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Susan Dwyer [37]Susan Jane Dwyer [1]Susan J. Dwyer [1]
  1. Moral competence.Susan Dwyer - 1999 - In Kumiko Murasugi & Robert Stainton (eds.), Philosophy and linguistics. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 169--190.
     
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  2. The Linguistic Analogy: Motivations, Results, and Speculations.Susan Dwyer, Bryce Huebner & Marc D. Hauser - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):486-510.
    Inspired by the success of generative linguistics and transformational grammar, proponents of the linguistic analogy (LA) in moral psychology hypothesize that careful attention to folk-moral judgments is likely to reveal a small set of implicit rules and structures responsible for the ubiquitous and apparently unbounded capacity for making moral judgments. As a theoretical hypothesis, LA thus requires a rich description of the computational structures that underlie mature moral judgments, an account of the acquisition and development of these structures, and an (...)
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  3. Moral dumbfounding and the linguistic analogy: Methodological implications for the study of moral judgment.Susan Dwyer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):274-296.
    The manifest dissociation between our capacity to make moral judgments and our ability to provide justifications for them, a phenomenon labeled Moral Dumbfounding, has important implications for the theory and practice of moral psychology. I articulate and develop the Linguistic Analogy as a robust alternative to existing sentimentalist models of moral judgment inspired by this phenomenon. The Linguistic Analogy motivates a crucial distinction between moral acceptability and moral permissibility judgments, and thereby calls into question prevailing methods used in the study (...)
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  4. How good is the linguistic analogy?Susan Dwyer - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York, US: Oxford University Press on Demand. pp. 145--167.
    A nativist moral psychology, modeled on the successes of theoretical linguistics, provides the best framework for explaining the acquisition of moral capacities and the diversity of moral judgment across the species. After a brief presentation of a poverty of the moral stimulus argument, this chapter sketches a view according to which a so-called Universal Moral Grammar provides a set of parameterizable principles whose specific values are set by the child's environment, resulting in the acquisition of a moral idiolect. The principles (...)
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  5. Believing in language.Susan Dwyer & Paul M. Pietroski - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):338-373.
    We propose that the generalizations of linguistic theory serve to ascribe beliefs to humans. Ordinary speakers would explicitly (and sincerely) deny having these rather esoteric beliefs about language--e.g., the belief that an anaphor must be bound in its governing category. Such ascriptions can also seem problematic in light of certain theoretical considerations having to do with concept possession, revisability, and so on. Nonetheless, we argue that ordinary speakers believe the propositions expressed by certain sentences of linguistic theory, and that linguistics (...)
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  6.  74
    Reconciliation for realists.Susan Dwyer - 1999 - Ethics and International Affairs 13:81–98.
    The rhetoric of reconciliation is common in situations where traditional judicial responses to past wrongdoing are unavailable because of corruption, large numbers of offenders, or anxiety about the political consequences. But what constitutes reconciliation?
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  7.  87
    Dupoux and Jacob's moral instincts: throwing out the baby, the bathwater and the bathtub.Susan Dwyer - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):1-2.
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  8.  85
    Moral Development and Moral Responsibility.Susan Dwyer - 2003 - The Monist 86 (2):181-199.
    At the end of Section III of “Freedom and Resentment,” just after he has drawn our attention to the reactive attitudes, P. F. Strawson remarks, “The object of these commonplaces is to try to keep before our minds something it is easy to forget when we are engaged in philosophy, especially in our cool, contemporary style, viz., what it is actually like to be involved in ordinary inter-personal relationships, ranging from the most intimate to the most casual.” It is striking, (...)
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  9. Romancing the Dane: Ethics and Observation.Susan Dwyer - unknown
    So far as we know, we are the only species capable of introspection, and thus, sometimes, of insight into our own individual and collective nature. Arguably, the entire discipline of philosophy and, much more recently, of psychology, is premised on this simply stated but complicated fact. We are also a social species, each of us desiring – perhaps, even needing – to live as one among others. Taken together, these perfectly trite observations invite a number of questions regarding the nature (...)
     
