This paper presents an attempt to bridge the gap between logical and cognitive treatments of strategic reasoning in games. There have been extensive formal debates about the merits of the principle of backward induction among game theorists and logicians. Experimental economists and psychologists have shown that human subjects, perhaps due to their bounded resources, do not always follow the backward induction strategy, leading to unexpected outcomes. Recently, based on an eye-tracking study, it has turned out that even human (...) subjects who produce the outwardly correct ‘backward induction answer’ use a different internal reasoning strategy to achieve it. The paper presents a formal language to represent different strategies on a finer-grained level than was possible before. The language and its semantics help to precisely distinguish different cognitive reasoning strategies, that can then be tested on the basis of computational cognitive models and experiments with human subjects. The syntactic framework of the formal system provides a generic way of constructing computational cognitive models of the participants of the Marble Drop game. (shrink)

There is a tendency in decision‐making research to treat uncertainty only as a problem to be overcome. But it is also a feature that can be leveraged, particularly in social interaction. Comparing the behavior of profitable and unprofitable poker players, we reveal a strategic use of information processing that keeps decision makers unpredictable. To win at poker, a player must exploit public signals from others. But using public inputs makes it easier for an observer to reconstruct that player's strategy (...) and predict his or her behavior. How should players trade off between exploiting profitable opportunities and remaining unexploitable themselves? Using a recent multivariate approach to information theoretic data analysis and 1.75 million hands of online two‐player No‐Limit Texas Hold'em, we find that the important difference between winning and losing players is not in the amount of information they process, but how they process it. In particular, winning players are better at integrative information processing—creating new information from the interaction between their cards and their opponents’ signals. We argue that integrative information processing does not just produce better decisions, it makes decision‐making harder for others to reverse engineer, as an expert poker player's cards act like the private key in public‐key cryptography. Poker players encrypt their reasoning with the way they process information. The encryption function of integrative information processing makes it possible for players to exploit others while remaining unexploitable. By recognizing the act of information processing as a strategic behavior in its own right, we offer a detailed account of how experts use endemic uncertainty to conceal their intentions in high‐stakes competitive environments, and we highlight new opportunities between cognitive science, information theory, and game theory. (shrink)

Joseph Heath'sCommunicative Action and Rational Choicestands out clearly as one of the most astute and original of the several critiques of Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action to have emerged in the last decade. Heath refrains from engaging merely in skirmishes with various details of Habermas's theory; he rather aims directly at its core issue: the critique of instrumental reason. Heath argues that Habermas's key criticism—that instrumental reason cannot account for successful communication—is not critical enough. Heath argues that instrumental reason (...) cannot account even for the successfulmonologicalaction. Heath then claims that one can construct a critical rational theory without much of the problematic addenda that Habermas requires, particularly the need for a tripartite theory of validity claims. (shrink)

Practical reasoning is an agent's capacity to determine her course of behavior on the base of some evaluation of available alternatives. Reasoning is instrumental insofar as an agent decides over available alternatives by aiming to choose the best means to realize her own goals. Reasoning is strategic if the agent assumes that what the best means to realize her own goals is depends on what other agents will do. Strategic reasoning still plays a central (...) role in influential accounts of social action. This paper first argues for the view that purely strategic reasoners are unable to achieve even the most basic and unproblematic forms of mutually beneficent coordination, and then gathers some elements of a richer account of relevant forms of practical reasoning. (shrink)

We consider systems of rational agents who act and interact in pursuit of their individual and collective objectives. We study and formalise the reasoning of an agent, or of an external observer, about the expected choices of action of the other agents based on their objectives, in order to assess the reasoner’s ability, or expectation, to achieve their own objective. To formalize such reasoning we extend Pauly’s Coalition Logic with three new modal operators of conditional strategic (...) class='Hi'>reasoning, thus introducing the Logic for Local Conditional Strategic Reasoning \. We provide formal semantics for the new conditional strategic operators in concurrent game models, introduce the matching notion of bisimulation for each of them, prove bisimulation invariance and Hennessy–Milner property for each of them, and discuss and compare briefly their expressiveness. Finally, we also propose systems of axioms for each of the basic operators of \ and for the full logic. (shrink)

Through the example of a paradigmatic deliberative speech from classical oratory, the paper addresses two fundamental questions of teaching rhetorical reasoning. First, the paper shows that a speech from ancient Greek and Roman political or judicial oratory could provide effective means to teach a variety of argumentation skills, the recognition of fallacies and an awareness of biases in the target audience. Second, the paper uses the speech to consider an elusive problem of rhetorical or critical reasoning instruction, namely (...) how students may use historical models to adapt their knowledge of a case to real-life situations, where a large number of uncertain variables demands a constant awareness of the conditions affecting the audience`s decision and may require a swift change in the argumentative strategy. The paper will argue that the application of a new model of strategic reasoning called heuristic rhetoric to Cicero`s speech could illustrate a workable solution to both problems. (shrink)

This paper is an overview of some recent and ongoing developments of formal logical systems designed for reasoning about systems of rational agents who act in pursuit of their individual and collective goals, explicitly specified in the language as arguments of the strategic operators, in a socially interactive context of collective objectives and attitudes which guide and constrain the agents’ behavior.

