This book shows that the debate over the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge has led to the investigation of a variety of topics, including the a...
Twin-earth thought experiments, standardly construed, support the externalist doctrine that the content of propositional attitudes involving natural-kind terms supervenes upon properties external to those who entertain them. But this doctrine in conjunction with a common view of self-knowledge might have the intolerable consequence that substantial propositions concerning the environment could be knowable a priori. Since both doctrines, externalism and privileged self-knowledge, appear independently plausible, there is then a paradox facing the attempt to hold them concurrently. I shall argue, however, that (...) externalist claims about the dependence of content on environmental factors presuppose certain theses about the semantics of natural-kind terms that, if sound, would make those claims eligible for empirical justification instead. In fact, that is the only interpretation of their epistemic status that could square with the standard conclusion from twin-earth cases. Furthermore, it can be shown to solve the paradox of externalism and self-knowledge in a more doxastically conservative way--accommodating precisely each of the well-accepted intuitions about knowledge, closure and the individuation of content given up by available competitors. (shrink)
This comprehensive collection of original essays written by aninternational group of scholars addresses the central themes inLatin American philosophy. Represents the most comprehensive survey of historical andcontemporary Latin American philosophy available today Comprises a specially commissioned collection of essays, manyof them written by Latin American authors Examines the history of Latin American philosophy and itscurrent issues, traces the development of the discipline, andoffers biographical sketches of key Latin American thinkers Showcases the diversity of approaches, issues, and styles thatcharacterize the field.
Note first that knowledge of one's own thought-contents would not count as a priori according to the usual criteria for knowledge of this kind. Surely, then, incompatibilists are using this term to refer to some other, stipulatively defined, epistemic property. But could this be, as suggested by McKinsey { 1 99 1: 9), the property of being knowable 'just by thinking' or 'from the armchair'? Certainly not if these were metaphors for knowledge attainable on the basis of reason alone, since (...) self-knowledge would fail to come out a priori in this sense. And exactly the same would happen if the property were that of being knowable by inference, since, according to a common intuition, self-knowledge is noninferential. (shrink)
In a familiar moral dilemma faced by physicians who care for the dying, some patients who are within days or hours of death may experience suffering in a degree that cannot be relieved by ordinary levels of analgesia. In such cases, it may sometimes be possible to honor a competent patient's request for pain relief only by giving an injection of narcotics in a dosage so large that the patient's death is thereby hastened. Doctors rightly worry that taking an action (...) likely to result in a patient's death may violate the Hippocratic injunction against the direct killing of anyone in their care. (shrink)
A durable question in Latin American thought is whether it could amount to a characteristically Latin American philosophy. I argue that, if, as is now widely conceded, there is a role for philosophical analysis in thinking about problems that arise in applied subjects, such as bioethics, environmental ethics, and feminism, then why not also in Latin American thought? After all, the focus of Hispanic thinkers has often been upon the issues that arise in their own experiences of the world, and (...) they make up a diverse group of peoples related by very idiosyncratic ethnic and historical connections. I believe that, given some appropriate criteria, the existing corpus of works by Latin American thinkers constitutes a distinctive philosophy. (shrink)
In a familiar moral dilemma faced by physicians who care for the dying, some patients who are within days or hours of death may experience suffering in a degree that cannot be relieved by ordinary levels of analgesia. In such cases, it may sometimes be possible to honor a competent patient's request for pain relief only by giving an injection of narcotics in a dosage so large that the patient's death is thereby hastened. Doctors rightly worry that taking an action (...) likely to result in a patient's death may violate the Hippocratic injunction against the direct killing of anyone in their care. (shrink)
These thirteen original essays, whose authors include some of the world's leading philosophers, examine themes from the work of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore (1873-1958), and demonstrate his considerable continuing influence on philosophical debate. Part I bears on epistemological topics, such as skepticism about the external world, the significance of common sense, and theories of perception. Part II is devoted to themes in ethics, such as Moore's open question argument, his non-naturalism, utilitarianism, and his notion of organic unities.
