This paper discusses the definition and sources of knowledge according to Ibn 'Arabi, the leading Sufi master of Andalusia (Muslim Spain).

_ Source: _Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 174 - 211 This article explores the metaphysical, epistemological, and mystical aspects of happiness in the Judeo-Arabic _Treatise on Ultimate Happiness_, of which only two chapters have survived from what is thought to have been a more comprehensive text. Although the treatise is attributed to Moses Maimonides, the conception of happiness it presents is clearly that of the Pietists, the Jewish-Sufi circle of thirteenth-century Egypt. The discussion of happiness in this short treatise (...) constitutes an important chapter in the philosophical and mystical discourse about happiness in medieval Jewish-Islamic thought, especially within the Jewish-Sufi mystical stream led by Maimonides’s descendants. (shrink)

Focusing on Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) - one of the foremost scholars and authorities in the Muslim world who is central to the Islamic intellectual tradition - this book embarks on a study of doubt (shakk) and certainty (yaqin) in his epistemology. The book looks at Ghazali's attitude to philosophical demonstration and Sufism as a means to certainty. In early scholarship surrounding Ghazali, he has often been blamed as the one who single-handedly offered the death-blow to philosophy in (...) the Muslim world. In much of contemporary scholarship, Ghazali is understood to prefer philosophy as the ultimate means to certainty, granting Sufism a secondary status. Hence, much of previous scholarship has either focused on Ghazali as a Sufi or as a philosopher; this book takes a parallel approach, and acknowledges each discipline in its right place. It analyses Ghazali's approach to acquiring certainty, his methodological scepticism, his foundationalism, his attitude to authoritative instruction (ta'lim), and the place of philosophical demonstration and Sufism in his epistemology. Offering a systematic and comprehensive approach to Ghazali's epistemology, this book is a valuable resource for scholars of Islamic philosophy and Sufism in particular, and for educated readers of Islamic studies in general. (shrink)

This thesis explores the epistemology and theology of a Sufi theorist Ibn al-ʿ Arabī (d. 1240) and one of the most controversial Muslim scholars Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) comparatively. Although scholars have long emphasized the differences between these two influential and significant figures, the purpose of this thesis is to focus on their potential similarities. The present work at the outset shows that both Ibn al-ʿ Arabī and Ibn Taymiyya regard revelation, the human intellect, and inspiration – unveiling (...) (ilhām – kashf) to be the main epistemological means for acquiring religious knowledge. However, they differ over the relative value of these means or tools. Both Ibn al-ʿ Arabī and Ibn Taymiyya place revelation at the top of the hierarchy, but after that Ibn al-ʿ Arabī places inspiration – unveiling ahead of reason while Ibn Taymiyya reverses the order. The other main subject elaborated in this thesis is the theological issue of the divine names and attributes. This subject is connected to many other theological problems, and both Ibn al-ʿ Arabī and Ibn Taymiyya pay considerable attention to it. Just as many similar approaches, ideas, and interpretations may be seen concerning their epistemological stances, it is possible to see similarities in their theological positions although there are crucial distinctions as well. The unique way of finding out this similarity is to keep in mind the existence of the duality found in the thought and expression of Ibn al-ʿ Arabī. Briefly, the main finding of the thesis is that Ibn al-ʿ Arabī and Ibn Taymiyya are more similar in their epistemologies and theologies than many scholars have thought. They are benefitting from the same epistemological means while putting them in different order. Also, they share similar theological points concerning the divine names and attributes, creation, the divine will, and the incomparability of God while expressing them through different conceptions and styles. (shrink)

This article deals with varieties of epistemological methods in calculating days of lunar calendar, mainly on the beginning date of months. Examining different methods in Indonesian Islamic-scape, it argues that there are three epistemological models which are rooted at Islamic classical epistemologies; the ahl al-hadith, the ahl al-ra‎y, and the intuitive sufi. The ahl al-hadith emphasizes on the empirical rukyatul-hilal, whereas the ahl al-ra’y strongly concerns on the mathematically rational method. The sufi, not so popular in Indonesia but (...) influential in some sufi circles, deploys the intuitive kashf method. In some cases, these three are however intertwined and in contradiction one to another. The article futher argues that different method-in-use is strongly influenced the local spesificties of diverse Indonesian Muslim’s backgrounds, and groupings. (shrink)

