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  1. Fairness Versus Welfare.Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell - 2002 - Law and Philosophy 23 (1):73-102.
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  2. Fairness Versus Welfare.Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):345-348.
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    Moral Rules, the Moral Sentiments, and Behavior: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System.Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell - manuscript
    How should moral sanctions and moral rewards - the moral sentiments involving feelings of guilt and of virtue - be employed to govern individuals' behavior if the objective is to maximize social welfare? In the model that we examine, guilt is a disincentive to act and virtue is an incentive because we assume that they are negative and positive sources of utility. We also suppose that guilt and virtue are costly to inculcate and are subject to certain constraints on their (...)
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    Reply to a Comment on “The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction”.Steven Shavell - 1996 - Legal Theory 2 (1):83-85.
    In his interesting comment on my recent article, “The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction,” Edward Schwartz makes two criticisms of my analysis. The criticisms have essentially to do with my assumption that an appeals court judge will base his or her decisions only on what happened at trial, and not on any inference that can be drawn from the fact that an appeal was brought. Before explaining why I do not find Schwartz's criticisms problematic, it will be (...)
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    Reply to Ripstein: Notes on Welfarist Versus Deontological Principles.Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):209-215.
    In Fairness versus Welfare (FVW), we advance the thesis that social policies should be assessed entirely with regard to their effects on individuals' well-being. That is, no independent weight should be accorded to notions of fairness such as corrective or retributive justice or other deontological principles. Our claim is based on the demonstration that pursuit of notions of fairness has perverse effects on welfare, on other problematic aspects of the notions, and on a reconciliation of our thesis with the evident (...)
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