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Stephen Gadsby
Monash University
  1.  26
    Biased Belief in the Bayesian Brain: A Deeper Look at the Evidence.Ben M. Tappin & Stephen Gadsby - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 68:107-114.
  2.  8
    Distorted Body Representations in Anorexia Nervosa.Stephen Gadsby - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 51:17-33.
  3.  27
    Action, Affordances, and Anorexia: Body Representation and Basic Cognition.Stephen Gadsby & Daniel Williams - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5297-5317.
    We evaluate a growing trend towards anti-representationalism in cognitive science in the context of recent research into the development and maintenance of anorexia nervosa in cognitive neuropsychiatry. We argue two things: first, that this research relies on an explanatorily robust concept of representation—the concept of a long-term body schema; second, that this body representation underlies our most basic environmental interactions and affordance perception—the psychological phenomena supposed to be most hospitable to a non-representationalist treatment.
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  4.  23
    Body Representations and Cognitive Ontology: Drawing the Boundaries of the Body Image.Stephen Gadsby - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 74:102772.
  5.  16
    Self-Deception and the Second Factor: How Desire Causes Delusion in Anorexia Nervosa.Stephen Gadsby - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):609-626.
    Empiricist models explain delusional beliefs by identifying the abnormal experiences which ground them. Recently, this strategy has been adopted to explain the false body size beliefs of anorexia nervosa patients. As such, a number of abnormal experiences of body size which patients suffer from have been identified. These oversized experiences convey false information regarding the patients’ own bodies, indicating that they are larger than reality. However, in addition to these oversized experiences, patients are also exposed to significant evidence suggesting their (...)
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  6.  35
    Delusions, Harmful Dysfunctions, and Treatable Conditions.Peter Clutton & Stephen Gadsby - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (2):167-181.
    It has recently been suggested that delusions be conceived of as symptoms on the harmful dysfunction account of disorder: delusions sometimes arise from dysfunction, but can also arise through normal cognition. Much attention has thus been payed to the question of how we can determine whether a delusion arises from dysfunction as opposed to normal cognition. In this paper, we consider another question, one that remains under-explored: which delusions warrant treatment? On the harmful dysfunction account, this question dissociates from the (...)
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  7.  6
    How Are the Spatial Characteristics of the Body Represented? A Reply to Pitron & de Vignemont.Stephen Gadsby - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 62:163-168.
  8. Imposter Syndrome and Self-Deception.Stephen Gadsby - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    Many intelligent, capable, and successful individuals believe that their success is due to luck and fear that they will someday be exposed as imposters. A puzzling feature of this phenomenon, commonly referred to as imposter syndrome, is that these same individuals treat evidence in ways that maintain their false beliefs and debilitating fears: they ignore and misattribute evidence of their own abilities, while readily accepting evidence in favour of their inadequacy. I propose a novel account of imposter syndrome as an (...)
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  9.  32
    Is the Sense of Bodily Ownership Related to Pre-Reflective Bodily Awareness? A Reply to Kuhle.Stephen Gadsby - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):629-637.
    There are two ways in which we are aware of our bodies: reflectively, when we attend to them, and pre-reflectively, a kind of marginal awareness that pervades regular experience. However, there is an inherent issue with studying bodily awareness of the pre-reflective kind: given that it is, by definition, non-observational, how can we observe it? Kuhle claims to have found a way around this problem—we can study it indirectly by investigating an aspect of reflective bodily awareness: the sense of bodily (...)
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  10.  17
    Manipulating Body Representations with Virtual Reality: Clinical Implications for Anorexia Nervosa.Stephen Gadsby - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):898-922.
    ABSTRACTAnorexia nervosa patients exhibit distorted body-representations. Specifically, they represent their bodies as larger than reality. Given that this distortion likely exacerbates the conditi...
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