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  10. Learning from experience: moral phenomenology and politics.Susan Dwyer - 1998 - In Ann Ferguson (ed.), Daring to Be Good: Essays in Feminist Ethico-Politics. New York: Routledge. pp. 28--44.
     
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  11. Pornography.Susan Dwyer - 2008 - In Paisley Livingston & Carl R. Plantinga (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. New York: Routledge.
    Pornography has attracted a good deal of academic and political attention, primarily from feminists of various persuasions, moral philosophers, and legal scholars. Surprisingly less work has been forthcoming from film theorists, given how much pornography has been produced on video and DVD and is now available through live streaming video over the Internet. Indeed, it is not until 1989, with the publication of Linda Williams’ groundbreaking Hard Core, that pornography is distinguished, in terms of its content, intent, and governing conventions, (...)
     
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  12. How not to argue that morality isn't innate: Comments on Jesse Prinz's “is morality innate?”.Susan Dwyer - manuscript
    We must admire the ambition of Prinz’s title question. But does he provide a convincing answer to it? Prinz’s own view of morality as “a byproduct – accidental or invented – of faculties that evolved for different purposes (1),” which appears to express a negative reply, does not receive much direct argument here. Rather, Prinz’s main aim is to try to show that the considerations he believes are typically presented by moral nativists are insufficient or inadequate to establish that morality (...)
     
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  13. News hound the all-time top 50, Lord Sutherland and the death of Wesley salmon.Julian Baggini, Susan Dwyer, Simon Kassom & Peter Fosl - 2001 - The Philosophers' Magazine 13.
  14. Censorship.Susan Dwyer - 2008 - In Paisley Livingston & Carl R. Plantinga (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film. New York: Routledge.
    For individuals at all points on the political spectrum, and especially for those engaged in any form of expressive enterprise – from comic book illustrators, to film directors, to performance artists – censorship typically carries very negative connotations. Indeed, for many, censorship is the very antithesis of freedom and creativity. However, we can and should conceive of censorship more neutrally – simply as the imposition of constraints. On such a construal, censorship is not obviously always a Bad Thing. This point (...)
     
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  15.  35
    Free Speech.Susan Dwyer - 2001 - SATS 2 (2):80-97.
  16. (1 other version)Gerald Dworkin, ed., Morality, Harm and the Law Reviewed by.Susan Dwyer - 1995 - Philosophy in Review 15 (1):29-32.
     
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  17. (1 other version)Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, eds., Feminist Epistemologies Reviewed by.Susan Dwyer - 1994 - Philosophy in Review 14 (3):155-157.
  18.  57
    Moral competence is cognitive but (perhaps) nonmodular.Susan Dwyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128-129.
    Barresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upondomain-generalchanges in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.
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  19. Miranda Fricker and Jennifer Hornsby, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy Reviewed by.Susan Dwyer - 2000 - Philosophy in Review 20 (6):410-413.
  20. Making "Implicit" Explicit: Toward an Account of Implicit Linguistic Knowledge.Susan Jane Dwyer - 1991 - Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    In chapter one I consider two arguments for the claim that we ought to attribute linguistic knowledge to speakers of a natural language. The a priori argument has it that a theory of understanding reveals what it is that speakers of a language know about their language. The second argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation, emphasising the idea that speaking and understanding a language is a rational activity carried on by agents with intention and purpose. (...)
     
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  21. Moral psychology as cognitive science: Explananda and acquisition.Susan Dwyer - unknown
    Depending on how one looks at it, we have been enjoying or suffering a significant empirical turn in moral psychology during this first decade of the 21st century. While philosophers have, from time to time, considered empirical matters with respect to morality, those who took an interest in actual (rather than ideal) moral agents were primarily concerned with whether particular moral theories were ‘too demanding’ for creatures like us (Flanagan, 1991; Williams, 1976; Wolf, 1982). Faithful adherence to Utilitarianism or Kantianism (...)
     
