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Stephen Hetherington [89]Stephen Cade Hetherington [24]Stephen C. Hetherington [2]
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Stephen Hetherington
University of New South Wales
  1.  80
    How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge.Stephen Hetherington - 2011 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    Some key aspects of contemporary epistemology deserve to be challenged, and _How to Know_ does just that. This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a practicalist conception of knowledge. Presents a philosophically original conception of knowledge, at odds with some central tenets of analytic epistemology Offers a dissolution of epistemology’s infamous Gettier problem — explaining why the supposed problem was never really a problem in (...)
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  2. Epistemology Futures.Stephen Hetherington (ed.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    How might epistemology build upon its past and present, so as to be better in the future? Epistemology Futures takes bold steps towards answering that question. What methods will best serve epistemology? Which phenomena and concepts deserve more attention from it? Are there approaches and assumptions that have impeded its progress until now? This volume contains provocative essays by prominent epistemologists, presenting many new ideas for possible improvements in how to do epistemology. Contributors: Paul M. Churchland, Catherine Z. Elgin, Richard (...)
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  3. Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology.Stephen Hetherington - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    What is knowledge? How hard is it for a person to have knowledge? Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge confronts contemporary philosophical attempts to answer those classic questions, offering a theory of knowledge that is unique in conceiving of knowledge in a non-absolutist way.
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  4.  97
    Knowledge Can Be Lucky.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 164.
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  5. How to Know.Stephen Hetherington - 2006 - In Epistemology Futures. Clarendon Press.
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  6. How to Know (That Knowledge-That is Knowledge-How).Stephen Hetherington (ed.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
     
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  7. Knowing Failably.Stephen Hetherington - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):565-587.
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  8. The Gettier-Illusion: Gettier-Partialism and Infallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):217-230.
    Could the standard interpretation of Gettier cases reflect a fundamental confusion? Indeed so. How well can epistemologists argue for the truth of that standard interpretation? Not so well. A methodological mistake is allowing them not to notice how they are simply (and inappropriately) being infallibilists when regarding Gettiered beliefs as failing to be knowledge. There is no Gettier problem that we have not merely created for ourselves by unwittingly being infallibilists about knowledge.
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  9.  68
    The Extended Knower.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):207 - 218.
    Might there be extended cognition and thereby extended minds? Rightly, that possibility is being investigated at present by philosophers of mind. Should epistemologists share that spirit, by inquiring into the possibility of extended knowing and thereby of extended knowers? Indeed so, I argue. The key to this shift of emphasis will be an epistemologically improved understanding of the implications of epistemic externalism.
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  10.  18
    Knowing How and Knowing To.Karyn L. Lai & Stephen Hetherington - 2015 - In Brian Bruya (ed.), The Philosophical Challenge from China. MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 279 - 302.
    Since the 1940s, Western epistemology has discussed Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Ryle argued that intelligent actions – manifestations of knowledge-how – are not constituted as intelligent by the guiding intervention of knowledge-that: knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that; we must understand knowledge-how in independent terms. Yet which independent terms are needed? In this chapter, we consider whether an understanding of intelligent action must include talk of knowledge-to. This is the knowledge to do this or that now, (...)
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  11.  28
    Knowing Failably.Stephen Hetherington - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):565.
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  12. Knowledge and Knowing: Ability and Manifestation.Stephen Hetherington - 2011 - In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. De Gruyter. pp. 1.
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  13. Actually Knowing.Stephen Hetherington - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):453-469.
  14. Knowing-That, Knowing-How, and Knowing Philosophically.Stephen Hetherington - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):307-324.
    This paper outlines how we may understand knowing-that as a kind of knowing-how-to, and thereby as an ability. (Contrast this form of analysis with the more commonly attempted reduction, of knowing-how-to to knowing-that.) The sort of ability in question has much potential complexity. In general, questioning can, but need not, be part of this complexity. However, questioning is always an element in the complexity that is philosophical knowing. The paper comments on the nature of this particular form of knowing.
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  15. Gettier Problems.Stephen Hetherington - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Gettier problems or cases are named in honor of the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who discovered them in 1963. They function as challenges to the philosophical tradition of defining knowledge of a proposition as justified true belief in that proposition. The problems are actual or possible situations in which someone has a belief that is both true and well supported by evidence, yet which — according to almost all epistemologists — fails to be knowledge. Gettier’s original article had a dramatic (...)
     
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  16. The Gettier Problem.Stephen Hetherington (ed.) - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    When philosophers try to understand the nature of knowledge, they have to confront the Gettier problem. This problem, set out in Edmund Gettier's famous paper of 1963, has yet to be solved, and has challenged our best attempts to define what knowledge is. This volume offers an organised sequence of accessible and distinctive chapters explaining the history of debate surrounding Gettier's challenge, and where that debate should take us next. The chapters describe and evaluate a wide range of ideas about (...)
