Formalisms such as description logics (DL) are sometimes expected to help terminologies ensure compliance with sound ontological principles. The objective of this paper is to study the degree to which one DL-based biomedical terminology (SNOMED CT) complies with such principles. We defined seven ontological principles (for example: each class must have at least one parent, each class must differ from its parent) and examined the properties of SNOMED CT classes with respect to these principles. Our major results are: 31% of (...) the classes have a single child; 27% have multiple parents; 51% do not exhibit any differentiae between the description of the parent and that of the child. The applications of this study to quality assurance for ontologies are discussed and suggestions are made for dealing with multiple inheritance. (shrink)

Since the crisis of Fordism, capitalism has been characterised by the ever more central role of knowledge and the rise of the cognitive dimensions of labour. This is not to say that the centrality of knowledge to capitalism is new per se. Rather, the question we must ask is to what extent we can speak of a new role for knowledge and, more importantly, its relationship with transformations in the capital/labour relation. From this perspective, the paper highlights the continuing validity (...) of Marx's analysis of the knowledge/power relation in the development of the division of labour. More precisely, we are concerned with the theoretical and heuristic value of the concepts of formal subsumption, real subsumption and general intellect for any interpretation of the present change of the capital/labour relation in cognitive capitalism. In this way, we show the originality of the general intellect hypothesis as a sublation of real subsumption. Finally, the article summarises key contradictions and new forms of antagonism in cognitive capitalism. (shrink)

This paper is a modification of Nicola Guarino and Christopher Welty's conception of the subsumption relation. Guarino and Welty require that that whether one property may subsume the other should depend on the modal metaproperties of those properties. I argue that the part of their account that concerns the metaproperty carrying a criterion of identity is essentially flawed. Subsequently, I propose to constrain the subsumption relation not, as Guarino and Welty require, by means of incompatible criteria of absolute (...) identity but by means of incompatible criteria of relative identity. After discussing the benefits of applying relative identity in ontological investigations I provide a formal framework in which to prove a counterpart of the identity criteria constraint. (shrink)

The least common subsumer of a set of concept descriptions is the most specific concept description that subsumes all of the concept descriptions in the given set. By computing the lcs, commonalities between concept descriptions can be made explicit. This is an important inference task useful in several applications, including, for instance, the bottom-up construction of description logic knowledge bases. Previous work on the lcs has concentrated on description logics that either allow for number restrictions or for existential restrictions. Many (...) applications, however, require to combine these constructors. In this work, we present an algorithm for computing the lcs in the description logic ALEN which comprises both constructors—number and existential restrictions—as well as concept conjunction, primitive negation, and value restrictions. To prove correctness of our lcs algorithm, we develop a structural characterization of subsumption in ALEN. (shrink)

The difference between computers and simple machines is the extent to which computer systems subsume design and development decisions over which users have little or no control. Normally, such decisions are all but forgotten after implementation. Subsumption ethics describes this process.This paper begins with a discussion of subsumption ethics and describes four axioms of subsumption ethics. Four ethical frameworks with roots in philosophical traditions are used as an ethical framework: The golden rule ; the golden mean; niskama (...) karma ; and complexity. A matrix is presented that combines the axioms of subsumption ethics with these ethical frameworks. The paper concludes by applying the matrix to some standard problems in software systems development. (shrink)

Attempts to unify Marxist and feminist social critique have been vexed by the fact that ‘patriarchy’ predates the advent of capitalism (its transhistorical status). Feminists within the Marxist, socialist, and materialist traditions have responded to this point by either granting patriarchy a certain autonomy relative to capitalism (the ‘dual/triple systems’ approach), or by suggesting that patriarchal relations have a foundational and necessary status in the history of capitalist development (which we term the ‘origins-subsistence’ approach). This paper offers an alternative account (...) of the relationship between capitalism and the transhistorical status of ‘patriarchy’. In aid of a ‘unitary theory’ of Marxist Feminism, we argue that the transhistorical status of patriarchy is better understood through an application of Marx’s concepts of formal and real subsumption. A modified version of these concepts can illuminate not only capitalist appropriation of antecedent social and economic forms, but also its capacity to produce new forms of gendered exploitation and oppression. (shrink)