This article aims to study Sufism (taṣawwuf) and inspiration (ilhâm), which is the main means of the mystical knowledge, in the thought of Ibn Taymiyya who is known generally as an exponent of a tradition grounded on the understanding of Salaf. He is considered by majority to be a rigid opponent of Sufism because of his unconventional interpretations of Sufi terminology. Also, since Ibn Taymiyya constantly offers the Qur’ān, ḥadīth, and the opinions of Salaf as the base of religious (...) knowledge, the idea that he does not lean toward inspirational and rational knowledge and he does not give a place for them in his epistemology came out and has grown in the course of time. As a result of our research, however, we realize Ibn Taymiyya admits the epistemological value of inspiration along with Sufism conditionally. While he divides Sufism into Early and Later periods, he examines inspiration in the context of knowledge (bâb al-ʿilm) which is considered to be a subcategory of supernatural events. Ibn Taymiyya, who believes that inspirational knowledge must be tested by means of the Qur’ān, Sunna, and the opinions of Salaf, without rejecting its reality, assesses the subject matter in detail through his own criteria. Therefore, this article, in which the subject is elaborated critically and descriptively, focuses on the approach of Ibn Taymiyya to Sufism and inspiration that is the basic element of Sufi knowledge. (shrink)

This article deals with varieties of epistemological methods in calculating days of lunar calendar (hijri), mainly on the beginning date of months. Examining different methods in Indonesian Islamic-scape, it argues that there are three epistemological models which are rooted at Islamic classical epistemologies; the ahl al-hadith (textualist), the ahl al-ra‎y (contextualist), and the intuitive sufi. The ahl al-hadith emphasizes on the empirical rukyatul-hilal (witnessing the moon), whereas the ahl al-ra’y strongly concerns on the mathematically rational method. The sufi, (...) not so popular in Indonesia but influential in some sufi circles, deploys the intuitive kashf (uncovering) method. In some cases, these three are however intertwined and in contradiction one to another. The article futher argues that different method-in-use is strongly influenced the local spesificties of diverse Indonesian Muslim’s backgrounds, and groupings. (shrink)

The article examines how the epistemologies of Islam and modern science are reconciled in the writings of the contemporary Turkish Sunni Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen (b. 1938), one of the once most influential yet vastly controversial religious leaders in contemporary Turkey. Through a close reading of his texts on science, the article analyzes how Gülen defines the scientific practice as an ethical act of reading the universe with heart and mind, and as a path in which one can fully grasp (...) the magnificence of God. Framing with references to Sufism, Gülen also explains science as a domain where Islamic ethics can be practiced. The article shows that Gülen’s project of Islamization of science is not limited to the domain of knowledge, but rather comprises a comprehensive cultural transformation led by a new epistemic approach to contest the secular hegemony in the country. Therefore, Gülen’s politics of Islam at large should be understood as a project of transforming the episteme, or the hegemonic regime of knowledge, in society, from secular to Islamic. However, the article also notes, somehow paradoxically, in his harmonization of the Sufi notions with secular science, Gülen cannot escape from being captured by the very epistemology of the modern science. (shrink)

Although Islamic philosophy represents one of the leading philosophical traditions in the world, it has only recently begun to receive the attention it deserves in the non-Islamic world. This important text provides a concise and accessible introduction to the major movements, thinkers and concepts within that tradition, from the foundation of Islam to the present day. Ever since the growth of Islam as a religious and political movement, Muslim thinkers have sought to understand the theoretical aspects of their faith by (...) using philosophical concepts. Leaman outlines this history and demonstrates that, although the development of Islamic philosophy is closely linked with Islam itself, its form is not essentially connected to any particular religion, and its leading ideas and arguments are of general philosophical significance. The author illustrates the importance of Islamic thought within philosophy through the use of many modern examples. He describes and contrasts the three main movements in Islamic philosophy – Peripatetic, Sufi and Illuminationist – and examines the Persian as well as the Arabic traditions. Wide coverage is given to key aspects of Islamic philosophy, including epistemology, ontology, politics, ethics and philosophy of language, providing readers with a balanced view of the discipline. The second edition has been thoroughly revised and updated throughout, including the addition of two new chapters on recent debates surrounding Islam’s need for an enlightenment, and on the future of Islamic philosophy. The new edition of Islamic Philosophy will continue to be essential reading for students and scholars of the subject, as well as anyone wanting to learn more about one of the most significant and influential philosophical traditions in the world today. (shrink)

