8 found
Steve Guglielmo [7]Steven Guglielmo [1]
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  1. Can Unintended Side Effects be Intentional? Resolving a Controversy Over Intentionality and Morality.Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle - 2010 - Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36:1635-1647.
    Can an event’s blameworthiness distort whether people see it as intentional? In controversial recent studies, people judged a behavior’s negative side effect intentional even though the agent allegedly had no desire for it to occur. Such a judgment contradicts the standard assumption that desire is a necessary condition of intentionality, and it raises concerns about assessments of intentionality in legal settings. Six studies examined whether blameworthy events distort intentionality judgments. Studies 1 through 4 show that, counter to recent claims, intentionality (...)
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    At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology.Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):449-466.
    Moral judgments about an agent's behavior are enmeshed with inferences about the agent's mind. Folk psychology—the system that enables such inferences—therefore lies at the heart of moral judgment. We examine three related folk-psychological concepts that together shape people's judgments of blame: intentionality, choice, and free will. We discuss people's understanding and use of these concepts, address recent findings that challenge the autonomous role of these concepts in moral judgment, and conclude that choice is the fundamental concept of the three, defining (...)
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  3. Enough skill to kill: Intentionality judgments and the moral valence of action.Steve Guglielmo & Bertram F. Malle - 2010 - Cognition 117 (2):139-150.
    Extant models of moral judgment assume that an action’s intentionality precedes assignments of blame. Knobe (2003b) challenged this fundamental order and proposed instead that the badness or blameworthiness of an action directs (and thus unduly biases) people’s intentionality judgments. His and other researchers’ studies suggested that blameworthy actions are considered intentional even when the agent lacks skill (e.g., killing somebody with a lucky shot) whereas equivalent neutral actions are not (e.g., luckily hitting a bull’s-eye). The present five studies offer an (...)
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    Moral judgment as information processing: an integrative review.Steve Guglielmo - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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    Unfounded dumbfounding: How harm and purity undermine evidence for moral dumbfounding.Steve Guglielmo - 2018 - Cognition 170:334-337.
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    Questioning the Influence of Moral Judgment.Steve Guglielmo - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):338-339.
    Moral judgment – even the type discussed by Knobe – necessarily relies on substantial information about an agent's mental states, especially regarding beliefs and attitudes. Moreover, the effects described by Knobe can be attributed to norm violations in general, rather than moral concerns in particular. Consequently, Knobe's account overstates the influence of moral judgment on assessments of mental states and causality.
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    Are intentionality judgments fundamentally moral.Bertram F. Malle & Steve Guglielmo - 2012 - In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press.
  8.  8
    Directions and Challenges in Studying Folk Concepts and Folk Judgments.Bertram Malle & Steven Guglielmo - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):321-329.
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