How can the reference of theoretical terms be stable over changes of theory? I defend an approach to this that does not depend on substantive metasemantic theories of reference. It relies on the idea that in contexts of use, terms may play a role in a theory that in turn points to a further (possibly unknown) theory. Empirical claims are claims about the nature of the further theories, and the falsification of these further theories is understood not as showing that (...) a term in the original theory fails to refer, but rather that a scientific hypothesis encapsulated by the further theory is mistaken. Introduction 1.1 Two theories involving ‘cat’ 1.2 Some objections 1.3 Doing it with matrices 1.4 The theory so far Approximate truth 2.1 Modes of reference 2.2 Papineau's solution Meaning, analyticity and verbal dispositions 3.1 Theory 1 and the folk theory 3.2 Is the armchair too comfortable? 3.3 What role for the armchair? 3.4 How can we be mistaken about our dispositions? 3.5 The theory of reference and the theory of meaning. (shrink)

There are various recent efforts to broaden applications of ontologies with vague knowledge, motivated in particular by applications of bio(medical)-ontologies, as well as to enhance rough set information systems with a knowledge representation layer by giving more attention to the intension of a rough set. This requires not only representation of vague knowledge but, moreover, reasoning over it to make it interesting for both ontology engineering and rough set information systems. We propose a minor extension to OWL 2 DL, called (...) rOWL, and define the novel notions of rough subsumption reasoning and classification for rough concepts and their approximations. (shrink)

According to one influential view, advanced by Jonathan Adler, David Owens and Susan Hurley, epistemic akrasia is impossible because when we form a full belief, any apparent evidence against that belief loses its power over us. Thus theoretical reasoning is quite unlike practical reasoning, in that in the latter our desires continue to exert a pull, even when they are outweighed by countervailing considerations. I call this argument against the possibility of epistemic akrasia the subsumption view. The subsumption (...) view accurately reflects the nature of reasoning in a range of everyday cases. But, as I show, it is quite false with regard to controversial questions, like philosophical disputes. In these, evidence against our best judgments continues to exert a hold on us. Thus, the claimed disanalogy between practical and theoretical reasoning fails. (shrink)

Formalisms based on one or other flavor of Description Logic (DL) are sometimes put forward as helping to ensure that terminologies and controlled vocabularies comply with sound ontological principles. The objective of this paper is to study the degree to which one DL-based biomedical terminology (SNOMED CT) does indeed comply with such principles. We defined seven ontological principles (for example: each class must have at least one parent, each class must differ from its parent) and examined the properties of SNOMED (...) CT classes with respect to these principles. Our major results are: 31% of these classes have a single child; 27% have multiple parents; 51% do not exhibit any differentiae between the description of the parent and that of the child. The applications of this study to quality assurance for ontologies are discussed and suggestions are made for dealing with the phenomenon of multiple inheritance. The advantages and limitations of our approach are also discussed. (shrink)

The thesis that subsumption is sufficient for explanation is dying out, but the thesis that it is necessary is alive and well. It is difficult to attack this thesis: non-subsumptive counter-examples are declared incomplete, or mere promissory notes. No theory, it is thought, can be explanatory unless it resorts to subsumption at some point. In this paper I attack this thesis by describing a theory that (1) would explain every event it could describe, (2) does not explain by (...) subsumption, and (3) is fundamental in that it is understood to be irreducible (hence there are no unstated laws waiting in the wings). (shrink)

Handling exceptions in a knowledge-based system is an important issue in many application domains, such as medical domain. Recently, there is an increasing interest in nonmonotonic extension of description logics to handle exceptions in ontologies. In this paper, we propose three preferential semantics for plausible subsumption to deal with exceptions in description logic-based knowledge bases. Our preferential semantics are defined in the framework of possibility theory, which is an uncertainty theory devoted to handling incomplete information. We consider the properties (...) of these semantics and their relationships. We also discuss the relationship between two of our preferential semantics and two existing preferential semantics. We extend a description logic-based knowledge base by adding preferential subsumptions. Entailment of plausible subsumptions relative to an extended knowledge base is defined. Properties of the preferential subsumption relations relative to an extended description logic-based knowledge base are discussed. Finally, we show that our semantics for plausible subsumption can be reduced to standard semantics of an expressive description logic. Thus, the problem of plausible subsumption checking under our semantics can be reduced to the problem of subsumption checking under the classical semantics. (shrink)

Robert Alexy has for many years been a prominent analyst of the role of principles in legal argumentation, and an equally prominent defender of the rationality of balancing and proportionality modes of legal decision-making. But although Alexy's defense of proportionality and balancing against charges by Jürgen Habermas and Justice Antonin Scalia that balancing is essentially an irrational process is sound, Alexy in the process is too quick to collapse the important differences between the process of balancing competing principles and the (...) process of interpreting a canonical written text. Although both can be and are frequently rational, rationality is not the same as external constraint, and the ability of canonical texts to provide a degree of external constraint on legal decision-making that cannot be provided by open-ended principles is a difference that should not be lost in the well-aimed efforts to demonstrate that both can be rational and both have important places in legal argumentation and decision-making. (shrink)

