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Stephen Jacobson [11]Stephen Robert Jacobson [1]
  1. Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms.Stephen Jacobson - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):343-355.
    In his book, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, John Pollock argues that all externalist theories of justification should be rejected on the grounds that they do not do justice to the action-guiding character of epistemic norms. I reply that Pollocks argument is ineffective — because not all externalisms are intended to involve action-guiding norms, and because Pollock does not give a good reason for thinking that action-guiding norms must be internalist norms. Second, I consider rehabilitating Pollocks argument by restricting his conclusion (...)
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  2.  69
    Contextualism and Global Doubts About the World.Stephen Jacobson - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):381-404.
    Several recent contextualist theorists have proposed contextualizing the skeptic. Their claim is that oneshould view satisfactory answers to global doubts regarding such subjects as theexternal world, other minds, and induction as requirements for justification incertain philosophical contexts, but not in everyday and scientific contexts. Incontrast, the skeptic claims that a satisfactory answer to a global doubt in eachof these areas is a context-invariant requirement for justified belief. In this paper,I consider and reject the arguments Michael Williams develops in his bookUnnatural (...)
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  3.  5
    Contextualism And Global Doubts About The World.Stephen Jacobson - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):381-404.
    Several recent contextualist theorists have proposed contextualizing the skeptic. Their claim is that one should view satisfactory answers to global doubts regarding such subjects as the external world, other minds, and induction as requirements for justification in certain philosophical contexts, but not in everyday and scientific contexts. In contrast, the skeptic claims that a satisfactory answer to a global doubt in each of these areas is a context-invariant requirement for justified belief. In this paper, I consider and reject the arguments (...)
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  4.  63
    Contextualism, Skepticism, and Invariantism.Stephen Jacobson - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (3):375-391.
    Michael Williams e Keith DeRose defendem suas diferentes versões de contextualismo com base em que o contextualismo fornece uma explicação melhor do uso ordinário de termos epistêmicos que competidores invariantistas. Um objetivo deste trabalho é explicar por que seus argumentos não têm sucesso. Um objetivo adicional é mostrar que a disputa entre contextualistas e invariantistas tal como apresentada por Williams e DeRose é uma interpretação limitada da disputa: há importantes posições contextualistas e invariantistas que estão fora do alcance de seus (...)
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  5.  44
    Internalism in Epistemology and the Internalist Regress.Stephen Jacobson - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):415 – 424.
  6.  16
    Externalism and Action-Guiding Epistemic Norms.Stephen Jacobson - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):381-397.
    In his book, "Contemporary Theories of Knowledge," John Pollock argues that all externalist theories of justification should be rejected on the grounds that they do not do justice to the action-guiding character of epistemic norms. I reply that Pollock's argument is ineffective -- because not all externalisms are intended to involve action-guiding norms, and because Pollock does not give a good reason for thinking that action-guiding norms must be internalist norms. Second, I consider rehabilitating Pollock's argument by restricting his conclusion (...)
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  7.  32
    Alston on Iterative Foundationalism and Cartesian Epistemology.Stephen Jacobson - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):133 - 144.
    In his influential paper ‘Two Types of Foundationalism,’ William Alston distinguishes two important conceptions of foundationalism: ‘simple foundationalism’ and ‘iterative foundationalism’. SF is the view that there are immediately justified beliefs of some kind or other. IF is the stronger view that certain epistemic propositions are immediately justified. Alston favors a reliability account of immediate justification of the kind defended by externalists such as Armstrong, Dretske, and Goldman. Alston rejects IF by appeal to what he calls the ‘second level argument.’ (...)
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  8.  20
    A Companion to the Philosophers.Stephen Jacobson - 2000 - Philosophical Inquiry 22 (4):105-108.
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  9.  4
    Contextualism, Skepticism, and Invariantism.Stephen Jacobson - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (3):375-392.
    Michael Williams and Keith DeRose defend their different versions of contextualism on the grounds that contextualism gives a better account of the ordinary use of epistemic terms than invariantist competitors. One aim of this paper is to explain why their arguments do not succeed. A further aim is to show that the dispute between contextualists and invariantists portrayed by Williams and DeRose is a narrow interpretation of the dispute: there are important contextualist and invariantist positions which fall outside the scope (...)
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  10.  1
    Alston on Iterative Foundationalism and Cartesian Epistemology.Stephen Jacobson - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):133-143.
    In his influential paper ‘Two Types of Foundationalism,’ William Alston distinguishes two important conceptions of foundationalism: ‘simple foundationalism’ and ‘iterative foundationalism’. SF is the view that there are immediately justified beliefs of some kind or other. IF is the stronger view that certain epistemic propositions are immediately justified. Alston favors a reliability account of immediate justification of the kind defended by externalists such as Armstrong, Dretske, and Goldman. Alston rejects IF by appeal to what he calls the ‘second level argument.’ (...)
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  11. 'In Defense of Truth and Rationality.Stephen Jacobson - 1992 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73:335-46.
     
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