The pluralistic philosophy of religion of Abdolkarim Soroush, whose neo-rationalist thought represents a genuine epistemological turn within Muslim reform discourse, is the central issue in this paper. Abdolkarim Soroush, as a contemporary Muslim thinker, brings a completely new understanding of the issue of religious pluralism and by incorporating analytical philosophy, contemporary hermeneutic tradition and Sufi metaphysics, contributes to the creation of a characteristically distinct philosophy of religion within the Muslim intellectual circle. Issues of expansion and contraction of religious knowledge, (...) as well as the expansion of prophetic experience, are inseparable elements of his philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Reason and revelation are a topic that is debated by many parties to determine the position and superiority between reason and revelation. There are differences of opinion among thinkers regarding the position of reason and revelation. This debate has also attracted the attention of many Islamic thinkers, including Islamic philosophers. This paper explores the ontological capture of reason and revelation debate by two of the most prominent Sufi philosophers, Ibn ‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā. This research employs a literature review (...) as a research methodology, with an emphasis on synthesis and integration. Through this research, it can be concluded that Ibn ‘Arabī’s and Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontological perspectives have deconstructed theological and epistemological disagreements between rationalists who place reason above revelation and their traditionalist opponents. Ibn ‘Arabī’s theory of creative imagination unveils the ontological order of reason and revelation, whereas Mullā Ṣadrā’s theories of tashkīk (gradation of being) and the union of the knower and the known during the production of knowledge (or to be more precise, the union of intellect and intelligible during intellection) consistently place reason and revelation not in opposing sides but rather in a single gradational existence. Both Ibn ‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā have broken the theological and epistemological vicious cycle by introducing ontological interventions into the debate. Ibn ‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā may or may not have intended to participate in the polemic; as a result, these outcomes were rarely mentioned in the historical context of the ideas. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diasporic Impulses:Sikh Philosophy as an AssemblageArvind-Pal S. Mandair (bio)Let me begin this response by thanking the editors of Philosophy East and West for generously allowing space for this review forum on my recent book, Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World (Bloomsbury, 2022), and thanking the reviewers Monika-Kirloskar Steinbach, Ananda Abeysekara, and Jeffery Long for their careful readings of this work. "Sikh Philosophy" names the modern academic (...) discourse that crystallized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a result of the encounter between modern Western philosophy and gurmat, a mode of thought-praxis deriving from and associated with Sikhi (lit. "the path of learning"), a spiritual-philosophical tradition hailing from India, which most readers may only have encountered through the modern knowledge system's categorization of it as the religion known as Sikhism. To avoid complicating the discussion, I will be referring interchangeably to gurmat and Sikh philosophy, even though they represent quite different entities. Gurmat represents a tradition of thought-praxis that goes back to Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhi, whereas Sikh philosophy is a modern formation that emerged from the encounter between gurmat and European thought, which is why I prefer to regard it as an assemblage. The book examines some of the key concepts of Sikh philosophy and how they inform its vision of life, what they tell us about the nature of reality, and whether it is possible to discern a distinct logic, epistemology, and ontology based on the principles of gurmat. In their reviews, Kirloskar-Steinbach, Abeysekara, and Long have provided critical readings and insightful questions, which I address below.Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach asks about the relationship between Sikh philosophy and Indian philosophy, noting that my book does not explicitly engage Indian philosophy. Specifically, she raises two questions: (1) whether Sikh philosophy should or potentially could be part of the broader field of Indian philosophy, and (2) whether I would be inclined to contribute to that field, particularly in light of recent efforts to diversify philosophical practices within Indian philosophy by scholars like Jonardon Ganeri in his Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy (2017) and Purushottama Bilimoria and Amy Rayner in their History of Indian Philosophy (2018). My immediate response would be "yes," but with an important caveat. In that vein, I applaud Ganeri's and Bilimoria/Rayner's efforts to open up philosophical inquiry within Indian traditions and take them beyond darśanic framings that narrowly positioned different thought-practices of South Asia either within or [End Page 364] in relation to the Brahmanical/Vedic/Sanskritic paradigm. Ganeri's "multiperspectival" narrative about practices might well enable discussions about Sikh philosophy to flourish, given that the lexicon of gurmat (the teaching, logic, practice of the Guru) is replete with concepts that have cognate terms in the main Hindu philosophical schools including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta; the Jain and Buddhist traditions; and perhaps most importantly, within the Islamic, especially Sufi, traditions. It is the seeming parity between cognate terms such as the Punjabi dharam (Skt. dharma), karam (Skt. karma), yoga, śabad (Skt. śabda), guru, hukam, and many more, which has given rise to the misperception that Sikh philosophy is a purely syncretic thought system parasitic on earlier Indic systems. A similar misperception might be that Sikhi is more primarily a mode of lived praxis or dharam than it is a philosophy (Bhogal 2018) and therefore has less to do with thought than with spiritual attainment. But this approach is far too narrow in that it opposes "philosophy"/"thought" to spiritual praxis without asking whether there might be a broader definition of thinking at play within Sikhi or gurmat. Such an approach fails to extricate itself from the legacy of imperial categorizations of Indic traditions as essentially religious and therefore unrelated to what is called "thinking." By doing so, it falls prey to another misconception many have, that the closest Indians have come to philosophical thought are the darśanic schools, not realizing that most Indian philosophers and thinkers were at the same time devotees and spiritual adepts who developed rigorous modes of discipline and practice.Having said this, I would premise any... (shrink)

