27 found
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  1. Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Harvard University Press.
  2. Varieties of Externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 101-153.
    Externalism comes in varieties. While the landscape isn.
     
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  3.  43
    Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity.Susan L. Hurley - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
    Hurley here revives a classical idea about rationality in a modern framework, by developing analogies between the structure of personality and the structure of society in the context of contemporary work in philosophy of mind, ethics, decision theory and social choice theory. The book examines the rationality of decisions and actions, and illustrates the continuity of philosophy of mind on the one hand, and ethics and jurisprudence on the other. A major thesis of the book is that arguments drawn from (...)
  4. The Shared Circuits Model. How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation and Mind Reading.Susan L. Hurley - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines; it is here surveyed under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring and simulation. It is cast at a middle, (...)
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  5. The Questions of Animal Rationality: Theory and Evidence.Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds - 2006 - In Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals? Oxford University Press.
    This introductory chapter explains the coverage of this book, which is about animal rationality and mental processing in animals. This book discusses the theoretical issues and distinctions that bear on attributions of rationality to animals and draws some contrasts between rationality and certain other traits of animals to determine the relationships between them. It explores the relations between behaviour and the processes that explain behaviour, and the senses in which animal behaviour might be rational in virtue of features other than (...)
     
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  6. Bypassing Conscious Control: Unconscious Imitation, Media Violence, and Freedom of Speech.Susan L. Hurley - 2006 - In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. pp. 301-337.
    Why does it matter whether and how individuals consciously control their behavior? It matters for many reasons. Here I focus on concerns about social influences of which agents are typically unaware on aggressive behavior.
     
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  7. Vehicles, Contents, Conceptual Structure and Externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):1-6.
    We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa. (...)
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  8. Overintellectualizing the Mind.Susan L. Hurley - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):423-431.
    Brewer’s Perception and Reason argues, from familiar scenarios of duplicate environments and switching, that a subject’s perceptual experiences must provide reasons for her empirical beliefs. Only perceptual experience can tie reference down to a thing as opposed to its duplicate, and this tying down must be a matter of giving the subject reasons that she can recognize as such. Moreover, such reasons require conceptual contents.
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  9.  32
    Perspectives on Imitation.Susan L. Hurley & Nick Chater (eds.) - 2004 - MIT Press.
    These volumes provide a resource that makes this research accessible across disciplines and clarifies its importance for the social sciences and philosophy as ...
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  10. Self-Consciousness, Spontaneity, and the Myth of the Giving.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - In Consciousness in Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    From my Consciousness in Action, ch. 2; see Consciousness in Action for bibligraphy. This chapter revises material from "Kant on Spontaneity and the Myth of the Giving", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1993-94, pp. 137-164, and "Myth Upon Myth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1996, vol. 96, pp. 253-260.
     
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  11. Active Perception and Perceiving Action: The Shared Circuits Model.Susan L. Hurley - 2006 - In Tamar Szab Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
    Recently research on imitation and its role in social cognition has been flourishing across various disciplines. After briefly reviewing these developments under the headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation, I advance the _shared circuits_.
     
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  12. Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Agency: Perspective and Access.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 30 (3-4):207-247.
  13. Is Responsibility Essentially Impossible?Susan L. Hurley - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (2):229-268.
    Part 1 reviews the general question of when elimination of an entity orproperty is warranted, as opposed to revision of our view of it. Theconnections of this issue with the distinction between context-drivenand theory-driven accounts of reference and essence are probed.Context-driven accounts tend to be less hospitable to eliminativism thantheory-driven accounts, but this tendency should not be overstated.However, since both types of account give essences explanatory depth,eliminativist claims associated with supposed impossible essences areproblematic on both types of account.Part 2 applies (...)
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  14.  92
    Luck, Responsibility, and the &lsquoNatural Lottery&Rsquo.Susan L. Hurley - 2002 - Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (1):79-94.
  15.  81
    Making Sense of Animals: Interpretation Vs. Architecture.Susan L. Hurley - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):273-280.
    i>: We should not overintellectualize the mind. Nonhuman animals can occupy islands of practical rationality: they can have specific, context-bound reasons for action even though they lack full conceptual abilities. Holism and the possibility of mistake are required for such reasons to be the agent’s reasons, but these requirements can be met in the absence of inferential promiscuity. Empirical work with animals is used to illustrate the possibility that reasons for action could be bound to symbolic or social contexts, and (...)
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  16.  56
    Responsibility, Reason, and Irrelevant Alternatives.Susan L. Hurley - 1999 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (3):205-241.
  17. Unity and Objectivity.Susan L. Hurley - 1994 - In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--77.
     
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  18. Action, the Unity of Consciousness, and Vehicle Externalism.Susan L. Hurley - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 78--91.
  19.  67
    Myth Upon Myth.Susan L. Hurley - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):253-260.
  20. Precis of Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - manuscript
  21. Consciousness in Action: Clarifications.Susan L. Hurley - manuscript
    Philosophy of neuroscience may seem an odd thing to do. What can a philosopher add to what neuroscience itself has to say, other than at some very abstract level, far removed from empirical details and the interests of scientists? At some point you take a deep breath, acknowledge the methodological questions, and just go ahead, spurred on by the sheer philosophical interest and excitement abroad in the neurosciences today. So it is very gratifying to a philosopher of neuroscience for such (...)
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  22.  93
    Is There a Substantive Disagreement Here? Reply to Chemero and Cordeiro.Susan L. Hurley - manuscript
  23.  84
    The Space of Reasons Vs. The Space of Inference: Reply to Noe.Susan L. Hurley - manuscript
  24. Unity, Neuropsychology, and Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - In Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.
  25.  12
    Clarifications: Responses to Kobes and Kinsbourne.Susan L. Hurley - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (5):556-561.
  26.  23
    Neural Dominance, Neural Deference, and Sensorimotor Dynamics.Susan L. Hurley - 2007 - In M. Velmans (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 640--656.
    Why is neural activity in a particular area expressed as experience of red rather than green, or as visual experience rather than auditory? Indeed, why does it have any conscious expression at all? These familiar questions indicate the explanatory gap between neural activity and ‘what it’s like’-- qualities of conscious experience. The comparative explanatory gaps, intermodal and intramodal, can be separated from the absolute explanatory gap and associated zombie issues--why does neural activity have any conscious expression at all?. Here I (...)
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  27. Action and the Unity of Consciousness.Susan L. Hurley - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
     
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