Recent work in the strategic-relational approach to explaining the relationship between structure and agency emphasises the significance of ideas, discourses, and the semiotic realm of symbols. However, this work does not yet offer an explanation of how discourses relate to symbols – how texts take on meaning. This article shows why this is needed. It then provides such an account of language use and learning in explicitly strategic-relational terms. That account both grounds strategic-relational concepts of discourse, and (...) helps define them more clearly. While complementing and strengthening such notions, it also provides an insight into the way particular discourses interrelate. In particular, the model presented here suggests the importance of the constructive and critical potential of reason, in enlarging the scope for critical syntheses across discourses, and guarding against hegemony. (shrink)

We combine two recent probabilistic approaches to natural language understanding, exploring the formal pragmatics of communication on a noisy channel. We first extend a model of rational communication between a speaker and listener, to allow for the possibility that messages are corrupted by noise. In this model, common knowledge of a noisy channel leads to the use and correct understanding of sentence fragments. A further extension of the model, which allows the speaker to intentionally reduce the noise rate on a (...) word, is used to model prosodic emphasis. We show that the model derives several well-known changes in meaning associated with prosodic emphasis. Our results show that nominal amounts of actual noise can be leveraged for communicative purposes. (shrink)

We argue that, in order to explain the relative strengths of our reasons to contribute to different collective endeavours, approaches to the ethics of collective action must understand the strengths of our reasons to make a given contribution as proportional to its expected benefits, or its chances of bringing about benefits in proportion to their magnitudes. The view that most clearly meets this proportionality requirement is the expected consequences approach, which identifies our reasons to perform an act with its expected (...) benefits. We contend that views other than the expected consequences approach must similarly proportion the expected degrees of what they take to be reason-giving features of a contribution – such as its virtuousness, appropriate expression, support by considerations of fairness, or helping without making a difference – to the contribution’s expected benefits. The proportionality requirement explains why we should spend more time participating in strategic social, political, and labour movement activities, while avoiding unproductive conflicts and merely performative activities. We conclude that the proportionality requirement, and the ability of views other than the expected consequences approach to meet it, are important for thinking and communicating about the ethics of collective action in ways that are simultaneously most compelling and most strategic. (shrink)

We analyse the incentives of individuals to misrepresent their truthful judgments when engaged in collective decision-making. Our focus is on scenarios in which individuals reason about the incentives of others before choosing which judgments to report themselves. To this end, we introduce a formal model of strategic behaviour in logic-based judgment aggregation that accounts for such higher-level reasoning as well as the fact that individuals may only have partial information about the truthful judgments and preferences of their peers. (...) We find that every aggregation rule must belong to exactly one of three possible categories: it is either (i) immune to strategic manipulation for every level of reasoning, or (ii) manipulable for every level of reasoning, or (iii) immune to manipulation only for everykth level of reasoning, for some natural number kgreater than 1. (shrink)

Strategic leadership and corporate sustainability have recently come together in conspicuously explicit fashion through the emergence of top management team positions with dedicated corporate sustainability responsibilities. These TMT positions, commonly referred to as “Chief Sustainability Officers,” have found their way into the upper echelons of many of the world’s largest corporations alongside more traditional TMT positions including the CEO and CFO. We explore this phenomenon and consider the following two questions: Why are corporate sustainability positions being installed to the (...) TMT?What effects do corporate sustainability TMT positions have at their organizations? We consider these questions through strategic leadership and neoinstitutional theoretical frameworks. Through the latter, we also engage with Weberian considerations of bureaucracy. We find that the reasons why corporate sustainability TMT positions are installed can be in response to a crisis at the corporation for which its legitimacy is challenged. We also find the corporate sustainability TMT position can be installed proactively in an effort to realize external opportunities that may have otherwise gone unrealized without concerted attention and coordination afforded by a strategic level position. Regarding effects, we determine the position can relate to the establishment of bureaucratic structures dedicated to corporate sustainability within the corporation through which formalized processes and key performance indicators to drive corporate sustainability performances are established. In the face of our finding that many corporate sustainability TMT positions are being removed despite having only relatively recently been introduced to their respective TMTs, we find that the successful implementation of bureaucratic machinery can help considerations to sustainability extend beyond the tenure of a corporate sustainability position within the TMT. (shrink)

In this book, I make use of an idea from economics to suggest how noble human tendencies might not only have survived the ruthless pressures of the material world, but actually have been nurtured by them.

