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Stephen Ingram
University of Manchester
Stephen Ingram
La Trobe University
  1.  49
    Epistemology Shmepistemology: Moral Error Theory and Epistemic Expressivism.Stephen Ingram - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):649-669.
    Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be (...)
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  2.  18
    I Can't Relax! You're Driving Me Quasi!Stephen Ingram - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
    Robust Realists think that there are irreducible, non-natural, and mind-independent moral properties. Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists think the same, but interpret these commitments differently. Robust Realists interpret them as metaphysical commitments, to be defended by metaphysical argument. Quasi-Realists and Relaxed Realists say that they can only be interpreted as moral commitments. These theories thus pose a serious threat to Robust Realism, for they apparently undermine the very possibility of articulating the robust metaphysical commitments of this theory. I clarify and respond (...)
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  3.  88
    The Moral Fixed Points: Reply to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau.Stephen Ingram - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (1):1-5.
  4. I Can't Relax! You're Driving Me Quasi!Stephen Ingram - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3).
    Robust Realists think that there are irreducible, non-natural, and mind-independent moral properties. Quasi -Realists and Relaxed Realists think the same, but interpret these commitments differently. Robust Realists interpret them as metaphysical commitments, to be defended by metaphysical argument. Quasi -Realists and Relaxed Realists say that they can only be interpreted as moral commitments. These theories thus pose a serious threat to Robust Realism, for they apparently undermine the very possibility of articulating the robust metaphysical commitments of this theory. I clarify (...)
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  5.  33
    Are Moral Error Theorists Intellectually Vicious?Stephen Ingram - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):80-89.
    Christos Kyriacou has recently proposed charging moral error theorists with intellectual vice. He does this in response to an objection that Ingram makes against the 'moral fixed points view' developed by Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. This brief paper shows that Kyriacou's proposed vice-charge fails to vindicate the moral fixed points view. I argue that any attempt to make an epistemic vice-charge against error theorists will face major obstacles, and that it is highly unlikely that such a charge could receive the evidential (...)
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  6.  21
    Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgements, by, Bart Streumer. [REVIEW]Stephen Ingram - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-2.
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  7.  85
    After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism.Stephen Ingram - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.
    Moral abolitionists recommend that we get rid of moral discourse and moral judgement. At first glance this seems repugnant, but abolitionists think that we have overestimated the practical value of our moral framework and that eliminating it would be in our interests. I argue that abolitionism has a surprising amount going for it. Traditionally, abolitionism has been treated as an option available to moral error theorists. Error theorists say that moral discourse and judgement are committed to the existence of moral (...)
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  8.  17
    Philosophy Without Intuitions. By Herman Cappelen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. Xii + 242. [REVIEW]Stephen Ingram - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (3):372-376.
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  9.  53
    The Prudential Value of Forgiveness.Stephen Ingram - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1069-1078.
    Most philosophers who discuss the value of forgiveness concentrate on its moral value. This paper focuses on the prudential value of forgiveness, which has been surprisingly neglected by moral philosophers. I suggest that this may be because part of the concept of forgiveness involves the forgiver being motivated by moral rather than prudential considerations. But this does not justify neglecting the prudential value of forgiveness, which is important even though forgivers should not be prudentially motivated. Forgiveness helps satisfy interests arising (...)
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  10.  14
    Moral Perception_, _written by Robert Audi. [REVIEW]Stephen Ingram - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (3):377-380.
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  11.  8
    Alan H. Goldman, Reasons From Within: Desires and Values. [REVIEW]Stephen Ingram - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):167-170.