts,Philosophical Ethics shows how Hobbes, Mill, Kant, Aristotle, and Nietzsche all did ethical philosophy how, for example, they (...)
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  20. Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality makes a significant contribution to clarifying the relationship between desire and reasons for acting, both the normative reasons we seek in deliberation and the motivating reasons we cite in explanation. About the former, Dancy argues that, not only are normative reasons not all grounded in desires, but, more radically, the fact that one desires something is never itself a normative reason. And he argues that desires fail to figure in motivating reasons also, concluding that neither the (...)
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  21. Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value.Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Ethics 113 (3):468-489.
    Principia Ethica set the agenda for analytical metaethics. Moore’s unrelenting focus on fundamentals both brought metaethics into view as a potentially separate area of philosophical inquiry and provided a model of the analytical techniques necessary to pursue it.1 Moore acknowledged that he wasn’t the first to insist on a basic irreducible core of all ethical concepts. Although he seems not to have appreciated the roots of this thought in eighteenth-century intuitionists like Clarke, Balguy, and Price, not to mention sentimentalists like (...)
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  22. Authority and Second Personal Reasons for Acting.Stephen Darwall - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  23. Welfare and Rational Care.Stephen Darwall - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):375-378.
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  24. Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction.Stephen Darwall - 1997 - In Stephen L. Darwall (ed.), Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches. Oxford University Press. pp. 305--312.
     
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  25. Because I Want It.Stephen L. Darwall - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):129-153.
    How can an agent's desire or will give him reasons for acting? Not long ago, this might have seemed a silly question, since it was widely believed that all reasons for acting are based in the agent's desires. The interesting question, it seemed, was not how what an agent wants could give him reasons, but how anything else could. In recent years, however, this earlier orthodoxy has increasingly appeared wrongheaded as a growing number of philosophers have come to stress the (...)
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  26.  93
    Agreement Matters: Critical Notice of Derek Parfit, On What Matters.Stephen Darwall - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):79-105.
    Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons (1984) mounted a striking defense of Act Consequentialism against a Rawls-inspired Kantian orthodoxy in moral philosophy. On What Matters (2011) is notable for its serious engagement with Kant's ethics and for its arguments in support of the “Triple Theory,” which allies Rule Consequentialism with Kantian and Scanlonian Contractualism against Act Consequentialism as a theory of moral right. This critical notice argues that what underlies this change is a view of the deontic concept of moral rightness (...)
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  27. Internalism and Agency.Stephen L. Darwall - 1992 - Philosophical Perspectives 6:155-174.
    have come in for increasing attention and controversy. A good example would be recent debates about moral realism where question of the relation between ethics (or ethical judgment) and the will has come to loom large.' Unfortunately, however, the range of positions labelled internalist in ethical writing is bewilderingly large, and only infrequently are important distinctions kept clear.2 Sometimes writers have in mind the view that sincere assent to a moral (or, more generally, an ethical) judgment concerning what one should (...)
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  28.  4
    The Authority of Reason.Stephen Darwall, Jean E. Hampton & Richard Healey - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):583.
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  29. “But It Would Be Wrong”.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):135-157.
    Is the fact that an action would be wrong itself a reason not to perform it? Warranted attitude accounts of value suggest about value, that being valuable is not itself a reason but to the reasons for valuing something in which its value consists. Would a warranted attitude account of moral obligation and wrongness, not entail, therefore, that being morally obligatory or wrong gives no reason for action itself? I argue that this is not true. Although warranted attitude theories of (...)
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  30.  55
    Self-Interest and Self-Concern.Stephen Darwall - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):158.
    In what follows I consider whether the idea of a person's interest or good might be better understood through that of care or concern for that person for her sake, rather than conversely, as is ordinarily assumed. Contrary to desire-satisfaction theories of interest, such an account can explain why not everything a person rationally desires is part of her good, since what a person sensibly wants is not necessarily what we would sensibly want, insofar as we care about her. First, (...)
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  31.  3
    Welfare and Rational Care.Stephen Darwall - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):585-601.
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  32. 10. Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, Eds., Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, and Michael Smith, Eds., Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Pp. 435-440). [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall, George Sher, Michael Ridge & François Schroeter - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2).
     