In Marx’s posthumously published manuscripts from 1857–1863, we find a systematic exposition of his concept of subsumption. Though much has been written about it, significant interpretative gaps persist. In this article, I begin filling these gaps by examining the emergence of Marx’s concept of subsumption. I will argue that in the Grundrisse Marx brings together distinct but complementary elements from Hegel’s theories of judgment and teleology to coin two new and well delineated concepts of subsumption that prefigure (...) his later concepts of formal and real subsumption. These two concepts may be defined as: (a) the process of acquiring the social relational property of being a means to an end; (b) the process by which changes in non-relational properties occur in something due to this acquisition – and occur to better suit said end. (shrink)

The background hypothesis of this essay is that psychological phenomena are typically explained, not by subsuming them under psychological laws, but by functional analysis. Causal subsumption is an appropriate strategy for explaining changes of state, but not for explaining capacities, and it is capacities that are the central explananda of psychology. The contrast between functional analysis and causal subsumption is illustrated, and the background hypothesis supported, by a critical reassessment of the motivational psychology of Clark Hull. I argue (...) that Hull's work makes little sense construed along the subsumptivist lines he advocated himself, but emerges as both interesting and methodologically sound when construed as an exercise in the sort of functional analysis featured in contemporary cognitive science. (shrink)

Through a comparison of the logic of socio-economic and technical development in Marx with the logic of technical invention in Simondon, I argue the thesis that worker’s democracy is the forgotten political form that offers a viable alternative to both capitalism and Soviet-style Communism, the dominant political régimes of the Cold War period that have not yet been surpassed. Marx’s detailed account of the capitalist technical logic from handwork through manufacture to industry is a logic of continuous concretization in Simondon’s (...) sense. Its immanent teleology is the exclusion of living labor through automation such that freedom is understood as free time apart from labor and technical activity. A post-capitalist society would require a conception of freedom in labor, such as that held by the early Marx, that demands a leap from this logic of concretization to a new technical object. Such a new technical object would require workers to engage in technical activity that continues the activity of invention in Simondon’s sense. Through these interpretive and argumentative links, Simondon’s possibility of transindividual technical activity and knowledge can be seen as, in socio-political terms, aiming at workplace democracy. In philosophical terms, it aims to displace the priority of thought and imagination over activity and to locate both within an ongoing impersonal task which contains the possibility of individual and social self-realization. (shrink)

:This paper argues that capitalist social relations do not presuppose wage-labour. The paper defends a functional definition of the capitalist relations of production, in terms of what Marx calls the ’subsumption of labour by capital’. I argue that there are at least four modes of subsumption, one transitional to and one transitional from the capitalist mode of production. Unlike the capitalist mode of production, capitalist relations of production are compatible with the absence of a labour market, and even (...) with the absence of workplace authority relations. The ambit of capitalist domination is therefore broader than typically thought. (shrink)

Through a comparison of the logic of socio-economic and technical development in Marx with the logic of technical invention in Simondon, I argue the thesis that worker’s democracy is the forgotten political form that offers a viable alternative to both capitalism and Soviet-style Communism, the dominant political régimes of the Cold War period that have not yet been surpassed. Marx’s detailed account of the capitalist technical logic from handwork through manufacture to industry is a logic of continuous concretization in Simondon’s (...) sense. Its immanent teleology is the exclusion of living labor through automation such that freedom is understood as free time apart from labor and technical activity. A post-capitalist society would require a conception of freedom in labor, such as that held by the early Marx, that demands a leap from this logic of concretization to a new technical object. Such a new technical object would require workers to engage in technical activity that continues the activity of invention in Simondon’s sense. Through these interpretive and argumentative links, Simondon’s possibility of transindividual technical activity and knowledge can be seen as, in socio-political terms, aiming at workplace democracy. In philosophical terms, it aims to displace the priority of thought and imagination over activity and to locate both within an ongoing impersonal task which contains the possibility of individual and social self-realization. (shrink)