These thirteen original essays, whose authors include some of the world's leading philosophers, examine themes from the work of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore (1873-1958), and demonstrate his considerable continuing influence on philosophical debate. Part I bears on epistemological topics, such as skepticism about the external world, the significance of common sense, and theories of perception. Part II is devoted to themes in ethics, such as Moore's open question argument, his non-naturalism, utilitarianism, and his notion of organic unities.
This concise, affordable, and engaging new text is designed for introductory courses on logic and critical thinking. This unique book covers the basic principles of informal logic while also raising substantive issues in other areas of philosophy: epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. The author’s presentation strikes a careful balance: it offers clear, jargon-free writing while preserving rigor. Brimming with numerous pedagogical features this accessible text assists students with analysis, reconstruction, and evaluation of arguments and helps them (...) become independent, analytical thinkers. Introductory students are exposed to the basic principles of reasoning while also having their appetites whetted for future courses in philosophy. (shrink)
G.E. Moore's philosophical legacy is ambiguous. On the one hand, Moore has a special place in the hearts of many contemporary analytic philosophers. He is, after all, one of the fathers of the movement, his broadly commonsensical methodology informing how many contemporary analytic philosophers practise their craft. On the other hand, many contemporary philosophers keep Moore's own substantive positions at arm's distance. According to many epistemologists, one can find no finer example of how to beg the question than Moore's case (...) against the sceptic. And, according to many moral philosophers, one can find no more vivid case of philosophical extravagance than Moore's non-naturalism. Given this ambiguity, one wonders: How should we assess Moore's legacy in epistemology and ethics – the two areas of philosophy in which Moore did most of his work?That is the task of this welcome collection of 16 essays. The list of contributors to the book is impressive: Crispin Wright, Ernest Sosa, Ram Neta, William Lycan, C.A.J. Cody, Paul Snowdon, Michael Huemer and Roy Sorenson consider Moore's work in epistemology. Stephen Darwall, Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons, Richard Fumerton, Charles Pigden, Robert Shaver, Joshua Gert, Jonathan Dancy and the editors of the book explore Moore's views in ethics. As one might expect, given this list of contributors, the quality of the essays is very high. Moreover, there is a decidedly constructive tone to many of them. While not willing to overlook Moore's mistakes, many of the essays endeavour to explore what is valuable in Moore's thought, critically engaging with positions that, not too long …. (shrink)
The attempt to hold both anti-individualism and privileged self-knowledge may have the absurd consequence that someone could know a priori propositions that are knowable only empirically. This would be so if such an attempt entailed that one could know a priori both the contents of one’s own thoughts and the anti-individualistic entailments from those thought-contents to the world. For then one could also come to know a priori the empirical conditions entailed by one’s thoughts. But I argue that there is (...) no construal of a priori knowledge that could be used to raise an incompatibility problem of this sort. First, I suggest that the incompatibilist a priori must be a stipulative one, since in none of the main philosophical traditions does knowledge of the contents of one’s thoughts count as a priori. Then, I show that under various possible construals of a priori, the incompatibilist argument would be invalid: either a fallacy of equivocation or an argument without a plausible closure principle guaranteeing transmission of epistemic status from premises to conclusion. Finally, I maintain that the only possible construal of the property of being knowable a priori that avoids invalidity is one that fails to generate the intended reductio. (shrink)
More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute ethical naturalism by offering the so-called open question argument (OQA), also charging that all varieties of ethical naturalism commit the naturalistic fallacy. Although there is consensus that OQA and the naturalistic-fallacy charge both fail, OQA is sometimes vindicated, but only as an argument against naturalistic semantic analyses. The naturalistic-fallacy charge, by contrast, usually finds no takers at all. This paper provides new grounds for an OQA thus restricted. But (...) it aims chiefly at vindicating a version of the naturalistic fallacy, „the semantic-naturalist fallacy‟ (SNF), that we think defensible. We first argue that the openness of the question OQA raises against such analyses hinges on self-ascriptive, comparative judgments of content, which may be considered a priori warranted. We then provide independent reasons for the claim that the sort of mistake committed by naturalistic analyses in fact amounts to a pragmatic fallacy of a kind familiar in petitio principii and other forms of viciously circular