38 found
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  1.  20
    The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning.Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Bulletin 119 (1):3-22.
    Distinctions have been proposed between systems of reasoning for centuries. This article distills properties shared by many of these distinctions and characterizes the resulting systems in light of recent findings and theoretical developments. One system is associative because its computations reflect similarity structure and relations of temporal contiguity. The other is "rule based" because it operates on symbolic structures that have logical content and variables and because its computations have the properties that are normally assigned to rules. The systems serve (...)
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  2.  86
    Base-Rate Respect: From Ecological Rationality to Dual Processes.Aron K. Barbey & Steven A. Sloman - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):241-254.
    The phenomenon of base-rate neglect has elicited much debate. One arena of debate concerns how people make judgments under conditions of uncertainty. Another more controversial arena concerns human rationality. In this target article, we attempt to unpack the perspectives in the literature on both kinds of issues and evaluate their ability to explain existing data and their conceptual coherence. From this evaluation we conclude that the best account of the data should be framed in terms of a dual-process model of (...)
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  3.  22
    Do We “Do”?Steven A. Sloman & David A. Lagnado - 2005 - Cognitive Science 29 (1):5-39.
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  4.  15
    Feature Centrality and Conceptual Coherence.Steven A. Sloman, Bradley C. Love & Woo-Kyoung Ahn - 1998 - Cognitive Science 22 (2):189-228.
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  5.  29
    Causal Reasoning Through Intervention.York Hagmayer, Steven A. Sloman, David A. Lagnado & Michael R. Waldmann - 2007 - In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation. Oxford University Press.
  6.  5
    Asymmetries in Predictive and Diagnostic Reasoning.Philip M. Fernbach, Adam Darlow & Steven A. Sloman - 2011 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 140 (2):168-185.
  7. Artifact Categorization: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.Barbara C. Malt & Steven A. Sloman - 2007 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representaion. Oxford University Press. pp. 85--123.
  8.  4
    Decision Makers Conceive of Their Choices as Interventions.York Hagmayer & Steven A. Sloman - 2009 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 138 (1):22-38.
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  9.  11
    Category Essence or Essentially Pragmatic? Creator’s Intention in Naming and What’s Really What.Barbara C. Malt & Steven A. Sloman - 2007 - Cognition 105 (3):615-648.
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  10.  59
    A Causal Model of Intentionality Judgment.Steven A. Sloman, Philip M. Fernbach & Scott Ewing - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):154-180.
    We propose a causal model theory to explain asymmetries in judgments of the intentionality of a foreseen side-effect that is either negative or positive (Knobe, 2003). The theory is implemented as a Bayesian network relating types of mental states, actions, and consequences that integrates previous hypotheses. It appeals to two inferential routes to judgment about the intentionality of someone else's action: bottom-up from action to desire and top-down from character and disposition. Support for the theory comes from three experiments that (...)
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  11.  86
    The Meaning of Cause and Prevent: The Role of Causal Mechanism.Clare R. Walsh & Steven A. Sloman - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (1):21-52.
    How do people understand questions about cause and prevent? Some theories propose that people affirm that A causes B if A's occurrence makes a difference to B's occurrence in one way or another. Other theories propose that A causes B if some quantity or symbol gets passed in some way from A to B. The aim of our studies is to compare these theories' ability to explain judgements of causation and prevention. We describe six experiments that compare judgements for causal (...)
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  12.  13
    The Problem of Induction.Steven A. Sloman & D. Lagnado - 2005 - In K. Holyoak & B. Morrison (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. Cambridge University Press. pp. 95--116.
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  13.  15
    Assessing the Causal Structure of Function.Sergio E. Chaigneau, Lawrence W. Barsalou & Steven A. Sloman - 2004 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 133 (4):601-625.
  14.  22
    Beyond Covariation.David A. Lagnado, Michael R. Waldmann, York Hagmayer & Steven A. Sloman - 2007 - In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation. Oxford University Press.
  15.  38
    Categorical Induction From Uncertain Premises: Jeffrey's Doesn't Completely Rule.Constantinos Hadjichristidis, Steven A. Sloman & David E. Over - 2014 - Thinking and Reasoning 20 (4):405-431.
    Studies of categorical induction typically examine how belief in a premise (e.g., Falcons have an ulnar artery) projects on to a conclusion (e.g., Robins have an ulnar artery). We study induction in cases in which the premise is uncertain (e.g., There is an 80% chance that falcons have an ulnar artery). Jeffrey's rule is a normative model for updating beliefs in the face of uncertain evidence. In three studies we tested the descriptive validity of Jeffrey's rule and a related probability (...)
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  16.  10
    When Explanations Compete: The Role of Explanatory Coherence on Judgements of Likelihood.Steven A. Sloman - 1994 - Cognition 52 (1):1-21.
  17.  45
    The Causal Psycho-Logic of Choice.Steven A. Sloman & York Hagmayer - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):407-412.
  18.  29
    The Causal Structure of Utility Conditionals.Jean-François Bonnefon & Steven A. Sloman - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (1):193-209.