In his theory of beauty, Kant introduces the free and harmonious play of the faculties as a kind of judging. This judging should precede the pleasure in the beautiful. But being the determining ground of the judgement of taste, the pleasure should precede the judgement. Regarding this problem, two opposing models have been proposed: Paul Guyer's ‘two-acts model’ and Hannah Ginsborg's ‘one-act model’. I propose a third model that, I argue, resolves the difficulty and does not fall prey to the (...) problems of the other two resolutions: the ‘subsumption model’, according to which the pleasure is followed by a subsumption under the concept ‘beautiful’. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper argues that the neoliberal (mis)appropriation of artistic creativity that begins to have a serious impact on music education can be seen as the result of a reverse détournement, whereby the very terms that used to play a pivotal role in describing the anti-systemic, anti-commercial, unsettling, emancipatory qualities of artistic creativity are being used to legitimize a thoroughly economized conception of creativity. It is suggested that this reverse détournement shapes a notion of creativity that can be referred to as (...) subsumptive, a term that denotes the thorough instrumentalization of creativity that leads to a managerial approach to creative processes and practices. The paper identifies some of the main terms that have been sacrificed in the process of the neoliberal colonization of creativity, suggesting that we actively resist subsumptive creativity by molding a counter-hegemonic language that offers an alternative conceptual apparatus that might permit a conceptualization of creativity as subversive. Thus, it is suggested that instead of drawing on notions of flexibility and adaptability we explore the notion of nondeterminist plasticity of minds; instead of emphasizing uncertainty and risk-taking we choose to cultivate fearless exploration; in the place of notions of collaboration (that easily slips to networking) we emphasize dis-identification; instead of celebrating independence we engage with the notion of collectivity; instead of emphasizing learning how to anticipate future needs we choose to explore the merits of (temporary) withdrawal; instead of celebrating innovation we choose to explore practices of dismeasure; and instead of seeking ways to boost confidence, we explore the subversive potential of vulnerability. (shrink)

Typed feature structures are used extensively for the specification of linguistic information in many formalisms. The subsumption relation orders TFSs by their information content. We prove that subsumption of acyclic TFSs is well founded, whereas in the presence of cycles general TFS subsumption is not well founded. We show an application of this result for parsing, where the well-foundedness of subsumption is used to guarantee termination for grammars that are off-line parsable. We define a new version (...) of off-line parsability that is less strict than the existing one; thus termination is guaranteed for parsing with a larger set of grammars. (shrink)

This article views capitalism not only as a mode of production, but also as a mediation of the reproduction of life, following the concept of ‘social metabolism’ that Marx employs to analyze the interaction between the individuals composing a society and their natural environment. Insofar as the ‘value-form’ is the distinctive social relation of capitalism, it appears necessary to ask whether the metabolic process of reproduction can be fully subsumed under this form. Marx takes for granted the idea that the (...) reproduction of labor-power consists only in the consumption of commodities resulting from abstract labor, thus omitting the appropriation of unpaid domestic work, mostly performed by women. Feminist criticism clarifies how capitalism always depends on some reproductive work being appropriated for the accumulation of surplus-value without being integrated in the value-form. Following Jason W. Moore, I attempt to indicate that the same logic is at work for the reproduction... (shrink)

Kant’s distinction between the determining and reflecting power of judgment in the third Critique is not well understood in the literature. A mainstream view unifies these by making determination the telos of all acts of judgment (Longuenesse 1998). On this view, all reflection is primarily in the business of producing empirical concepts for cognition, and thus has what I call a determinative ideal. I argue that this view fails to take seriously the independence and autonomy of the ‘power of judgment’ (...) [Urteilskraft] as a higher cognitive faculty in its own right with its own a priori principle. Instead of seeing merely reflecting judgments as failed or incomplete acts of judgment, I argue that these are in fact paradigmatic of the activity of the power of judgment. More precisely, the reflecting power of judgment just is the power of judgment. Accordingly, reflecting judgment takes precedence over determining judgment; while the former operates according to a law that it gives itself, the latter requires another higher cognitive faculty to provide its principle. On my view, reflecting judgment should be understood as the capacity for purposive subsumption—most clearly seen in the activity of mere reflection. (shrink)

This paper presents a viewpoint on natural philosophy focusing on the organization of substance, as well as its changes as invited by the Second Law of thermodynamics. Modes of change are pointed to as definitive of levels of organization; these include physical, chemical, and biological modes of change. Conceptual uses of the subsumptive hierarchy format are employed throughout this paper. Developmental change in dissipative structures is examined in some detail, generating an argument for the use of final causality in studies (...) of natural systems. Considerations of ‘internalism’ in science are presented along the way. (shrink)

