16 found
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  1.  51
    Paradoxes of Fair Division.Steven J. Brams, Paul H. Edelman & Peter C. Fishburn - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (6):300.
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  2.  23
    Divide the Dollar: Three Solutions and Extensions. [REVIEW]Steven J. Brams & Alan D. Taylor - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (2):211-231.
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  3.  18
    Staying Power in Sequential Games.Steven J. Brams & Marek P. Hessel - 1983 - Theory and Decision 15 (3):279-302.
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  4.  59
    Fair Division of Indivisible Items.Steven J. Brams, Paul H. Edelman & Peter C. Fishburn - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (2):147-180.
    This paper analyzes criteria of fair division of a set of indivisible items among people whose revealed preferences are limited to rankings of the items and for whom no side payments are allowed. The criteria include refinements of Pareto optimality and envy-freeness as well as dominance-freeness, evenness of shares, and two criteria based on equally-spaced surrogate utilities, referred to as maxsum and equimax. Maxsum maximizes a measure of aggregate utility or welfare, whereas equimax lexicographically maximizes persons' utilities from smallest to (...)
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  5.  28
    Power and Size: A New Paradox. [REVIEW]Steven J. Brams & Paul J. Affuso - 1976 - Theory and Decision 7 (1-2):29-56.
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  6.  37
    Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem. [REVIEW]Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (3):263-289.
    A cornerstone of game theory is backward induction, whereby players reason backward from the end of a game in extensive form to the beginning in order to determine what choices are rational at each stage of play. Truels, or three-person duels, are used to illustrate how the outcome can depend on (1) the evenness/oddness of the number of rounds (the parity problem) and (2) uncertainty about the endpoint of the game (the uncertainty problem). Since there is no known endpoint in (...)
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  7.  20
    Double Deception: Two Against One in Three-Person Games. [REVIEW]Steven J. Brams & Frank C. Zagare - 1981 - Theory and Decision 13 (1):81-90.
    This article examines deception possibilities for two players in simple three-person voting games. An example of one game vulnerable to (tacit) deception by two players is given and its implications discussed. The most unexpected findings of this study is that in those games vulnerable to deception by two players, the optimal strategy of one of them is always to announce his (true) preference order. Moreover, since the player whose optimal announcement is his true one is unable to induce a better (...)
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  8.  9
    Omniscience and Omnipotence: How They May Help - or Hurt - in a Game.Steven J. Brams - 1982 - Inquiry 25 (2):217 – 231.
    The concepts of omniscience and omnipotence are defined in 2 ? 2 ordinal games, and implications for the optimal play of these games, when one player is omniscient or omnipotent and the other player is aware of his omniscience or omnipotence, are derived. Intuitively, omniscience allows a player to predict the strategy choice of an opponent in advance of play, and omnipotence allows a player, after initial strategy choices are made, to continue to move after the other player is forced (...)
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  9. Superior Beings. If They Exist How Would We Know?Steven J. Brams - 1987 - Studia Logica 46 (2):205-206.
  10.  43
    National Security Games.Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - 1988 - Synthese 76 (2):185 - 200.
    Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games. A generic two-person game called the Conflict Game, which captures strategic features of such variable-sum games as Chicken and Prisoners'' Dilemma, is then analyzed. Unlike these classical games, however, the Conflict Game is a two-stage game in which each player can threaten to retaliate (...)
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  11.  17
    Belief in God: A Game-Theoretic Paradox. [REVIEW]Steven J. Brams - 1982 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (3):121 - 129.
    The Belief Game is a two-person, nonzero-sum game in which both players can do well [e.g., at (3, 4)] or badly [e.g., at (1,1)] simultaneously. The problem that occurs in the play of this game is that its rational outcome of (2, 3) is not only unappealing to both players, especially God, but also, paradoxically, there is an outcome, (3, 4), preferred by both players that is unattainable. Moreover, because God has a dominant strategy, His omniscience does not remedy the (...)
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  12.  7
    A Resolution of the Paradox of Omniscience.Steven J. Brams - 1981 - Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 3:17-30.
  13.  16
    Optimal Deterrence.Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - 1985 - Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1):118.
    1. Introduction The policy of deterrence, at least to avert nuclear war between the superpowers, has been a controversial one. The main controversy arises from the threat of each side to visit destruction on the other in response to an initial attack. This threat would seem irrational if carrying it out would lead to a nuclear holocaust – the worst outcome for both sides. Instead, it would seem better for the side attacked to suffer some destruction rather than to retaliate (...)
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  14.  1
    Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational, and Will Star Wars Help?Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour - 1987 - Analyse & Kritik 9 (1-2):62-74.
    Deterrence means threatening to retaliate against an attack in order to deter it in the first place. The central problem with a policy of deterrence is that the threat of retaliation may not be credible if retaliation leads to a worse outcome - perhaps a nuclear holocaust - than a side would suffer from absorbing a limited first strike and not retaliating. - The optimality of deterrence is analyzed by means of a Deterrence Game based on Chicken, in which each (...)
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  15. Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution.Steven J. Brams & Alan D. Taylor - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods, or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number (...)
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  16. Optimal Deterrence*: Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour.Steven J. Brams - 1985 - Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1):118-135.
    1. Introduction The policy of deterrence, at least to avert nuclear war between the superpowers, has been a controversial one. The main controversy arises from the threat of each side to visit destruction on the other in response to an initial attack. This threat would seem irrational if carrying it out would lead to a nuclear holocaust – the worst outcome for both sides. Instead, it would seem better for the side attacked to suffer some destruction rather than to retaliate (...)
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