This article is a first step in a project to study the influence of the Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ in the Ottoman world. We argue that, at least from the end of the fourteenth century until well into the second half of the sixteenth, the knowledge presented in the encyclopedic Rasāʾil was a conspicuous scholarly source for the Ottoman cultural milieu, especially at the dynastic court, and played a significant role in forming their epistemological perspective. This argument is developed with reference (...) to three universal histories: (1) in Turkish, the İskendernāme (Book of Alexander) of Taceddin İbrahim İbn Hızır Ahmedi (d. 1413) written between the last quarter of the fourteenth century and the first quarter of the fifteenth; (2) in Arabic, the Naẓm al-sulūk fī musāmarat al-mulūk (The ordering of ways for the conversation of kings) by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Bisṭāmī (d. 1454), a prominent intellectual and expert in occult sciences, protégé of Sultan Murad II (r. 1421–44, 1446–51); (3) in Persian, the first volume of Shāhnāmā-yi Āl-i ʿUsmān (Book of kings of the house of ʿUsmān) by the Sufi intellectual and litterateur Fethullah Çelebi (d. 1561/62), better known by his pen-name ʿArif. The choice of these three histories enables us to mark the time period for the influence of the Rasāʾil, stretching it (in both directions) further than is accepted in present scholarship. These histories enable us also to draw attention to the proximity to the Ottoman dynasty of the cultural milieu attuned to the Rasāʾil, and highlight the relationship between history and knowledge that is central both for the texts under study here and the Rasāʾil. (shrink)