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  17.  49
    Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction to Epistemology.Stephen Cade Hetherington - 1996 - Westview Press.
    Despite the problems students often have with the theory of knowledge, it remains, necessarily, at the core of the philosophical enterprise. As experienced teachers know, teaching epistemology requires a text that is not only clear and accessible, but also capable of successfully motivating the abstract problems that arise.In Knowledge Puzzles, Stephen Hetherington presents an informal survey of epistemology based on the use of puzzles to illuminate problems of knowledge. Each topic is introduced through a puzzle, and readers are invited to (...)
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  18. Fallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Fallibilism is the epistemological thesis that no belief (theory, view, thesis, and so on) can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way. Always, there remains a possible doubt as to the truth of the belief. Fallibilism applies that assessment even to science’s best-entrenched claims and to people’s best-loved commonsense views. Some epistemologists have taken fallibilism to imply skepticism, according to which none of those claims or views are ever well justified or knowledge. In fact, though, it is (...)
     
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  19.  96
    Concessive Knowledge-Attributions: Fallibilism and Gradualism.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2835-2851.
    Any knowledge-fallibilist needs to solve the conceptual problem posed by concessive knowledge-attributions (such as ‘I know that p, but possibly not-p’). These seem to challenge the coherence of knowledge-fallibilism. This paper defuses that challenge via a gradualist refinement of what Fantl and McGrath (2009) call weak epistemic fallibilism.
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  20. 5.Stephen Hetherington - 2006 - In How to Know (That Knowledge-That is Knowledge-How). Oxford University Press. pp. 71-94.
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  21. Abnormality and Gettier Situations: An Explanatory Proposal.Stephen Hetherington - 2011 - Ratio 24 (2):176-191.
    Analytic epistemologists reach regularly for favoured ‘intuitions’. And the anti-luck intuition (as Duncan Pritchard calls it) is possibly one of the best-entrenched epistemological intuitions at present, seemingly guiding standard reactions to Gettier situations. But why is that intuition true (if it is)? This paper argues that the anti-luck intuition (like the ability intuition) rests upon something even more deeply explanatory – the normality intuition. And to recognise this is to understand better what most epistemologists want from a concept of knowledge. (...)
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  22. The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier’s Challenge: A Case Study.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.
    Taking his conceptual cue from Ernest Sosa, John Turri has offered a putative conceptual solution to the Gettier problem: Knowledge is cognitively adept belief, and no Gettiered belief is cognitively adept. At the core of such adeptness is a relation of manifestation. Yet to require that relation within knowing is to reach for what amounts to an infallibilist conception of knowledge. And this clashes with the spirit behind the fallibilism articulated by Gettier when stating his challenge. So, Turri’s form of (...)
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  23.  93
    Epistemic Responsibility: A Dilemma.Stephen Hetherington - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):398-414.
    Might epistemic justification be, to some substantive extent, a function of epistemic responsibility—a belief's being formed, or its being maintained, in an epistemically responsible way? I will call any analysis of epistemic justification endorsing that kind of idea epistemic responsibilism—or, for short, responsibilism. Many epistemic internalists are responsibilists, because they think that what makes a belief justified is its being appropriately related to one's good evidence for it, and because many of them regard this appropriate relation as somehow involving one's (...)
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  24.  58
    Understanding Fallible Warrant and Fallible Knowledge: Three Proposals.Stephen Hetherington - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
    One of contemporary epistemology's more important conceptual challenges is that of understanding the nature of fallibility. Part of why this matters is that it would contribute to our understanding the natures of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge. This article evaluates two candidates – and describes a shared form of failing. Each is concealedly infallibilist. This failing is all-too-representative of the difficulty of doing justice to the notion of fallibility within the notions of fallible warrant and fallible knowledge. The article ends (...)
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  25. Where is the Harm in Dying Prematurely? An Epicurean Answer.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):79-97.
    Philosophers have said less than is needed about the nature of premature death, and about the badness or otherwise of that death for the one who dies. In this paper, premature death’s nature is clarified in Epicurean terms. And an accompanying argument denies that we need to think of such a death as bad in itself for the one who dies. Premature death’s nature is conceived of as a death that arrives before ataraxia does. (Ataraxia’s nature is also clarified. It (...)
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  26.  65
    Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy, by Peter Unger: New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, Pp. Xiv + 258, US$45. [REVIEW]Stephen Hetherington - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):418-419.
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  27.  13
    The Gettier Non-Problem.Stephen Hetherington - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (1):85-107.