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  33. Moral Obligation: Form and Substance.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):31-46.
    Beginning from an analysis of moral obligation's form that I defend in The Second-Person Standpoint as what we are answerable for as beings with the necessary capacities to enter into relations of mutual accountability, I argue that this analysis has implications for moral obligation's substance. Given what it is to take responsibility for oneself and hold oneself answerable, I argue, it follows that if there are any moral obligations at all, then there must exist a basic pro tanto obligation not (...)
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  34. Contractarianism, Contractualism.Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) - 2003 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    Contractualism/Contractarianism collects, for the first time, both major classical sources and central contemporary discussions of these important approaches to philosophical ethics. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative ethics.
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  35.  86
    Agent-Centered Restrictions From the Inside Out.Stephen L. Darwall - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (3):291 - 319.
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  36. Authority, Accountability, and Preemption.Stephen Darwall - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (1):103-119.
    Joseph Raz's 'normal justification thesis' is that the normal way of justifying someone's claim to authority over another person is that the latter would comply better with the reasons that apply to him anyway were he to treat the former's directives as authoritative. Darwall argues that this provides 'reasons of the wrong kind' for authority. He turns then to Raz's claim that the fact that treating someone as an authority would enable one to comply better with reasons that apply to (...)
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  37. Welfare and Rational Care.Stephen Darwall - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):409-413.
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  38. Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect.Stephen Darwall - 2008 - In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. De Gruyter.
  39. Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Ethics 96 (3):604-619.
     
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  40.  85
    Justice and Retaliation.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (3):315-341.
    Punishment and Reparations are sometimes held to express retaliatory emotions whose object is to strike back against a victimizer. I begin by examining a version of this idea in Mill's writings about natural resentment and the sense of justice in Chapter V of Utilitarianism. Mill's view is that the ?natural? sentiment of resentment or ?vengeance? that is at the heart of the concept of justice is essentially retaliatory, therefore has ?nothing moral in it,? and so must be disciplined or moralized (...)
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  41.  3
    Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition.Stephen L. Darwall & Jean Hampton - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):401.
  42.  37
    Reply to Feldman, Hurka, and Rosati. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):637 - 658.
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  43.  3
    The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought'.Stephen Darwall - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):992-995.
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  44. Consequentialism.Stephen L. Darwall (ed.) - 2003 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    Consequentialism collects, for the first time, both the main classical sources and the central contemporary expressions of this important position. Edited and introduced by Stephen Darwall, these readings are essential for anyone interested in normative ethics.
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  45.  85
    Being With.Stephen Darwall - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):4–24.
    What is it for two or more people to be with one another or together? And what role do empathic psychological processes play, either as essential constituents or as typical elements? As I define it, to be genuinely with each other, persons must be jointly aware of their mutual openness to mutual relating. This means, I argue, that being with is a second-personal phenomenon in the sense I discuss in The Second-Person Standpoint. People who are with each other are in (...)
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  46. Welfare and Rational Care.Stephen Darwall - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):619-635.
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  47.  8
    Impartial Reason.Stephen Darwall - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):60-64.
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  48. Moral Discourse and Practice.Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard & Peter Railton (eds.) - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
    What are ethical judgments about? And what is their relation to practice? How can ethical judgment aspire to objectivity? The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in metaethics, placing questions such as these about the nature and status of ethical judgment at the very center of contemporary moral philosophy. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches is a unique anthology which collects important recent work, much of which is not easily available elsewhere, on core metaethical issues. Naturalist (...)
     
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  49.  98
    Moral Obligation and Accountability.Stephen Darwall - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Clarendon Press.
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  50. Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics Ii.Stephen Darwall - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Stephen Darwall expands upon his argument for a second-personal framework for morality, in which morality entails mutual accountability and the authority to address demands. He explores the role of the framework in relation to cultural ideas of respect and honor; the development of "modern" moral philosophy; and interpersonal relations.
     
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