Soon after taking power, three leaders of nonviolent African independence movements, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia immediately turned to violent means to suppress internal opposition. The paper examines the reasons for the success of their Gandhian nonviolent tactics in ousting British colonial governments and argues that these new heads of state lost confidence in nonviolence due to a mixture of self-serving expediency, a lack of understanding of nonviolence's many different forms, and the (...) constraints of inheriting a state already dependent on the use of force. (shrink)

The author gives an analysis of the strategic manoeuvring in the justification of legal decisions from a pragma-dialectical perspective by showing how a judge tries to reconcile dialectical and rhetorical aims. On the basis of an analysis and evaluation of the argumentation given by the US Supreme Court in the famous Holy Trinity case, it is shown how in a case in which the judge wants to make an exception to a legal rule for the concrete case tries to (...) meet the dialectical reasonableness norm by seeing to it that his standpoint is sufficiently defended according to the requirements of the burden of proof of a judge in a rational critical discussion and how he tries at the same time to be rhetorically convincing for the legal audience by presenting the decision as a choice that is in line with the argumentation schemes and starting points that can be considered as accepted by the legal community in the US and by the US community as a whole. (shrink)

Henrike Jansen’s “The strategic formulation of abductive arguments in everyday reasoning” insightfully explores the terrain of abductive argumentation. The purpose of this note is to continue the exploration along lines marked out by her paper. This further exploration proceeds in two stages. Section 2 of the paper addresses the nature of abductive inference by distinguishing two types of abduction, identifying some of abduction’s formal and nonformal properties, and relating abduction to enthymematic inference. Section 3 focuses on some of (...) Jansen’s examples, paying particular attention to the distinction between abduction and argument from sign. Whereas Jansen maintains that some arguments from sign are not abductive, the paper suggests an alternative perspective from which arguments from sign can generally be viewed as one sort of abductive inference. (shrink)

In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing. Young's framework emphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of equilibrium (...) to which they converge. He also stresses the limits of what can be achieved: for a given type of game and a given amount of information, there may exist no learning procedure that satisfies certain reasonable criteria of performance and convergence. In short, Young has provided a valuable primer that delineates what we know, what we would like to know, and the limits of what we can know, when we try to learn about a system that is composed of other learners. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibilities for strategic maneuvering of the argumentative technique that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on Argumentation, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame/London, 1969) called dissociation. After an exploration of the general possibilities that dissociation may have for enhancing critical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, the use of dissociation in the successive stages of a critical discussion is examined. For each stage, first, the dialectical moves that dissociation can be employed in are specified, (...) then, the specific ways in which dissociation contributes to fulfilling the dialectical tasks that are associated with these moves are delineated, and, finally, the rhetorical gain that␣dissociation can bring in the fulfillment of these tasks is discussed. Some general conclusions are drawn for research that aims at understanding the potential of an argumentative technique for strategic maneuvering. (shrink)

According to Haidt’s “social intuitionist model”, empirical moral psychology supports the following conclusion: intuition comes first, strategic reasoning second. Critics have responded by arguing that intuitions can depend on non-conscious reasons, that not being able to articulate one’s reasons doesn’t entail not being responsive to reasons, and that the relations between intuitions and reasoning can be truth-tracking and principled in ways overlooked by Haidt. This debate involves a false dichotomy: that either reasoning is truth-tracking, or else (...) our reasoning is purely strategic and manipulative in nature. Reason-giving also, I argue, performs other important functions in moral and social life. A robust willingness to offer reasons in favor of our convictions is itself a virtue we seek and appreciate in others. Others’ willingness to reason with us is itself a good we enjoy at their hands, or that they confer upon us. What we give each other in being willing and determined to reason together is, among other things, respect for, and good-will towards, each other. (shrink)

Many people have misgivings about the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Some of those misgivings centre on issues of effectiveness: safety depends entirely upon the dissuasion of an adversary. Other misgivings centre on moral concerns: the essence of deterrence is the threat, and the conditional intention, to kill millions of noncombatants. US President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative promised an alternative to deterrence, a strategic posture of interception of an adversary's weapons rather than preclusion of the decision to attack. It (...) is conceived as a means of ‘defending’ the United States that does not threaten anyone. In this essay I examine various SDI proposals. I argue that only one of these could justify the transition to a strategic posture of ‘defence’, and might be a genuine alternative to deterrence—the one that is least feasible technologically. Only that one could plausibly be claimed to be morally superior to deterrence—and for strategic reasons, even its claim is dubious at best. Technologically more feasible proposals are not ‘defences’, but variants of deterrence. Since that is so, the most common and dramatic claim of their moral superiority to deterrence is incoherent. (shrink)