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  22. Mind your morals.Susan Dwyer - manuscript
    Morality is so steeped in the quotidian details of praise and blame, of do’s and don’t’s, and of questions about the justifiability of certain practices it is no wonder that philosophers and psychologists have devoted relatively little effort to investigating what makes moral life possible in the first place. In making this claim, I neither ignore Kant and his intellectual descendants, nor the large literature in developmental moral psychology from Piaget on. My charge has to do with this fact: morality (...)
     
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  23. (1 other version)Robert V. Hannaford, Moral Anatomy and Moral Reasoning Reviewed by.Susan Dwyer - 1995 - Philosophy in Review 15 (4):246-249.
     
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  24.  51
    The many faces of autonomy.Susan Dwyer - 2001 - The Philosophers' Magazine 13:40-41.
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  25. Understanding the Problem of Abortion.Susan Dwyer - unknown
    Abortion raises a number of difficult questions for morality, law, and public policy. When, if ever, is abortion morally permissible? Do women have a legal right to abortion, and how is that right to be justified? Ought abortions for poor women be funded by the state? These questions are related in the sense that answers to any one of them have implications for answers to the others. But it is crucial to remember that they are different questions. For example, suppose (...)
     
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  26.  37
    Why care where moral intuitions come from?Susan Dwyer - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):14-15.
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  27.  16
    What psychopaths can teach us.Susan Dwyer - 2000 - The Philosophers' Magazine 9 (9):32-33.
  28.  52
    Knowledge by ignoring.Paul M. Pietroski & Susan J. Dwyer - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):781-781.
    Some cases of implicit knowledge involve representations of (implicitly) known propositions, but this is not the only important type of implicit knowledge. Chomskian linguistics suggests another model of how humans can know more than is accessible to consciousness. Innate capacities to focus on a small range of possibilities, thereby ignoring many others, need not be grounded by inner representations of any possibilities ignored. This model may apply to many domains where human cognition “fills a gap” between stimuli and judgment.
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  29. Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine M. Korsgaard, eds., Reclaiming the History of Ethics. Essays for John Rawls Reviewed by. [REVIEW]Susan Dwyer - 1998 - Philosophy in Review 18 (4):294-297.
     
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  30.  28
    (1 other version)Critical Notice. [REVIEW]Susan Dwyer - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):545-569.
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  31.  43
    Does Moral Philosophy have a Future? Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy, Michele M. Moody-Adams , 270 pp., $35.00 cloth. [REVIEW]Susan Dwyer - 1999 - Ethics and International Affairs 13:269-271.
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  32.  95
    Review of Abigail Levin, The Cost of Free Speech: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Their Challenge to Liberalism[REVIEW]Susan Dwyer - 2011 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
  33.  26
    The Meaning of Mind: Language, Morality, and Neuroscience Thomas Szasz Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996, x + 182 pp., $19.95. [REVIEW]Susan Dwyer - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (2):420-.
    In this book, psychiatrist Thomas Szasz returns to familiar subjects—the collusion between state and medical authorities, the social construction of mental disease—linking them with some other recent topics: so-called False Memory Syndrome and the modern erosion of individual responsibility. Szasz’s central and unifying thesis is that there is no such thing as the mind; he recommends, rather, that we focus on the concept of minding, where this encompasses a host of cognitive operations, including intentionality, thinking, remembering, pondering, and reasoning. Misunderstanding (...)
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  34.  54
    Who's Afraid of Feminism? [REVIEW]Susan Dwyer - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (2):327-342.
    Philosopher Christina Hoff Sommers's target inWho Stole Feminism? How Women Have Betrayed Womenis “gender feminism.” Her aim is to convince us that gender feminists are anti-intellectual opportunists who deliberately spread lies about the incidence of date rape (chap. 10), domestic battery (Preface, chap. 9) and about the general state of male-female relations in America (chaps. 1, 9 and 11), thereby generating fear and resentment of men (chap. 2), all so that they may secure vast amounts of government funding and high-paying (...)
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  35.  49
    David M. Estlund and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds., Sex, Preference, and Family: Essays on Law and Nature:Sex, Preference, and Family: Essays on Law and Nature. [REVIEW]Susan Dwyer - 1998 - Ethics 109 (1):184-187.