Sadr al-Sharīʿah (d. 747/1346) is one of the theologians representing the later period of the Māturīdī kalām. He based his system of thought on his criticisms of Avicenna, al-Rāzī, and Ṭūsī. His criticism of these names stems from his own understanding of being. He thinks differently from the theologians of the later period on issues such as the essence-existence division, the superaddition of existence to essence, and the acceptance of mental being, which are accepted by the majority of theologians of (...) the later period. His understanding of being in question also influenced his analysis of the idea of the wahdat al-wujūd. In the study, some aspects of the framework proposed by Muhammed Bedirhan will be given first. Then, in order to make sense of Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s criticism of wahdat al-wujūd, the major understandings of wahdat al-wujūd will be summarized briefly, and finally, Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s analysis of wahdat al-wujūd will be examined and clarified using Bedirhan’s framework. Although the framework has subheadings, it classifies criticisms into two categories: rationally-based and sharʻī-based objections. Rational objections are directed from the traditions of kalām and philosophy, while sharʻī-based objections come from Salafi thinkers, faqihs, and sufis. The framework is comprehensive in classifying criticisms against the theory of wahdat al-wujūd. This framework will clarify Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s approach, and the source of his criticisms should be identified. According to Bedirhan, the sufis’ theory is in conflict with the members of other schools in two aspects, practical and theoretical. While the first one considers sufism a religious state (ḥal), the second one is the point that shapes the view of other intellectual groups on sufism in terms of the fact that sufism is also a science. Bedirhan has based the theoretical conflict part of his framework on the triple classification of al-Jābiri: burhān, beyān and irfān. According to al-Jābiri’s classification, sufism, which is included under the title of irfān, deals with the previous two traditions mentioned. However, burhan and beyan traditions also offer their criticisms of the epistemological and ontological acceptances of the irfān tradition. Behind the criticism of the traditions of thought towards each other is the claim that the metaphysical theory of the opposite group is insufficient. According to the presented framework Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s criticisms can be considered within not only the kalām tradition but also the sufi tradition, because he is a sufi who accepts ittihād as one of the “sayr sulūk” degrees. Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s explains two proofs by which sufis defend their metaphysical theory, and also presents a counter-proof based on the verbal commonality of sense knowledge and being. He also aims to point out the weakness of the metaphysical theory of sufis with the view that the idea of ittihād is unique to a certain degree. By mentioning Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s criticisms and explanations of wahdat al- wujūd, the study identifies Sadr al-Sharīʿah’s stance on the rational and sharʻī-based objections. (shrink)