inference. Of interest here are naturalistic analyses of ethical terms or concepts, not of properties. Our OQA (OQA*) raises an objection to the former. For no such semantic analyses can get off the ground unless moral terms are content-equivalent to purely descriptive terms, which amounts to saying that they must instantiate the same semantic types. Suppose „good‟ is the analysandum and „pleasure maximizing‟ the analysans (whichever purely descriptive term or terms would turn out to be the correct descriptive analysis of the target analysandum) of a certain semantic analysis. The claim that such terms are content-equivalent appears to be open to doubt on a priori grounds. After 1 all, whether one‟s own tokens of „good‟ and „pleasure maximizing‟ have/don‟t have the same content is a first-person, comparative judgment of content. Evaluating the proposed analysis requires, then, a self-ascriptive, comparative judgment of content.1 Judgments of this sort are thought to have a special epistemic status, since they seem grounded in neither evidence nor inference.. (shrink)
In some ways that have been largely ignored, ethnic-group names might be similar to names of other kinds. If they are, for instance, analogous to proper names, then a correct semantic account of the latter could throw some light on how the meaning of ethnic-group names should be construed. Of course, proper names, together with definite descriptions, belong to the class of singular terms, and an influential view on the semantics of such terms was developed, at the turn of the (...) nineteenth century, from discussion of a puzzle about some differences in the cognitive value of certain statements of identity. Clearly, that a = a (e.g., that Mark Twain was Mark Twain) is trivial, and its truth could be known a priori, just by thinking. On the other hand, that a = b (e.g., that Mark Twain was Samuel Clemens) is of course informative and knowable only by empirical investigation. To solve this puzzle, Frege famously proposed that those variations in the cognitive value of statements of identity “can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of that which is designated.” On his view, although in the above statements of identity, the singular terms, ‘a,’ and, ‘b,’ may designate the same thing, they do so with different senses, or under different modes of presentation of that object. When the puzzling statements involving ‘a’ and ‘b’ are true, they may then be said to have exactly the same reference. But since those singular terms pick out the object of reference differently (i.e., under different senses or modes of presentation), therefore the cognitive value of these statements also varies significantly. On this account, then, the reference of a non-vacuous proper name is secured by the name’s sense, or mode of presentation, which constitutes its semantic content. And given that Fregeans (here under the influence of Russell) cash out that sense as consisting in whatever concept (or cluster of concepts) could be uniquely associated with that name, they might hold, for example, that the property of being the author of Huckleberry Finn, and that of being an American who lived his early life in Hannibal, Missouri, and later became a famous writer, amount to the senses of ‘Mark Twain,’ and ‘Samuel Clemens,’ respectively.. (shrink)
Ethics . . . [is] partly analysis of what’s meant by ‘good’, ‘ought’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘valuable’, etc. And if certain analyses of these are right, then other ethical propositions, ones which aren’t analytic, wouldn’t be philosophical at all, but belong to psychology, sociology, and the theory of evolution.
The development of modern science, as everybody knows, has come largely through naturalizing domains of inquiry that were historically parts of philosophy. Theories based on mere speculation about matters empirical, such as Aristotle‟s view about teleology in nature, were replaced with law-based, predictive explanatory theories that invoked empirical data as supporting evidence. Although philosophers have, by and large, applauded such developments, inquiry into normative domains presents a different set of problems, and there is no consensus about whether such an inquiry (...) can be naturalized. Since the early twentieth century, attempts at naturalizing ethics have been at the center of heated debates, and later attempts at naturalizing epistemology triggered similarly contentious disputes. In ethics, of course, it was not only the Humean and Moorean arguments of early nonnaturalists and noncognitivists that raised doubts about naturalism, but also the arguments of nihilists, who later joined the chorus of criticism, rejecting any ontology that would countenance moral properties and facts. In epistemology, Quinean eliminativism brought reactions that questioned the consistency of naturalism and asked whether it could accommodate the normativity of fundamental epistemic notions such as belief and knowledge. There have so far been no similarly substantial reactions to attempts at naturalizing inquiry into another normative domain, that of reasoning. We hope to remedy that by offering 1 here a response to some recent efforts by experimental philosophers. Experimentalism about reasoning is a radical naturalistic program that rejects reflective-equilibrium accounts of the epistemic grounds for the rules of inference. If we ignore other attempts at justifying those rules a priori by, for instance, appeal to self-evidence, then those invoking Goodmanian reflective equilibrium can be considered the standard analytic accounts (hereafter, „SAA‟). Of concern here is an objection to SAA, the cognitive-diversity argument,1 that is part of a broader experimentalist critique of analytic epistemology.. (shrink)