In this research, we proposed multi-robot system that has robustness to the change of environments and has adaptability to the change of tasks and number of robots. To implement them, we use parameter learning on subsumption architecture.The subsumption architecture control robots' fundamental behaviors and robots move continuously in principle.The optimal value of the parameter and the number of robot that does the task in field are searched by learning. As the result,the robot's action on the task is improved.Proposed (...) system has functions to recognize the task and to generate the recordation memory.And then robots adapt to the change of tasks and the number of robots.In this paper, the function of proposed system is tested in simulation experiments. (shrink)

Reflections on the relationship of aesthetics to politics tend to circle, almost compulsively, around a relatively stable set of conceptual oppositions, inherited from German philosophies of the late 18th century. This essay proposes an expansion of the theoretical terms of the debate by extending the field of transcendental aesthetics into the domain of historical temporalization. Fundamental art-historical categories may thereby be incorporated, philosophically transformed, into ‘aesthetics’ as forms of historical temporalization: avant-garde, modern, contemporary. The essay expounds two theses, in particular: (...) 1. The historical subsumption of the temporality of the avant-garde by the temporality of the modern: the modern stands to the avant-garde as the negation of its politics by the repetition of the new –‘the new as the ever–same’; 2. the historical subsumption of the temporality of the modern by ‘the contemporary’: the contemporary stands to the modern as the negation of the dialectical logic – and hence specifically developmentalist futurity – of the new by a spatially determined, but imaginary co-presencing. One effect of this latter subsumption, it is argued, is a particular, regressive ‘repetition of the national’, at the level of cultural representation, on the terrain of the global. (shrink)

We describe a knowledge representation and inference formalism, based on an intensional propositional semantic network, in which variables are structures terms consisting of quantifier, type, and other information. This has three important consequences for natural language processing. First, this leads to an extended, more natural formalism whose use and representations are consistent with the use of variables in natural language in two ways: the structure of representations mirrors the structure of the language and allows re-use phenomena such as pronouns and (...) ellipsis. Second, the formalism allows the specification of description subsumption as a partial ordering on related concepts (variable nodes in a semantic network) that relates more general concepts to more specific instances of that concept, as is done in language. Finally, this structured variable representation simplifies the resolution of some representational difficulties with certain classes of natural language sentences, namely, donkey sentences and sentences involving branching quantifiers. The implementation of this formalism is called ANALOG (A NAtural LOGIC) and its utility for natural language processing tasks is illustrated. (shrink)

This paper is an experiment in Leibnizian analysis. The reader will recall that Leibniz considered all true sentences to be analytically so. The difference, on his account, between necessary and contingent truths is that sentences reporting the former are finitely analytic; those reporting the latter require infinite analysis of which God alone is capable. On such a view at least two competing conceptions of entailment emerge. According to one, a sentence entails another when the set of atomic requirements for the (...) first is included in the corresponding set for the other; according to the other conception, every atomic requirement of the entailed sentence is underwritten by an atomic constituent of the entailing one. The former conception is classical on the twentieth century understanding of the term; the latter is the one we explore here. Now if we restrict ourselves to the formal language of the propositional calculus, every sentence has a finite analysis into its conjunctive normal form. Semantically, then, every sentence of that language can be represented as a simple hypergraph, H, on the powerset of a universe of states. Entailment of the sort we wish to study can be represented as a known relation, subsumption between hypergraphs. Since the lattice of hypergraphs thus ordered is a DeMorgan lattice, the logic of entailment thus understood is the familiar system, FDE of first-degree entailment. We observe that, extensionalized, the relation of subsumption is itself a DeMorgan Lattice ordered by higher-order subsumption. Thus the semantic idiom that hypergraph-theory affords reveals a hierarchy of lattices capable of representing entailments of every finite degree. (shrink)

The appearance of consciousness in the world is an amazing and puzzling fact in its own right. Indeed, consciousness is one of the most mystifying features of the cosmos. The unity of consciousness is something that cries out for analysis and explanation as well. This chapter provides a way of relating the three types of unity: objectual phenomenal unity; subject phenomenal unity; and subsumptive phenomenal unity. According to Tim Bayne and David Chalmers, this sort of unity is irrelevant for investigating (...) the nature of consciousness' unity because it is trivially true by definition and tells us nothing about consciousness. Many thinkers, including Bayne himself, believe there is no self or subject that unifies consciousness. Bayne's position amounts to a bunch of mere assertions that allow him to avoid an obvious solution: substance dualism. (shrink)

