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Profile: Steve Pearce
  1. The Moral Content of Psychiatric Treatment.Hanna Pickard & Steve Pearce - 2009 - British Journal of Psychiatry.
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    Answering the Neo-Szaszian Critique: Are Cluster B Personality Disorders Really So Different?Steve Pearce - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (3):203-208.
    I was delighted to be asked to comment on Peter Zachar’s paper, partly because he presents an elegant proposal for how personality disorders (PD) might be considered to fit into a broadly medical conception of disorder, but also because the overlap between moral and clinical elements of disorder, and more broadly moral and clinical psychiatric kinds, seems to me to be a question central to the theory and practice of psychiatry. The moral context of diagnosis and treatment is a question (...)
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  3. Addiction in Context: Philosophical Lessons From a Personality Disorder Clinic.Hanna Pickard & Steve Pearce - 2013 - In . pp. 165-189.
    Popular and neurobiological accounts of addiction tend to treat it as a form of compulsion. This contrasts with personality disorder, where most problematic behaviours are treated as voluntary. But high levels of co-morbidity, overlapping diagnostic traits, and the effectiveness of a range of comparable clinical interventions for addiction and personality disorder suggest that this difference in treatment is unjustified. Drawing on this range of clinical interventions, we argue that addiction is not a form of compulsion. Rather, the misuse of drugs (...)
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    A Pure Representationalist Account of Belief and Desire.Steve Pearce - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Western Ontario
    According to the traditional view, beliefs and desires are mental representations that play particular functional roles. A belief that P is state which represents P and plays the belief-role, while a desire that P is a state which represents that P and plays the desire-role. In this dissertation I argue that the traditional view has trouble accounting for (a) role that belief and desire play in the causal and rational explanation of behaviour and (b) our knowledge of our own conscious, (...)
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