Abstract: Some seventy years ago, G. E. Moore invoked his own sensory experience (as of a hand before him in the right circumstances), added some philosophical analysis about externality, and took himself to have offered his "Proof" of the existence of an external world. Current neo-Mooreans either reject completely the standard negative assessment of the Proof or qualify it substantially. For Sosa, the Proof can be persuasive, but only when read literally as offering reasons for the conclusion that there is (...) at least one external object—rather than that the prover is justified in believing, or even knowing, that there is at least one external object. Sosa, then, is a neo-Moorean—though not of the sort we might expect in light of the ongoing debate about the Proof. I argue that Sosa needs to say more about the circularity often thought to vitiate the Proof before we can accept his view. (shrink)
The increasingly pluralistic character of modern societies has led to questions, not only about the proper use of ethnic-group terms, but also about the correct semantic analysis of them. Here I argue that ethnic-group terms are analogous to other linguistic expressions whose extension is fixed in the way suggested by a causal theory of reference. My view accommodates precisely those scenarios of communication involving ethnic-group terms that will be seen puzzling to Fregeans. At the same time, it undermines the plausibility (...) of skepticism about those terms. (shrink)
More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously offered an extended inference to reject what are in effect two substantially different types of ethical naturalism. Although some naturalistic doctrines targeted by that inference make semantic claims that, if true, would entail certain metaphysical claims, it is also possible that those semantic doctrines could be false and the metaphysical ones true at the same time. For if semantic naturalism is true, then moral terms and sentences are reducible, by an analysis (...) of what they mean, into some purely descriptive terms and sentences. But, if metaphysical naturalism is true, then the moral properties and propositions expressed by moral terms and sentences are reducible to purely natural properties and propositions. By conflating claims about meaning with claims about reference, Moore‟s original inference proved vulnerable to a number of well known objections. But we believe there is a revised Moorean inference that can succeed, and we offer that argument here. Its scope is restricted to semantic reductivist forms of ethical naturalism: those that rest on theses claiming the reducibility of expressions in the moral vocabulary to expressions in a non-moral one. A not uncommon philosophical view in Moore‟s day, such theses remain live options in metaethics (as we‟ll presently show). Although our inference is run for some putative equivalences between moral and purely descriptive terms, it could easily be adapted against ethical naturalist theses 1 involving moral concepts and thoughts as well as sentences. Like Moore, we take the successful inference to consist in an open question argument („OQA’) followed by the naturalistic-fallacy charge („NFC‟). But, unlike Moore, we identify semantic naturalism as the only naturalistic doctrine vulnerable to the inference, and we offer adequate support for the inference‟s premises. Naturalism in ethics is thus undermined, though not refuted in all its forms: semantical naturalism comes out false, but metaphysical naturalism might still be true.. (shrink)
This comprehensive collection of original essays written by an international group of scholars addresses the central themes in Latin American philosophy. Represents the most comprehensive survey of historical and contemporary Latin American philosophy available today Comprises a specially commissioned collection of essays, many of them written by Latin American authors Examines the history of Latin American philosophy and its current issues, traces the development of the discipline, and offers biographical sketches of key Latin American thinkers Showcases the diversity of approaches, (...) issues, and styles that characterize the field. (shrink)
More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute all versions of moral naturalism by offering the open question argument (OQA) followed by the “naturalistic fallacy” charge (NF).1 Although there is consensus that this extended inference fails to undermine all varieties of moral naturalism, OQA is often vindicated as an argument against analytical moral naturalism. By contrast, NF usually finds no takers at all. ln this paper we argue that analytical naturalism of the sort recently proposed by (...) Frank Jackson and Michael Smith does after all rest on a mistake — though perhaps not the NF. Analytical moral naturalism is roughly the doctrine that some moral predicates and sentences are a priori equivalent to predicates and sentences framed in non-moral terms (Jackson 2003: 558). Given moral naturalism, it is at least possible that there are some such a priori or conceptual equivalences. But a properly construed OQA challenges this reductive strategy by showing that it is open to doubt on a priori grounds. We further contend that, in the dialectical context created by our OQA, a "digging in the heeis" defense of the strategy would beg the question. ll.. (shrink)