    The psychology of reasoning is increasingly considering agents' values and preferences, achieving greater integration with judgment and decision making, social cognition, and moral reasoning. Some of this research investigates utility conditionals, ‘‘if p then q’’ statements where the realization of p or q or both is valued by some agents. Various approaches to utility conditionals share the assumption that reasoners make inferences from utility conditionals based on the comparison between the utility of p and the expected utility of q. This (...)
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  19.  18
    Self-Deception Requires Vagueness.Steven A. Sloman, Philip M. Fernbach & York Hagmayer - 2010 - Cognition 115 (2):268-281.
  20.  11
    Similarity as an Explanatory Construct.Steven A. Sloman & Lance J. Rips - 1998 - Cognition 65 (2-3):87-101.
  21.  6
    Is Deontic Reasoning Special?Amit Almor & Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (2):374-380.
  22.  8
    Thought as a Determinant of Political Opinion.Steven A. Sloman & Nathaniel Rabb - 2019 - Cognition 188:1-7.
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  23.  22
    Opening Editorial: The Changing Face of Cognition.Steven A. Sloman - 2015 - Cognition 135:1-3.
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  24.  7
    When Good Evidence Goes Bad: The Weak Evidence Effect in Judgment and Decision-Making.Philip M. Fernbach, Adam Darlow & Steven A. Sloman - 2011 - Cognition 119 (3):459-467.
  25.  55
    Counterfactuals and Causal Models: Introduction to the Special Issue.Steven A. Sloman - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):969-976.
    Judea Pearl won the 2010 Rumelhart Prize in computational cognitive science due to his seminal contributions to the development of Bayes nets and causal Bayes nets, frameworks that are central to multiple domains of the computational study of mind. At the heart of the causal Bayes nets formalism is the notion of a counterfactual, a representation of something false or nonexistent. Pearl refers to Bayes nets as oracles for intervention, and interventions can tell us what the effect of action will (...)
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  26.  19
    Subject Index to Volume 29.Robert L. Goldstone, Steven A. Sloman, David A. Lagnado, Mark Steyvers, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Saskia Jaarsveld, Cees van Leeuwen, Murray Shanahan, Terry Dartnall & Simon Dennis - 2005 - Cognitive Science 29:1093-1096.
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  27. Causal Beliefs Influence the Perception of Temporal Order.Philip M. Fernbach, Preston Linson-Gentry & Steven A. Sloman - 2007 - In McNamara D. S. & Trafton J. G. (eds.), Proceedings of the 29th Annual Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 269--74.
     
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  28.  11
    Speaking Versus Thinking About Objects and Actions.Barbara C. Malt, Steven A. Sloman & Silvia P. Gennari - 2003 - In Dedre Getner & Susan Goldin-Meadow (eds.), Language in Mind: Advances in the Study of Language and Thought. MIT Press. pp. 81--112.
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  29.  24
    Explanatory Coherence and the Induction of Properties.Steven A. Sloman - 1997 - Thinking and Reasoning 3 (2):81 – 110.
    Statements that share an explanation tend to lend inductive support to one another. For example, being told that Many furniture movers have a hard time financing a house increases the judged probability that Secretaries have a hard time financing a house. In contrast, statements with different explanations reduce one another s judged probability. Being told that Many furniture movers have bad backs decreases the judged probability that Secretaries have bad backs. I pose two questions concerning such discounting effects. First, does (...)
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  30.  17
    Base-Rate Respect: From Statistical Formats to Cognitive Structures.Aron K. Barbey & Steven A. Sloman - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):287-292.
    The commentaries indicate a general agreement that one source of reduction of base-rate neglect involves making structural relations among relevant sets transparent. There is much less agreement, however, that this entails dual systems of reasoning. In this response, we make the case for our perspective on dual systems. We compare and contrast our view to the natural frequency hypothesis as formulated in the commentaries.
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  31.  5
    More Than Words, but Still Not Categorization.Barbara C. Malt & Steven A. Sloman - 2007 - Cognition 105 (3):656-657.
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  32.  11
    Don't Throw Out the Bayes with the Bathwater.Philip M. Fernbach & Steven A. Sloman - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (4):198-199.
    We highlight one way in which Jones & Love (J&L) misconstrue the Bayesian program: Bayesian models do not represent a rejection of mechanism. This mischaracterization obscures the valid criticisms in their article. We conclude that computational-level Bayesian modeling should not be rejected or discouraged a priori, but should be held to the same empirical standards as other models.
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  33.  27
    Do Causal Beliefs Influence the Hot-Hand and the Gambler's Fallacy?Giorgio Gronchi & Steven A. Sloman - 2008 - In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1164--1168.
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  34.  37
    Part-Set Cuing Inhibition in Category-Instance and Reason Generation.Steven A. Sloman - 1991 - Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (2):136-138.
  35.  4
    Community Appeal: Explanation Without Information.Babak Hemmatian & Steven A. Sloman - 2018 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 147 (11):1677-1712.
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  36.  9
    Progress Within the Bounds of Memory.Steven A. Sloman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):679-680.
  37.  4
    What Does Evolution Tell Us About Age Preferences?Steven A. Sloman & Leon Sloman - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):110-111.
  38. Counterfactual and Generative Accounts of Causal Attribution.Clare R. Walsh & Steven A. Sloman - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. pp. 184.