4 found
Steven S. Aspenson [6]Steven Scott Aspenson [3]Steve Aspenson [1]
  1. The Rescue Defence of Capital Punishment.Steve Aspenson - 2013 - Ratio 26 (1):91-105.
    Many political philosophers today think of justice as fundamentally about fairness, while those who defend capital punishment typically hold that justice is fundamentally about desert. In this paper I show that justice as fairness calls for capital punishment because the continued existence of murderers increases unfairness between themselves and their victims, increasing the harm to murdered persons. Rescuing murdered persons from increasing harm is prima facie morally required, and so capital punishment is a prima facie duty of society and sentencing (...)
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    Anselmian Satisfaction, Duns Scotus and the Debt of Sin.Steven S. Aspenson - 1996 - Modern Schoolman 73 (2):141-158.
    I assess Anselm’s claim that the debt of sin is "infinite" by examining the thought-experiment used to illustrate it. The claim crashes due to a conflict with Anselm’s implied (and plausible) view of God’s obligations and due to interesting errors in his thought-experiment. Nevertheless, I defend his "Union-of-Obligation-and-Ability (UOA) strategy and his "Provision-of-Satisfaction" mechanism for explaining atonement, which relied functionally on sin’s infinite demerit, by changing them a bit. I also defend Anselm’s UOA and "Disorder-Avoidance" strategies from objections from Duns (...)
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    Adorno, Theodor W. Critical Mod.Ron Dultz, Michael Eldridge, Stephen M. Fishman, Lucille McCarthy, Antony Flew, Peter A. French, E. Theodore, Charles G. Gross & Steven Scott Aspenson - 1998 - Teaching Philosophy 21 (4):427.
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    Reply to O’Connor.Steven S. Aspenson - 1989 - Faith and Philosophy 6 (1):95-98.
    In this reply I consider David O’Connor’s article “A Variation on the Free Will Defense” in which he tries to show that natural evil is necessary for free will by showing that it is required for the possibility of “morally creditable free choice.” I argue that O’Connor’s reply to an anticipated objection was unsuccessful in showing that humans can be moral without the property he calls “p.” that an altered understanding of what “morally creditable free choice” is would not help. (...)
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