In this comment on the work by Ulises Moulines I shall not refer to the interesting analysis of the ontological commitments that depends the treatment of the so-called «data models», nor shall I debate the general metaphysical principles proposed in his approach, adopting an experimentalist, instrumentalist, anti-realistic, positivist or empirical stance. I shall focus on the last part of his article in which he elaborates on the links between Wesley Salmon’s causalist approach and the structuralist analysis of explanation viewed as (...) theoretical subsumption, as he relates it to the structural analysis of the theoretical terms in light of a certain general shared understanding of the job of epistemology. (shrink)

A hypothetical reasoning, which can find an explanation for a given set of observation by assuming some hypothetical sets, is a useful knowledge processing framework because of its theoretical basis and usefulness for practical problems such as diagnostics, scheduling, and design. It is, however, known to be computationally very expensive for large problems because it must deal with incomplete knowledge. Predicate-logic allows powerful and compact knowledge representation compared to propositional-logic. Efficient methods to proceed reasoning have been developed for propositional-logic. However (...) it would be desirable to develop similar methods for predicate-logic, but this has so far proved difficult. “KICK-HOPE” is one of hypothetical reasoning systems for predicate-logic. KICK-HOPE, which is based on a deductive database technique called the QSQR method and a basic fast hypothetical reasoning system called ATMS, made advances in the speed of reasoning. However, for a practical knowledge base, ‘the inconsistent process’ and ‘the subsumption process’ still consume much calculation time. In this paper, we investigate an e.cient method of the inconsistent and subsumption processes of KICK-HOPE. First, we show most of these processes are vain and omissible. Second, to omit vain processes, we introduce bit-vector to represent what hypotheses include in hypothetical sets. And, we improve that vain processes will be reduced to check the check-vector. Finally, we examine the proposed system with two examples, a diagnostic problem of a logic circuit and a scheduling problem. It is shown to be more efficient than the original KICK-HOPE for all problems. (shrink)

The Question of Workplace Resistance in the French Sociology of Work The modernisation of the process of production and labour which, until recently, had aroused responses of indulgent enchantment, is today the object of a sustained sociological critique. This aim of the article is to examine the theoretical orientations which focus their attention on domination in work and which consider the workplace as a steel cage. A different approach is put forward here, one built around the concepts of subsumption (...) and workplace resistance. Analysis centred on the question of domination frequently tends to neglect the possibility of micro-practices, regarding them as a contribution to the fluidity and overall efficiency of work. The perspective adopted here is a different one. The article argues that spaces of autonomy still exist in the workplace. Though limited, these spaces are real. In addition, everyday workplace solidarities are a reality. It is thus important not to equate workplace solidarities with other types of informal behaviour. Such resistance is intimately bound up with the nature of wage-labour, understood as a coercive activity subject to the logical of value-creation. (shrink)

I argue for a subsumption of any version of Grice’s first quantity maxim posited to underlie scalar implicature, by developing the idea of implicature recovery as a kind of explanatory inference, as e.g. in science. I take the applicable model to be contrastive explanation, while following van Fraassen’s analysis of explanation as an answer to a why-question. A scalar implicature is embedded in such an answer, one that meets two probabilistic constraints: the probability of the answer, and ‘favoring’. I (...) argue that besides having application at large, outside of linguistic interpretation, these constraints largely account not only for implicatures based on strength order, logical and otherwise, but also for unordered cases. I thus suggest that Grice’s maxim and its descendants are expressions of general explanatory constraints, as they happen to be manifested in this particular explanatory task. I conclude by briefly discussing how I accordingly view Grice’s system outside of scalar implicature. (shrink)

Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine (...) the autonomy of psychological laws, a condition of free will. Requirements for compatibilist acceptance of physicalism are described. (shrink)

In exploring the nature of psychological explanation, this book looks at how psychologists theorize about the human ability to calculate, to speak a language and the like. It shows how good theorizing explains or tries to explain such abilities as perception and cognition. It recasts the familiar explanations of "intelligence" and "cognitive capacity" as put forward by philosophers such as Fodor, Dennett, and others in terms of a theory of explanation that makes established doctrine more intelligible to professionals and their (...) students.In particular, the book shows that vestigial adherence to the positivists' D-N model has distorted the view of philosophers of science about what psychologists (and biologists) do and has masked the real nature of explanation. Major sections in the book cover Analysis and Subsumption; Functional Analysis; Understanding Cognitive Capacities; and Historical Reflections.Robert Cummins is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle. A Bradford Book. (shrink)