Strategic Reliabilism is a framework that yields relative epistemic evaluations of belief-producing cognitive processes. It is a theory of cognitive excellence, or more colloquially, a theory of reasoning excellence (where 'reasoning' is understood very broadly as any sort of cognitive process for coming to judgments or beliefs). First introduced in our book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment (henceforth EPHJ), the basic idea behind SR is that epistemically excellent reasoning is efficient reasoning that leads (...) in a robustly reliable fashion to significant, true beliefs. It differs from most contemporary epistemological theories in two ways. First, it is not a theory of justification or knowledge – a theory of epistemically worthy belief. Strategic Reliabilism is a theory of epistemically worthy ways of forming beliefs. And second, Strategic Reliabilism does not attempt to account for an epistemological property that is assumed to be faithfully reflected in the epistemic judgments and intuitions of philosophers. If SR makes recommendations that accord with our reflective epistemic judgments and intuitions, great. If not, then so much the worse for our reflective epistemic judgments and intuitions. (shrink)

The article deals with a role of mass culture in term of the theory of the culture industry by M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno and the theory of communicative action by J. Habermas, who continues research of the Frankfurt school. It is known that Habermas says about two types of rationality — communicative and structural. The lifeworld and the system correspond them. Usually, culture correspond to lifeworld because it helps people`s socialization. Also it is a place for communication and finding (...) new meanings. However, a place of mass culture is very controver- sial. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between popular and mass culture, because these definitions have been used as interchangeable for a long time. Popular culture is still an area of meanings. Moreover, it has the potential for protest. From this point of view, it is clearly part of the life world. But mass culture as a «cultural industry» is not so unambiguous. It is worth considering its characteristics and role in people’s life more detail. Above all, one cannot help paying attention to masses. Already in the last century, H. Arendt characterized them as an atomized and isolated group of people, and they are not united by any common ideas. After all, even in the modern world it is possible to see that they do not have and do not want to search for any ideas or meanings. Masses are a direct consumers of mass culture. It is consumerism that the characteristic feature of modernity. Therefore, mass culture is inseparably connected with the market. On the one hand, it sells entertainments, and on the other hand, it generates new consumers, because it is related to advertising. In the same way, mass culture is connected with agitation and propaganda. Thus, it is possible to speak about its connection with politics. The market and politics correspond to the system and are guided by strategic rationality. This fact gives reason to talk about mass culture as a strategic tool. Such culture with no meanings leads to a crisis in society. (shrink)

Over the past decade, the ideal model of shared decision-making has been increasingly promoted as the preferred standard of doctor-patient communication in medical consultation. The model advocates a treatment decision-making process in which the doctor and his patient are considered coequal partners that carefully negotiate the treatment options available in order to ultimately reach a treatment decision that is mutually shared. Thereby, the model notably leaves room for—and stimulates—argumentative discussions to arise in the context of medical consultation. A paradigm example (...) of a discussion that often emerges between doctors and their patients concerns antibiotics as a method of treatment for what is presumed to be a viral infection. Whereas the doctor will generally not encourage treatment with antibiotics, patients oftentimes prefer the medicine to other methods of treatment. In this paper, two cases of such antibiotic-related discussions in consultation are studied using insights gained in the extended pragma-dialectical theory to argumentation. It is examined how patient and physician maneuver strategically in order to maintain a balance between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, as well as an equilibrium between patient participation and evidence-based medication, while arguing a case for and against antibiotics respectively. (shrink)

While substantial evidence is emerging internationally of positive increases in the participation of women on company boards, there is less evidence of any significant change in the proportion of women in senior executive ranks. This paper describes evidence of positive changes in the number of women on boards in Australia. Unfortunately these changes are not mirrored in the senior executive ranks where the proportion of women remains consistently low. We explore some of the reasons for these disproportionate changes and examine (...) the likely effect of the recent amendments to the Australian stock exchange’s corporate governance code designed to improve gender diversity both on boards and throughout organisations. Based on the early corporate response to these regulatory changes, it is interesting to consider whether Australia’s approach in promoting voluntary self-regulation at the corporate level may be as effective in the long run as the emerging trend in Europe to apply legislated quotas for female corporate board representation. Interview evidence is presented suggesting that the primary reasons for the lack of women in leadership are not simply lack of opportunity at the apex of the corporation, but issues at mid-management level that are unlikely to be resolved by mandatory board quotas. In some circumstances carefully monitored voluntary targets may be more effective at promoting cultural and strategic change at the heart of the corporation. In summary, mandatory quotas may achieve early and significant results in terms of female board representation. However, voluntary targets for women’s participation on boards and in executive ranks may promote more effective cultural and practical change in support of greater representation of women in leadership. (shrink)