This study investigates Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī's sufi philosophy of illumination and explores its potential contribution to contemporary environmental consciousness. The increasingly urgent global ecological crisis has sparked interdisciplinary debate about root causes and comprehensive solutions. Several contemporary thinkers argue that the ecological crisis is a manifestation of a more fundamental ontological crisis, namely the loss of humans' harmonious relationship with nature. In this context, Islamic philosophy, especially the school of illumination (ishrāq) developed by Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, offers a unique (...) perspective that can enrich environmental discourse. The research aims to integrate Suhrawardī’s ontological and epistemological concepts with contemporary ecological principles to offer a novel perspective on human-nature relationships. A descriptive-analytical approach is employed to analyze Suhrawardī’s philosophical texts and correlate them with modern ecological theories. The study reveals that Suhrawardī’s concept of asala al-mahiya (essential reality) and his illuminationist epistemology, which views all beings as emanations of divine light, challenge the anthropocentric worldview. This perspective promotes two fundamental ecological principles: biospherical illuminative egalitarianism and illuminative equilibrium. These principles emphasize social justice and environmental balance, recognizing humans as integral parts of nature with responsibility for its preservation. By shifting the human-nature relationship from a subject-object dichotomy to an inter-subject interaction, Suhrawardī’s philosophy can enhance awareness of environmental issues and inspire more sustainable practices. Integrating spiritual wisdom and ecological consciousness offers a holistic approach to addressing contemporary environmental challenges. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of BeingLatimah-Parvin Peerwani ArlingtonMullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being. By Sajjad H. Rizvi. Culture and Civilization in the Middle East Series, edited by Ian Richard Netton. London and New York: Routledge, 2009. Pp. xii + 222. Hardcover $135.00.In Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics: Modulation of Being, Sajjad H. Rizvi focuses on tashkīk (modulation), variously translated as the systematic ambiguity, analogical gradation, or just (...) gradation of being from the perspective of Mullā Ṣadrā, comparing it with classical Islamic philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy. He states that he makes two major claims in this study. First, he argues that modulation is a hermeneutic concept that describes the threefold division of being and its gradation. Second, gradation and modulation occur in each mode of being. Each mode of being refers to a branch of Ṣadrā's philosophy: mental being is a discussion of epistemology and psychology; 'being-in-language' is critical to Sadrian semantic theory; being in re focuses on 'traditional metaphysics.' But the philosophy of Ṣadrā is not compartmentalized; being cuts across these fields and unites them. Each mode of being as modulated shares features of intensification. According to Rizvi, Ṣadrā has extended the normal understanding of modulation and of being beyond the simple division of the two realms of mental and concrete existence to bring out the semantics of being. This aspect of Islamic philosophy, according to Rizvi, has often been neglected (p. 3). [End Page 278]This study consists of an Introduction and two parts. In the Introduction, Rizvi states the problem of tashkīk as the central hermeneutic of Ṣadrian ontology. An analysis of this critical concept, according to Rizvi, facilitates our understanding of Ṣadrā's position on a wide variety of important philosophical issues such as predication, the problem of reconciling unity and plurality in being, and God-world relationship. It provides an answer to the age-old problem of the One and the many, and the median way between the ontological monism of Ibn ʿArabi and the metaphysical pluralism of Avicenna. Rizvi says that according to Ṣadrā there are four levels of being: the concept of being, its reality, its uttered manifestation (sound), and its written manifestation.Part 1 consists of two chapters. In the first chapter Rizvi outlines his methodology and some of his assumptions about the cultural history of the period and the context of Ṣadrā. The significant contention, according to Rizvi, is that a proper understanding of Ṣadrā's philosophy requires an appreciation of philosophy in the Neoplatonic traditions "as a way of life" that is often closely related to spiritual practice and religious commitment. The aim of philosophical inquiry for Ṣadrā, according to Rizvi, is therapy for the rational soul and its perfecting and development in its path of return to its origins in the One.Four methodological approaches are utilized in this study. (1) Tashkīk is seen as the central hermeneutic of Ṣadrian metaphilosophy, and not ontology; Rizvi argues that tashkīk is a central guiding principle in Ṣadrā's metaphilosophy and permeates all branches of his philosophical system. (2) The aporetic method is used in analyzing Ṣadrā's philosophy. (3) Rizvi maintains that Ṣadrā's philosophy is processual, for it represents a shift from substance to process metaphysics. (4) Ṣadrian hikmat (philosophy, wisdom) is approached as a metaphilosophical inquiry. Metaphysics is a foundational science for Ṣadrā, instrumental in the possibility of acquiring knowledge and in the construction of definitions and meaningful discourse. Hikmat, according to Rizvi, is doubly transcendent, (1) as a higher synthesis of Avicennan, Illuminationist, Sufi, and esoteric Shiʿite systematic thought, and (2) as a prophetic philosophy that claims to be derived from direct 'revelation.'The second chapter introduces the tashkīk (modulation) of being. Rizvi traces its historical development from the Aristotelian pros hen homonym to Avicenna, Nasir al-Din Tusi, and Ibn ʿArabi, and offers an account of an intensifying scale of being toward a hierarchy of being that is singular but with multiple degrees defined by their intensity, that is, in terms of scales of intensification and deliberation. He makes explicit the Neoplatonic logic of being that this implies and examines how... (shrink)