A common utilitarian argument in favor of abortion for fetal defects rests on some controversial assumptions about what counts as a life worth living. Yet critics of abortion for fetal defects are also in need of an argument free from controversial assumptions about the future child's quality of life. Christopher Kaczor, The ethics of abortion: women's rights, human life, and the question of justice, Routledge, New York, 2011) has devised an analogy that apparently satisfies this condition. On close scrutiny, however, (...) Kaczor's analogy is too weak to debunk the common-morality intuition that at least some abortions for fetal defects are morally permissible. The upshot of this discussion is that, on the moral permissibility of abortions for fetal defects, a case-by-case approach is to be preferred. (shrink)
For Latin American philosophers, the quality of their own philosophy is a recurrent issue. Why hasn’t it produced any internationally recognized figure, tradition, or movement? Why is it mostly unknown inside and outside Latin America? Although skeptical answers to these questions are not new, they have recently shifted to some critical-thinking competences and dispositions deemed necessary for successful philosophical theorizing. Latin American philosophers are said to lack, for example, originality in problem-solving, problem-making, argumentation, and to some extent, interpretation. Or does (...) the problem arise from their vices of “arrogant reasoning?” On my view, all of these answers are incomplete, and some even self-defeating. Yet they cast some light on complex, critical-thinking virtues and vices that play a significant role in philosophical thinking. (shrink)
This collection of classic and contemporary essays in philosophy of language offers a concise introduction to the field for students in graduate and upper-division undergraduate courses. It includes some of the most important basic sources in philosophy of language, as well as new essays by scholars on the leading edge of innovation in this increasingly influential area of philosophy. Each chapter is preceded the editors' introduction.
Latin American philosophy is best understood as a type of applied philosophy devoted to issues related to the culture and politics of Latin America. This introduction provides a comprehensive overview of its central topics. It explores not only the unique insights offered by Latin American thinkers into the traditional pre-established fields of Western philosophy, but also the many 'isms' developed as a direct result of Latin American thought. Many concern matters of practical ethics and social and political philosophy, such as (...) Lascasianism, Arielism, Bolívarism, modest and immodest feminisms, republicanism, positivism, Marxism, and liberationism. But there are also meta-philosophical 'isms' such as originalism and perspectivism. Together with clear and accessible discussions of the major issues and arguments, the book offers helpful summaries, suggestions for further reading, and a glossary of terms. It will be valuable for all readers wanting to explore the richness and diversity of Latin American philosophy. (shrink)
Ethical naturalism is narrowly construed as the doctrine that there are moral properties and facts, at least some of which are natural properties and facts. Perhaps owing to its having faced, early on, intuitively forceful objections by eliminativists and non-naturalists, ethical naturalism has only recently become a central player in the debates about the status of moral properties and facts which have occupied philosophers over the last century. It has now become a driving force in those debates, one with sufficient (...) resources to challenge not only eliminativism, especially in its various non-cognitivist forms, but also the most sophisticated versions of non-naturalism. This volume brings together twelve new essays which make it clear that, in light of recent developments in analytic philosophy and the social sciences, there are novel grounds for reassessing the doctrines at stake in these debates. (shrink)
G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica is a landmark publication in twentieth-century moral philosophy. Through focusing on the origin and evolution of his main doctrines, this guidebook makes it clear that Moore was an innovator whose provocative take on traditional philosophical problems ignited heated debates among philosophers. Principia Ethica is an important text for those attempting to understand and engage with some major philosophical debates in ethics today. The Routledge Guidebook to Moore's Principia Ethica provides a comprehensive introduction to this historic text, (...) examining key Moorean themes including: ethical non-naturalism the naturalistic fallacy the Open Question Argument moral ontology and epistemology ideal utilitarianism vindictive punishment and organicity moral intuition for epistemic justification in ethics theory of value Ideal for anyone wanting to understand and gain perspective on Moore's seminal work, the book is essential reading for students of moral philosophy, metaethics, normative ethics, philosophical analysis, and related fields. (shrink)