Among philosophers, the question about strategic fouls has been whether they are ethically justified in light of our best conception of sport. This paper proposes a different defense. I argue that many strategic fouls should be excused even if we regard them as unjustified. I first lay out a partial defense of the assumptions that playing to win cannot be subordinate to playing skillfully and that winning has value that cannot be accounted for in terms of the skill (...) that produces it. I then argue that the logic of competitive play structures practical reason such that it is unreasonable to require even an ethical competitor always to subordinate the aim of winning to ethical standards within the game. Some ethical failures should be excused. The argument implies limits on the excusing conditions. I discuss these limits in some detail, showing that they fit patterns in the common acceptance of strategic fouls. I then address possible objections. In conclusion I argue that the logic of excuse rather than justification explains a common reaction to strategic fouls, resolving what might otherwise appear to be a contradiction in that reaction. (shrink)

As a contribution to the challenge of building game-playing AI systems, we develop and analyse a formal language for representing and reasoning about strategies. Our logical language builds on the existing general Game Description Language and extends it by a standard modality for linear time along with two dual connectives to express preferences when combining strategies. The semantics of the language is provided by a standard state-transition model. As such, problems that require reasoning about games can be solved (...) by the standard methods for reasoning about actions and change. We also endow the language with a specific semantics by which strategy formulas are understood as move recommendations for a player. To illustrate how our formalism supports automated reasoning about strategies, we demonstrate two example methods of implementation: first, we formalise the semantic interpretation of our language in conjunction with game rules and strategy rules in the Situation Calculus; second, we show how the reasoning problem can be solved with Answer Set Programming. (shrink)

Strategic interactions have been studied extensively in the area of judgment and decision-making. However, so far no specific measure of a decision-maker's ability to be successful in strategic interactions has been proposed and tested. Our contribution is the development of a measure of strategic ability that borrows from both game theory and psychology. Such measure is aimed at providing an estimation of the likelihood of success in many social activities that involve strategic interaction among multiple decision-makers. (...) To construct a reliable measure of strategic ability, that we propose to call ``Strategic Quotient'' (SQ), we designed a test where each item is a game and where, therefore, the individual score obtained depends on the distribution of choices of other decision-makers taking the test. The test is designed to provide information on the abilities related to two dimensions, mentalization and rationality, that we argue are crucial to strategic success, with each dimension being characterized by two main factors. Principal component analysis on preliminary data shows that indeed four factors (two for rationality, two for mentalization) account for strategic success in most of the strategically simpler games of the test. Moreover, two more strategically sophisticated games are inserted in the test and are used to investigate if and to what extent the four factors obtained by simpler games can predict strategic success in more sophisticated strategic interactions. Overall, the collected empirical evidence points to the possibility of building a SQ measure using only simple games designed to capture information about the four identified factors. (shrink)

Despite its importance in different occupational and everyday contexts, vigilance, typically defined as the capacity to sustain attention over time, is remarkably limited. What explains these limits? Two theories have been proposed. The Overload Theory states that being vigilant consumes limited information-processing resources; when depleted, task performance degrades. The Underload Theory states that motivation to perform vigilance tasks declines over time, thereby prompting attentional shifts and hindering performance. We highlight some conceptual and empirical problems for both theories and propose an (...) alternative: the Strategic Allocation Theory. For the Strategic Allocation Theory, performance on vigilance tasks optimizes as a function of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, including metacognitive factors such as the expected value of effort and the expected value of planning. Limited capacities must be deployed across task sets to maximize expected reward. The observed limits of vigilance reflect changes in the perceived value of, among other things, sustaining attention to a task rather than attending to something else. Drawing from recent computational theories of cognitive control and meta-reasoning, we argue that the Strategic Allocation Theory explains more phenomena related to vigilance behavior than other theories, including self-report data. Lastly, we outline some of the testable predictions the theory makes across several experimental paradigms. (shrink)

Strategic games require reasoning about other people’s and one’s own beliefs or intentions. Although they have clear commonalities with psychological tests of theory of mind, they are not clearly related to theory of mind tests for children between 9 and 10 years of age “Flobbe et al. J Logic Language Inform 17(4):417–442 (2008)”. We studied children’s (5–12 years of age) individual differences in how they played a strategic game by analyzing the strategies that they applied in a (...) zero, first, and second-order reasoning task. For the zero-order task, we found two subgroups with different accuracy levels. For the first-order task, subgroups of children applied different suboptimal strategies or an optimal strategy. For the second-order task only suboptimal strategies were present. Strategy use for all tasks was related to age. The 5- and 6-year old children were additionally tested on theory of mind understanding and executive functioning. Strategy-use in these children was related to working memory, but not to theory of mind after correction for age, verbal ability and general IQ. (shrink)