    This paper highlights an aspect of Gettier situations, one standardly not accorded interpretive significance. A remark of Gettier’s suggests its potential importance. And once that aspect’s contribution is made explicit, an argument unfolds for the conclusion that it is fairly simple to have knowledge within Gettier situations. Indeed, that argument dissolves the traditional Gettier problem.
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  28.  76
    Knowledge’s Boundary Problem.Stephen Hetherington - 2006 - Synthese 150 (1):41-56.
    Where is the justificatory boundary between a true belief's not being knowledge and its being knowledge? Even if we put to one side the Gettier problem, this remains a fundamental epistemological question, concerning as it does the matter of whether we can provide some significant defence of the usual epistemological assumption that a belief is knowledge only if it is well justified. But can that question be answered non-arbitrarily? BonJour believes that it cannot be -- and that epistemology should therefore (...)
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  29.  25
    Technological Knowledge-That As Knowledge-How: A Comment.Stephen Hetherington - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (4):567-572.
    Norström has argued that contemporary epistemological debates about the conceptual relations between knowledge-that and knowledge-how need to be supplemented by a concept of technological knowledge—with this being a further kind of knowledge. But this paper argues that Norström has not shown why technological knowledge-that is so distinctive because Norström has not shown that such knowledge cannot be reduced conceptually to a form of knowledge-how. The paper thus applies practicalism to the case of technological knowledge-that. Indeed, the paper shows why Norström’s (...)
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  30. Knowledge and the Gettier Problem.Stephen Hetherington - 2016 - Cambridge University Press.
    Edmund Gettier's 1963 verdict about what knowledge is not has become an item of philosophical orthodoxy, accepted by philosophers as a genuine epistemological result. It assures us that - contrary to what Plato and later philosophers have thought - knowledge is not merely a true belief well supported by epistemic justification. But that orthodoxy has generated the Gettier problem - epistemology's continuing struggle to understand how to accommodate Gettier's apparent result within an improved conception of knowledge. In this book, Stephen (...)
     
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  31. On Being Epistemically Internal.Stephen Cade Hetherington - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):855-871.
  32.  72
    Is This a World Where Knowledge has to Include Justification?Stephen Hetherington - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):41–69.
    If any thesis is all-but-universally accepted by contemporary epistemologists, it is justificationism-the thesis that being an instance of knowledge has to include being epistemically justified in some appropriate way. If there is to be any epistemological knowledge about knowledge, a paradigm candidate would seem to be our knowledge that justificationism is true. This is a conception of a way in whichknowledge has to be robust. Nevertheless, this paper provides reason to doubt the truth of that conception. Even epistemology’s supposed conceptual (...)
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  33.  24
    Some Fallibilist Knowledge: Questioning Knowledge-Attributions and Open Knowledge.Stephen Hetherington - forthcoming - Synthese:1-17.
    We may usefully distinguish between one’s having fallible knowledge and having a fallibilist stance on some of one’s knowledge. A fallibilist stance could include a concessive knowledge-attribution. But it might also include a questioning knowledge-attribution. Attending to the idea of a QKA leads to a distinction between what we may call closed knowledge that p and open knowledge that p. All of this moves us beyond Elgin’s classic tale of the epistemic capacities of Holmes and of Watson, and towards a (...)
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  34.  56
    Aspects of Knowing.Stephen Hetherington (ed.) - 2006 - Elsevier Science.
    AcknowledgementsContributors1. Introduction: The art of precise epistemology Stephen HetheringtonPart A. Epistemology as scientific?2.
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  35.  89
    Fallibilism and Knowing That One Is Not Dreaming.Stephen Hetherington - 2002 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):83 - 102.
    Of course, if infallibilism about such knowledge is true, then it is true that one can never know that one is not dreaming. But, of course, if infallibilism is true, then there is also no special difficulty posed for one’s having knowledge in general by one’s not knowing in particular that one is not dreaming: one would know either nothing or next to nothing anyway, regardless of one’s not knowing in particular that one is not dreaming. Yet epistemologists have generally (...)
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  36.  74
    Why There Need Not Be Any Grue Problem About Inductive Inference as Such.Stephen Hetherington - 2001 - Philosophy 76 (1):127-136.
    I argue that Goodman's puzzle of grue at least poses no real challenge about inductive inference. By drawing on Stove's characterisation of Hume's characterisation of inductive inference, we see that the premises in an inductive inference report experienced impressions; and Goodman can be interpreted as posing a real challenge about inductive inference only if we treat an epistemic subject's observations more as logical contents and less as experienced impressions. So, even though the grue puzzle was effective against its stated logicist (...)
