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Steven Sverdlik [27]Steven David Sverdlik [1]
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Profile: Steven Sverdlik (Southern Methodist University)
  1. Deterrent Punishment in Utilitarianism.Steven Sverdlik - manuscript
    This is a presentation of the utilitarian approach to punishment. It is meant for students. The first section discusses Bentham's psychological hedonism. The second briefly criticizes it. The third section explains abstractly how utilitarianism would determine of the right amount of punishment. The fourth section applies the theory to some cases, and brings out how utilitarianism could favor punishments more or less severe than the lex talionis.
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  2.  69
    Intention, Intentional Action, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred Mele & Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (3):265 - 287.
  3. The Origins of the Objection.Steven Sverdlik - manuscript
    It is considered to be a devastating objection to utilitarianism (and consequentialism) that it would sometimes favor deliberately punishing an innocent person. I call this The Objection. In this paper I try to find the origin of The Objection. Although various writers have suggested that it occurs much earlier, I claim that it emerged in Oxford in the late 1920's, and may have been invented by W. D. Ross.
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  4.  47
    Intentionality and Moral Judgments in Commonsense Thought About Action.Steven Sverdlik - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):224-236.
    The concept of intentional action occupies a central place in commonsense or folk psychological thought. Philosophers of action, psychologists and moral philosophers all have taken an interest in understanding this important concept. One issue that has been discussed by philosophers is whether the concept of intentional action is purely ‘naturalistic’, that is, whether it is entirely a descriptive concept that can be used to explain and predict behavior. (Of course, judgments using such a concept could be used to support moral (...)
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  5.  57
    Motive and Rightness.Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Ethics 106 (2):327-349.
    Motive and Rightness is the first book-length attempt to answer the question: Does the motive of an action ever make a difference to whether that action is ...
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  6.  70
    Collective Responsibility.Steven Sverdlik - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (1):61 - 76.
    More than one person can be responsible for a particular state of affairs--In this sense collective moral responsibility does indeed exist. However, Even in such cases, Moral responsibility is still fundamentally individualized since each agent responsible for a particular state of affairs is responsible for his/her actions which have the intention of producing this state of affairs.
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  7. Hume's Key and Aesthetic Rationality.Steven Sverdlik - 1986 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 45 (1):69-76.
  8.  20
    Pure Negligence.Steven Sverdlik - 1993 - American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2):137 - 149.
  9.  95
    The Nature of Desert.Steven Sverdlik - 1983 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):585-594.
  10.  23
    Kantianism, Consequentialism and Deterrence.Steven Sverdlik - forthcoming - In Christian Seidel (ed.), Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems? Oxford University Press.
    It is often argued that Kantian and consequentialist approaches to the philosophy of punishment differ on the question of whether using punishment to achieve deterrence is morally acceptable. I show that this is false: both theories judge it to be acceptable. Showing this requires attention to what the Formula of Humanity in Kant requires agents to do. If we use the correct interpretation of this formula we can also see that an anti-consequentialist moral principle used by Victor Tadros to criticize (...)
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  11.  19
    Consistency Among Intentions and the 'Simple View'.Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):515 - 522.
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  12.  1
    Desert as a Limiting Condition.Steven Sverdlik - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-17.
    I examine two related ideas about the role of desert judgments which say, roughly, that, if a punishment is undeserved, it is impermissible to impose it. These can both be taken to claim that desert is a ‘limiting condition’ on the pursuit of consequentialist aims. I discuss what considerations are supposed to support an offender’s desert claim. I first examine the major divide between contemporary retributivist theories: those that take an offender’s desert to supervene only on culpability considerations, and those (...)
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  13.  10
    Giving Wrongdoers What They Deserve.Steven Sverdlik - 2016 - Journal of Ethics 20 (4):385-399.
    Retributivist approaches to the philosophy of punishment are usually based on certain claims related to moral desert. I focus on one such principle:Censuring Principle : There is a moral reason to censure guilty wrongdoers aversively.Principles like CP are often supported by the construction of examples similar to Kant’s ‘desert island’. These are meant to show that there is a reason for state officials to punish deserving wrongdoers, even if none of the familiar goals of punishment, such as deterrence, will be (...)
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  14.  24
    Crime and Moral Luck.Steven Sverdlik - 1988 - American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1):79 - 86.
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  15.  37
    Kant, Nonaccidentalness and the Availability of Moral Worth.Steven Sverdlik - 2001 - Journal of Ethics 5 (4):293-313.
    Contemporary Kantians who defend Kant''s view of the superiority of the sense of duty as a form of motivation appeal to various ideas. Some say, if only implicitly, that the sense of duty is always ``available'''' to an agent, when she has a moral obligation. Some, like Barbara Herman, say that the sense of duty provides a ``nonaccidental'''' connection between an agent''s motivation and the act''s rightness. In this paper I show that the ``availability'''' and ``nonaccidentalness'''' arguments are in tension (...)
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  16.  25
    Punishment.Steven Sverdlik - 1988 - Law and Philosophy 7 (2):179 - 201.
    The main previous analyses of punishment by Hart, Feinberg and Wasserstrom are considered and criticized. One persistent fault is the neglect of the idea that in punishment the person subjected to it is represented as having no valid excuse for wrongdoing. A new analysis is proposed which attempts to specify in what sense punishment by its very nature is retributive, as Wasserstrom has asserted. Certain problematic cases such as strict liability offenses and pre-trial detention are considered in light of the (...)
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  17.  23
    Punishment and Reform.Steven Sverdlik - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (3):619-633.
    The reform of offenders is often said to be one of the morally legitimate aims of punishment. After briefly surveying the history of reformist thinking I examine the ‘quasi-reform’ theories, as I call them, of H. Morris, J. Hampton and A. Duff. I explain how they conceive of reform, and what role they take it to have in the criminal justice system. I then focus critically on one feature of their conception of reform, namely, the claim that a reformed offender (...)
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  18.  29
    Counterexamples in Ethics.Steven Sverdlik - 1985 - Metaphilosophy 16 (2‐3):130-145.
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  19.  20
    Sidgwick's Methodology.Steven Sverdlik - 1985 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 23 (4):537-553.
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  20.  19
    The Logic of Desert.Steven Sverdlik - 1983 - Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (4):317-324.
  21.  1
    The Nature of Desert.Steven Sverdlik - 1983 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):585-594.
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  22.  16
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Steven Sverdlik, Tomas Kulka & David C. Graves - 1991 - Philosophia 21 (1-2):141-159.
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  23.  4
    Unconscious Evil Principles.Steven Sverdlik - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):13-14.
  24.  11
    Justice and Mercy.Steven Sverdlik - 1985 - Journal of Social Philosophy 16 (3):36-47.
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  25. Consistency Among Intentions and the ‘Simple View’.Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):515-522.
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  26. Distributing Ackerman's Manna.Steven Sverdlik - 1983 - Reason Papers 9:51-56.
     
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  27. Motive and Rightness.Steven Sverdlik - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Motive and Rightness is the first book-length attempt to answer the question, Does the motive of an action ever make a difference in whether that action is morally right or wrong? Steven Sverdlik argues that the answer is yes. His book examines the major theories now being discussed by moral philosophers to see if they can provide a plausible account of the relevance of motives to rightness and wrongness. Sverdlik argues that consequentialism gives a better account of these matters than (...)
     
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