Strategic Reliabilism addresses resource allocation considerations within a cost-benefit framework. However, there are serious reasons to worry about the feasibility of a cost-benefit approach to epistemology. First, there are serious general objections to cost-benefit analyses; and second, it is not clear how we can identify the costs and benefits of reasoning. This chapter addresses these two concerns. It is argued that although many of the deep general concerns about cost-benefit analysis are legitimate, flawed cost-benefit analyses can be very (...) useful, especially if we are clear about the ways in which such analyses are flawed. It is further argued that there are measurable proxies for the costs and benefits of reasoning we can employ in a cost-benefit approach to epistemology. (shrink)

The article analyzes strategic manoeuvring within the pragmadialectical framework with respect to the selection of starting points in the opening stage to frame the arguments. The Terri Schiavo case is presented, which can provide interesting insights concerning this issue. I would like to show that resolution of the difference of opinion requires the resolution of a subordinate difference of opinion concerning how to label her medical state, and why discussants were not able to resolve this subordinate difference of opinion. (...) After, the conflict that arises between critical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness is examined and how strategic manoeuvring aims to resolve this conflict. In the final part of the paper I argue that the problems raised can be dealt with within the framework of pragma-dialectics. (shrink)

The beauty contest game is widely used to study the determinants of strategic thinking. Here, we examine the role of theory of mind in strategic reasoning by comparing both performance and the reas...

In the wake of the current financial crises triggered by risky mortgage-backed securities, the question of ethics and risk-taking is once again at the front and center for both practitioners and academics. Although risk-taking is considered an integral part of strategic decision-making, sometimes firms could be propelled to take risks driven by reasons other than calculated strategic choices. The authors argue that a firm's risk-taking propensity is impacted by its ethical climate (egoistic or benevolent) and its emphasis on (...) output control to manage its marketing function. The firm's long-term orientation is argued to moderate the control–risk propensity relationship. The authors also extend research on risk and performance and argue that the association of risk-taking propensity and firm performance is contingent on the ownership (publicly traded versus privately held) structure of the firm. Based on survey data from a sample of manufacturing industries in the United States, the results show significant impact of ethical climate and marketing output control on a firm's risk-taking propensity; also risk-taking propensity shows a stronger association with firm performance in privately held firms than in publicly traded firms. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to study the notion of conditional right by means of a dialogical approach to constructive type theory (CTT). We will develop this idea in a framework where the distinction between local-reason and strategic-reason leads to the further distinction between two basic kinds of pieces of evidence, factual and logical. The present paper is based on Rahman (2015). However, though the underlying CTT-analysis is the same, the dialogical reconstruction makes use of a new (...) way of linking dialogical logic and CTT. (shrink)

In diplomatic mediation, dissociation and definitions become tools of the mediator’s strategic maneuvering by means of which the disputants’ disagreement space is minimized, decision-making being thus facilitated. The mediator’s argumentative behavior is explored, investigating the way in which he succeeds in “maintaining a delicate balance” between the dialectical and the rhetorical aims in accordance with the institutional aim specific to mediation as an activity type. In order to argue reasonably and efficiently, the mediator assumes certain roles and adopts and (...) develops a set of strategies in compliance with the goal and constraints of the particular activity type he argues within. Consequently, the mediator builds his argumentation case in full awareness of the specific circumstances, and of the types of constraints of the case, by making a pertinent choice from the topical potential, adjusting it to the particular audience, and exploiting the range of presentational devices accordingly. (shrink)

Around 1610 the Dutch author Gerbrand Bredero wrote a letter to his painting teacher Francesco Badens, asking for the loan of a painting to make a copy of it. The act of writing asks for a proactive role in managing the reader’ reactions. Although at first sight the letter may look like no more than a simple, insignificant and most of all polite piece of correspondence, it is argued that, from the viewpoint of strategic maneuvering, Bredero’s approach may be (...) considered as a well-thought-out and potentially effective strategy, contributing to pinning Badens to a promise. An analysis from the perspective of argumentation theory allows us a better understanding of certain characteristics in this letter. Bredero’s choice from the ‘topical potential’ especially finds expression in proleptic formulated objections of the addressee to fulfilling his promise. Starting the letter from the seemingly low power situation of a pupil asking his master to do something, in every stage of the communication Bredero is aiming at a reasonable balance and turning this balance to his own advantage at the same time. (shrink)

This chapter discusses Strategic Reliabilism. The epistemological theory underlying Ameliorative Psychology is a view called Strategic Reliabilism: Epistemic excellence involves the efficient allocation of cognitive resources to robustly reliable reasoning strategies applied to significant problems. Strategic Reliabilism gives a systematic voice and a theoretical foundation to the long-standing success of SPRs while at the same time avoiding the most serious objections to traditional process reliabilism.