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  37.  59
    Practising to Know: Practicalism and Confucian Philosophy.Stephen Hetherington & Karyn Lai - 2012 - Philosophy 87 (3):375-393.
    For a while now, there has been much conceptual discussion about the respective natures of knowledge-that and knowledge-how, along with the intellectualist idea that knowledge-how is really a kind of knowledge-that. Gilbert Ryle put in place most of the terms that have so far been distinctive of that debate, when he argued for knowledge-how's conceptual distinctness from knowledge-that. But maybe those terms should be supplemented, expanding the debate. In that spirit, the conceptual option of practicalism has recently entered the fray. (...)
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  38.  29
    Skeptical Challenges and Knowing Actions.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):18-39.
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  39.  34
    Scepticism and Perceptual Justification Edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini: New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, Viii + 363, US$74. [REVIEW]Stephen Hetherington - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):817-818.
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  40.  53
    Shattering a Cartesian Sceptical Dream.Stephen Hetherington - 2004 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (1):103-117.
    Scepticism about external world knowledge is frequently claimed to emerge from Descartes’s dreaming argument. That argument supposedly challenges one to have some further knowledge — the knowledge that one is not dreaming that p — if one is to have even one given piece of external world knowledge that p. The possession of that further knowledge can seem espe-cially important when the dreaming possibility is genuinely Cartesian. But this paper shows why that Cartesian use of that possi-bility is not at (...)
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  41.  99
    The Cogito: Indubitability Without Knowledge?Stephen Hetherington - 2009 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 13 (1):85-92.
    How should we understand both the nature, and the epistemic potential, of Descartes’s Cogito? Peter Slezak’s interpretation of the Cogito’s nature sees it strictly as a selfreferential kind of denial: Descartes cannot doubt that he is doubting. And what epistemic implications flow from this interpretation of the Cogito? We find that there is a consequent lack of knowledge being described by Descartes: on Cartesian grounds, indubitability is incompatible with knowing. Even as the Cogito halts doubt, therefore, it fails to be (...)
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  42.  8
    Ancient Philosophers on Death and Immortality - Long Death and Immortality in Ancient Philosophy. Pp. VIII + 232. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. Cased, £74.99, Us$99.99. Isbn: 978-1-107-08659-3. [REVIEW]Stephen Hetherington - forthcoming - The Classical Review:1-3.
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  43. Tooley's Theory of Laws of Nature.Stephen C. Hetherington - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):101 - 106.
    This paper contains a discussion of a theory of laws of nature formulated recently by Michael Tooley. He sees the truth-makers for laws of nature as consisting of particular sorts of contingent relations between universals. He is not alone in this idea; it has also been advanced by Fred Dretske and D.M. Armstrong. However, its most thorough and detailed presentation is by Tooley. Being a challenging and stimulating idea, it merits investigation.
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  44.  40
    Gettieristic Scepticism.Stephen Cade Hetherington - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):83 – 97.
  45.  43
    Not Actually Hume's Problem: On Induction and Knowing-How: Stephen Hetherington.Stephen Hetherington - 2008 - Philosophy 83 (4):459-481.
    Philosophers talk routinely of ‘Hume's problem of induction’. But the usual accompanying exegesis is mistaken in a way that has led epistemologists to conceive of ‘Hume's problem’ in needlessly narrow terms. They have overlooked a way of articulating the conceptual problem, along with a potential way of solving it. Indeed, they have overlooked Hume's own way. In explaining this, I will supplement Hume's insights by adapting Ryle's thinking on knowledge-how and knowledge-that. We will also see why Hume's ‘sceptical solution’ was (...)
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  46. Knowledge Puzzles: An Introduction to Epistemology.Stephen Cade Hetherington & Charles Landesman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (194):109-111.
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  47. Elusive Epistemological Justification.Stephen Hetherington - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):315 - 330.
    What does it take for some epistemological thinking to be epistemically justified? Indeed, is that outcome even possible? This paper argues that it is not possible: no epistemological thinking can ever be epistemically justified. A vicious infinite regress of epistemological reflection is the price that would have to be paid for having some such justification. Clearly, that price would be too high.
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  48.  37
    After Certainty: A History of Our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions, by Robert Pasnau: New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, Pp. Iii + 384, £55.Stephen Hetherington - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):211-211.
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  49. A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem.Stephen Hetherington - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26:307-324.
    How can a person avoid being Gettiered? This paper provides the first answer to that question that is both fallibilist and purely internalist. It is an answer that allows the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge to survive Gettier’s attack (albeit as a nonreductionist analysis of knowledge).
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  50.  12
    Knowing That P: Degrees and Qualities of Knowledge.Stephen Hetherington - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4).
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