The efforts to prove God's existence in the history of thought have been one of the fundamental problems of philosophy and theology, and even the most important one. The evidences put furword to prove the existence of God constitute the center of philosophy of religion’s problems not only philosophy of religion, but also the disciplines such as theology-kalam and Islamic philosophy are also seriously concerned. When we look at the history of philosophy, it is clear that almost all philosophers are (...) interested in the evidence in favour of and against the existence of God. Especially in recent times, religious experience has often been regarded as evidence of the existence of God. Studies in the field of religious and mystical experience have put forward many arguments concerning the use of religious experience as evidence. However, this study has been limited to experience of sense and pure consciousness claims rather than examining all of these arguments. In this study firstly, the analogy between experience of sense and religious experience will be deal with, and then claims that conciousness can be emptied by a number of methods which are defended by mystics. In addition, it will be tried to defend the opinion that the mystical experiences which are the common point of the two approaches are valid. The main emphasis of the article will be that these arguments can be used as evidence for the existence of God.Summary: Religious experience - which has not been considered as one of the classical evidences regarding the existence of God before being popular by recent studies – is started to be called one of the arguments. The most important reason for not arguing religious experience among the evidences of God’s existence is that it is a personal experience and therefore contains subjective perspectives. However, many researchers, who refuse to accept the criticism raised against religious experience with restricting to subjectivity, emphasized the importance of religious experience by highlighting the objective aspects of such experiences. This emphasis was not only on its significance, but also on the fact that it had a cognitive feature and thus it could provide evidence for the existence of God. The argument of religious experience is generally defined as an effort for demonstrating to existence of God with reference to several feelings such as spiritual experiences of human in face of creator and sacred Being, encounter with God, uniting, and annihilating selfness in Him. The emergence of such efforts, especially after the XVIIIth century, indicates that the history of the evidence does not go back much earlier. However, even if notas evidence, it is possible to extend the traces of religious and mystical experience to the history of religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism. Considering a great amount of the previous literature focused on religious experience in the West, It is easily seen that such research is still new. The main purpose in addressing such a controversial issue is to make the argument on the religious experience more current and to show whether the religious experience would be able to use as evidence for the existence of God.First title of this study comprises many different claims such as Walter T. Stace’s The Argument from Unanimity Richard Swinburne’s The Principle of Credulity, William P. Alston’s Perceiving God, John Hick’s Experience-as. However, instead of briefly giving out very different claims, the study chooses to focus on two arguments which are less discussed and can be given in more detail. The first is the argument based on the analogy between the religious experience and the sense experience. The fundamental point of this argument is sense experience. With reference to the similarities between the sense experience and the religious experience, it can be argued that religious experience is also cognitive and may function as an evidence for the existence of God. In other words, being perceptual and noetic, namely cognitive, of sense experience is addressed as a similar side of religious experience. Whether it is imaginary or real, eventually, it is necessary for an experience to have an object and being experience of something. Therefore, the religious experience includes the perception of a Transcendent Being that is beyond and in excess of the individual who experiences. Perception of the sense experience will definitely be different from the perception of religious experience. Researchers who think that the five sense organs do not run the perception of Sacred Beings, identified broader and various meanings for the perception. Thereby, in this approach, where the semantic field of perception is expanded, it was contended that human beings were able to perceive the transcendent, eternal, and unlimited God, and this can be explained in the epistemological sense. In order to use religious experiences as an evidence for the existence of God, it is necessary to determine whether such experiences are caused by God rather than something else. This raises the issue of the validity of religious experience. The researchers in this area have propounded various criteria to identify whether religious experience is existed or not. Experiences, which do not meet the criteria, are not considered existed even if they claim to be religious experience.The second is the argument that discusses whether it is possible to suggest an evidence for the existence of God by utilizing pure consciousness events. In general, this argument claims that the consciousness gets clear, and thus, mystic or Sufi experiences the Divine One with pure consciousness by discharging consciousness from all sensual contents and removing it from secular desire and wishes. The argument, which claims the experience of Divine One is direct, therefore uninterpretable, and experienced by pure consciousness, believes clearing the consciousness of mystics from sensual qualities such as seeing, hearing, and tasting. It is stated that it is possible for mystics to empty their sensory images and get rid of them, and thus, their desires and wishes could be lost. Especially, the thinkers who are connected with the philosophy of perennialism and defend this approach, thought that people, who have distinct religion, culture, and beliefs in different parts of the world and in various time periods, had the same experience and considered such experiences were universal by suggesting that this similarity could be called as common essence.Even though the claim which offers that the events of pure consciousness are the same everywhere have been criticized in many respects, the advocates of this approach have argued that the experience has the common essence, but the interpretation is different. This relationship, which was tried to be established between experience and commentary, caused a lot of work for both the thinkers who put forward the claims of pure consciousness and the researchers who opposed it. However, examining the relationship between experience and interpretation requires serious studies in socio-psychological, cultural and religious fields. Therefore, in order not to exceed the limits of the article, the relationship between experience and interpretation is briefly mentioned.While discussing two arguments, the main claims of the arguments were addressed, and the criticisms directed to this argument were not discussed as much as possible. However, some fundamental criticisms have been mentioned shortly for a better understanding of the discussion. Since such western-oriented claims mostly were deployed in a western context, the study excluded the comparison of the claims across different cultures. (shrink)