Examining previous discussions on how to construe the concepts of gender and race, we advocate what we call strategic conceptual engineering. This is the employment of a (possibly novel) concept for specific epistemic or social aims, concomitant with the openness to use a different concept (e.g., of race) for other purposes. We illustrate this approach by sketching three distinct concepts of gender and arguing that all of them are needed, as they answer to different social aims. The first concept (...) serves the aim of identifying and explaining gender-based discrimination. It is similar to Haslanger’s well-known account, except that rather than offering a definition of ‘woman’ we focus on ‘gender’ as one among several axes of discrimination. The second concept of gender is to assign legal rights and social recognitions, and thus is to be trans-inclusive. We argue that this cannot be achieved by previously suggested concepts that include substantial gender-related psychological features, such as awareness of social expectations. Instead, our concept counts someone as being of a certain gender solely based on the person’s self-identification with this gender. The third concept of gender serves the aim of personal empowerment by means of one’s gender identity. In this context, substantial psychological features and awareness of one’s social situation are involved. While previous accounts of concepts have focused on their role in determining extensions, we point to contexts where a concept’s role in explanation and moral reasoning can be more important. (shrink)

This chapter offers a framework for understanding significance that tolerates our incomplete knowledge of the conditions for human well-being. Topics discussed include the role of significance in Strategic Reliabilism, a reason-based approach to significance, and the potential unavailability of objective reasons. It is argued that a proper understanding of the notion of epistemic significance is a core problem for any epistemological theory that claims to be able to guide reason, and that any epistemological view that gives a central place (...) to the notion of significance is bound to be deeply empirical. (shrink)

There is renewed scholarly interest in studying the dynamics of constitutional revolutions and the explanations for the rise of constitutional courts around the world. At the same time, there is growing discussion of democratic backsliding and concern that democracies are exhibiting extremism, weakening of opposition forces and constitutional courts, and violations of civil and political rights that are pertinent to vibrant democracies. Scholars try to study both phenomena and understand the relationship between them. Israel is an important case study for (...) both agendas. This Article analyzes the jurisprudence of Aharon Barak, one of the greatest jurists of our time with a worldwide reputation for revolutionizing both Israeli constitutional law and comparative constitutional law. It explains the tactics and strategy used by Barak to revolutionize Israeli constitutional law on issues of reasonableness, proportionality, standing, justiciability, constitutional review, equality, and supra-constitutional law. It reveals how each revolution paved the way for the next. It offers explanations for the effectiveness of these judicially-led revolutions as well as possible bases for their legitimation. Barak was a common law judge and ultimately treated parliamentary sovereignty as a doctrine arising from common law and constrained by common law, though he never quite put it in these terms. The Article concludes with explanations for the political backlash experienced by the current Israeli Supreme Court that some have characterized as democratic backsliding. It argues that the Court contributes to the development of law as part of a dialog and interaction between the different branches of government. As the Court operates within these dynamics, it must understand and take into account the institutional, political, and social environments in which it operates to preserve legitimacy and achieve efficacy. Barak was a strategic player that laid foundations for an expansive judicial power, but his Court was very prudent in utilizing that power. His successors may have contributed unintentionally to the backlash against the Court by following Barak’s substantive jurisprudence, but not necessarily his prudent tactics and strategy. (shrink)

In legal decisions standpoints can be supported by formal and also by substantive interpretative arguments. Formal arguments consist of reasons the weight or force of which is essentially dependent on the authoritativeness that the reasons may also have: In this connection one may think of linguistic and systemic arguments. On the other hand, substantive arguments are not backed up by authority, but consist of a direct invocation of moral, political, economic, or other social considerations. Formal arguments can be analyzed as (...) exclusionary reasons: The authoritative character excludes—in principle—substantial counterarguments. Formal arguments are sometimes used to conceal value judgements based on substantial arguments. This paper deals with reconstructing problems regarding this strategic use of formal arguments in legal decisions, with a focus on linguistic argumentation. (shrink)

Condom use among college men in the United States is notoriously erratic, yet we know little about these men’s approaches to other contraceptives. In this paper, accounts from 44 men attending a university in the western United States reveal men’s reliance on culturally situated ideas about gender, social class, race, and age in assessing the risk of pregnancy and STI acquisition in sexual encounters with women. Men reason that race- and class-privileged college women are STI-free, responsible for contraception, and will (...) pursue abortion services if necessary. Since men expect women will take responsibility, they often stay silent about condoms and other contraceptives in sexual encounters—a process we term “strategic silence.” Men’s strategic silence helps uphold local constructions of hegemonic masculinity that prioritize men’s sexual desires and protects these constructions by subtly shifting contraceptive and sexual health responsibility onto women. Our analysis demonstrates the importance of men’s expectations of women for upholding constructions of hegemonic masculinity, which legitimate gender inequality in intimacy and are related to men’s underestimation of the risks associated with condom-free sex. (shrink)

In pragma-dialectics, a study of legal reasoning analyses judicial judgements’ dialectical and rhetorical aspects. Most analytical studies of legal reasoning focus on the role of judges and their decision-making mechanisms. In our study, we focus on the strategic manoeuvring of the opposing parties. Depending on the context, parties may have to justify their decision to litigants, a professional audience, and the public in rhetorically and dialectically different ways. What makes strategic manoeuvring special in judicial trials is (...) that rhetorical aims (winning the debate) and dialectical aims (convincing the jury), in contrast with debates where parties dialectically aim at resolving a dispute by reaching consensus, are not in conflict. We analyse the Depp ctr. Heard trial 2022, focusing on the parties’ dialectical potential in cases when rhetorical aspects play an important role in addition to objective evidence required by the legal framework. Depp’s party started the trial with a strategic movement we shall call as a ‘topical shift’, doubling their starting position, aiming at dual dialectical goals, and hence also beginning a new debate parallel with the apparently only one by introducing a not directly relevant factor into the debate. Although other factors also played a role in Depp’s victory, setting up his position in the confrontation stage this way was decisive for the trial’s outcome: Heard’s party, following a traditional route, joined actively in one of the dual debates only, effectively giving up the extra debate started by Depp. This way, analysing the trial offers wider consequences to how to understand strategic manoeuvring in judicial trials, and in general as well. (shrink)

How might argumentation scholars approach sound? Using the analytics afforded by strategic maneuvering, this essay identifies three unique features of sonic presentational devices: they are immersive, immediate and embodied. Although these features offer arguers presentational resource, they also pose new problems to the reasonable resolution of disagreement: immersion hazards overlap, immediacy risks rate of delivery beyond reflection, and materiality can coerce listeners. To theorize strategic use of sound, I reconstruct and analyze a popular Radiolab segment “The Unconscious Toscanini (...) of the Brain.” I find Radiolab uses three different sonic figures: synchronicity, or the translation of data into sound to foreground temporal relations; musical stings, an auditory invocation of embodied memory and the wave, a sonic strategy to arouse and narrow attention. I conclude that Radiolab’s use of sound is reasonable because it extends the critical discussion. (shrink)

: Newhard recommends that anarcho-capitalist societies acquire nuclear weapons and adopt aggressive territorial-defense postures. This paper substantiates the argument for the necessity of such actions under reasonable assumptions. In particular, these societies are likely to be relatively small in geographic size, population, and economic output, inhibiting strategic depth and military spending. Deterrence and defense will […].

The ancient puzzle of the Liar was shown by Tarski to be a genuine paradox or antinomy. I show, analogously, that certain puzzles of contemporary game theory are genuinely paradoxical, i.e., certain very plausible principles of rationality, which are in fact presupposed by game theorists, are inconsistent as naively formulated. ;I use Godel theory to construct three versions of this new paradox, in which the role of 'true' in the Liar paradox is played, respectively, by 'provable', 'self-evident', and 'justifiable'. I (...) also construct in modal operator logic a paradox involving reflexive empirical reasoning. Unlike the paradox of the Liar, the paradox of reflexive reasoning does not depend on self-reference. ;I consider various solutions to the Liar paradox and evaluate how well these solutions cope with the paradox of reflexive reasoning. I then formalize the solution to the paradoxes which I favor: the indexical-hierarchical approach, first sketched out by Charles Parsons and Tyler Burge. In this solution, occurrences of the predicate 'true' in sentence-tokens are contextually relativized to levels of a hierarchy. Drawing also on some brief remarks of Bertrand Russell and Charles Parsons, I develop an account of the kind of schematic generality needed for this theory to be statable. ;Finally, I demonstrate that the principles shown to be paradoxical are in fact presupposed by contemporary game theorists in their reliance on the notion of common knowledge or, more precisely, mutual belief. I create novel analyses of and corresponding solutions to several recalcitrant puzzles within game theory, including the "chain-store paradox". (shrink)