Although extant literature has covered the differences between unethical behaviors in relation to perpetrators and targets, most of this research has not considered the effects of observed unethical behaviors on employees. In this study, we focus on observed unethical behaviors of peers targeted at their organization and examine how witnessing a peer engage in an organizationally targeted unethical behavior would impact the observer. Drawing on cognitive appraisal theory, we propose that organizational identification will inform emotions, which in turn will shape (...) employee silence, depending on how employees appraise the observed unethical behavior. We theorize that peer unethical behaviors would induce anger, anxiety, and vicarious shame, which will guide employees’ quiescent and prosocial silence behaviors. In addition, we suggest that the proposed relationships would vary with the level of organizational identification. With a sample of 329, results from a between-subject scenario study generally supported our hypotheses. There was a combined effect of peer unethical behaviors and organizational identification on anger, anxiety, and shame, which in turn led to employee silence in the cases of anxiety and shame. (shrink)

Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm, -1641--Criticism and interpretation. ; Islamic philosophy.

Peripatetics. ; Political science -- Philosophy. ; Islamic philosophy.

Wir leben in einer Welt, in der die verschiedenen Kulturen und Religionen zunehmend eine gemeinsame Antwort auf die ethischen Fragen unseres Zusammenlebens finden müssen. Dieser Band leistet deshalb zweierlei: Einerseits informiert er über die übergreifenden ethischen Traditionen und Paradigmen in den Kulturregionen und in den größeren und kleineren Religionsgemeinschaften dieser Welt. Andererseits versucht er, die Grundlagen bereitzustellen, die eine völkerübergreifende Verständigung über die Grundfragen der Moral ermöglichen können. Wer über den Tellerrand eines ausschließlich im Westen entwickelten Diskurses hinausblicken und den (...) interkulturellen Dialog fruchtbar führen will, findet mit diesem Band das unentbehrliche Hilfsmittel. (shrink)

​Vielleicht nie zuvor war Toleranz so wichtig wie in der heutigen Welt, in der Menschen verschiedenster Kulturregionen und Religionsgemeinschaften zusammenkommen. Der Toleranzbegriff wird nach wie vor fast ausschließlich aus der Perspektive der europäisch-westlichen Traditionen dargestellt. Mit dem vorliegenden Band wird zum ersten Mal versucht, umfassend in die Weltgeschichte der Toleranz einzuführen. Über 30 Autoren aus verschiedenen Fachgebieten und Nationen haben ihre Forschungen zu Methoden und Themen der Toleranzfrage zusammengetragen. So ist sowohl ein einführendes und weitere Forschungen anregendes Kompendium als auch (...) ein Lehrbuch für Studierende der Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften, der Philosophie, Theologie, Rechts- sowie Religionswissenschaft entstanden. (shrink)

Bayesian epistemology addresses epistemological problems with the help of the mathematical theory of probability. It turns out that the probability calculus is especially suited to represent degrees of belief (credences) and to deal with questions of belief change, confirmation, evidence, justification, and coherence. Compared to the informal discussions in traditional epistemology, Bayesian epis- temology allows for a more precise and fine-grained analysis which takes the gradual aspects of these central epistemological notions into account. Bayesian epistemology therefore complements (...) traditional epistemology; it does not re- place it or aim at replacing it. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno (1903-1969) was a cultural philosopher, sociologist, literary critic, and historian of music who, along with Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and Erich Fromm, founded the Frankfurt School. Against Epistemology is one of his most important works.

Vice epistemology is in the business of defining epistemic vice. One of the proposed requirements of epistemic vices is that they are reprehensible—blameworthy in a non-voluntarist way. Our problem, as vice epistemologists, is giving an analysis of non-voluntarist responsibility that will count just the right qualities, no more and no less, as epistemic vices. If our analysis of non-voluntarist responsibility ends up being too narrow, then it risks excluding some qualities that we want to count as epistemic vices, such (...) as implicit biases. Whereas, if it ends up being too broad, it risks including qualities that we do not want to count as epistemic vices, such as impaired vision. I recommend a three-step program for vice epistemologists: 1. admit that we have a responsibility problem; 2. strive to define the responsibility problem; 3. work together with specialists in non-voluntarist responsibility to solve the responsibility problem. (shrink)