Upon publication in 1791-92, the two parts of Thomas Paine's Rights of Man proved to be both immensely popular and highly controversial. An immediate bestseller, it not only defended the French revolution but also challenged current laws, customs, and government. The Routledge Guidebook to Paine's Rights of Man provides the first comprehensive and fully contextualized introduction to this foundational text in the history of modern political thought, addressing its central themes, reception, and influence. The Guidebook examines: the history of rights, (...) populism, representative governments, and challenges to monarchy from the 12th through 18th century; Paine's arguments against monarchies, mixed governments, war, and state-church establishments; Paine's views on constitutions; Paine's proposals regarding suffrage, inequality, poverty, and public welfare; Paine's revolution in rhetoric and style; the critical reception upon publication and influence through the centuries, as well as Paine's relevance today. The Routledge Guidebook to Paine's Rights of Man is essential reading for students of eighteenth-century American and British history, politics and philosophy, and anyone approaching Paine's work for the first time. (shrink)
_Engaging Bioethics: An Introduction with Case Studies_ draws students into this rapidly changing field, helping them to actively untangle the many issues at the intersection of medicine and moral concern. Presuming readers start with no background in philosophy, it offers balanced, philosophically based, and rigorous inquiry for undergraduates throughout the humanities and social sciences as well as for health care professionals-in-training, including students in medical school, pre-medicine, nursing, public health, and those studying to assist physicians in various capacities. Written by (...) an author team with more than three decades of combined experience teaching bioethics, this book offers Flexibility to the instructor, with chapters that can be read independently and in an order that fits the course structure Up-to-date coverage of current controversies on topics such as vaccination, access to health care, new reproductive technologies, genetics, biomedical research on human and animal subjects, medically assisted death, abortion, medical confidentiality, and disclosure Attention to issues of gender, race, cultural diversity, and justice in health care Integration with case studies and primary sources Pedagogical features to help instructors and students, including Chapter learning objectives Text boxes and figures to explain important terms, concepts, and cases End-of-chapter summaries, key words, and annotated further readings Discussion cases and questions Appendices on moral reasoning and the history of ethical issues at the end and beginning of life An index of cases discussed in the book and extensive glossary/index A companion website with a virtual anthology linking to key primary sources, a test bank, topics for papers, and PowerPoints for lectures and class discussion. (shrink)
The development of modern science, as everybody knows, has come largely through naturalizing domains of inquiry that were traditionally parts of philosophy – a process that philosophers have, by and large, applauded. But could this worthwhile endeavor now move on to include critical thinking? Here we argue that critical thinking, a discipline devoted principally to the study of the normative aspects of reasoning, cannot be assimilated to purely naturalistic, descriptive studies of reasoning of the sort now prevalent in the social (...) sciences and in what is now called „experimental philosophy.‟ Critical thinking, on our view, is a discipline whose central task is not that of constructing a catalogue of common patterns of reasoning, but instead of accounting for the normative worth of such patterns. Plainly, it is an enterprise that raises philosophical questions about the nature of such normativity and requires an evaluation of possible answers. The normativity issues at stake in critical thinking are parallel in significant ways to those arising in normative ethics and traditional epistemology. And this is why successful arguments offered against attempts at eliminating or reducing the latter disciplines to the sciences could be adapted to support the philosophical autonomy of critical thinking. A glance at the naturalistic approaches to reasoning currently on offer reveals that there is so far no naturalistic account of the normativity of reasoning in the offing. Not surprisingly, naturalistic studies of reasoning concerned with such normativity either fail to account for it or simply rehash traditional philosophical accounts. In a recent study, Sripada and Stich (2005) 1 seem to assume that all there is to explaining what moral judgments are can be captured by some results of experimental tests about what people standardly make of moral norms in general (e.g., Turiel‟s moral/conventional task experiments) – perhaps together with some psychological account of the role of emotions and motivation in normative judgment.. (shrink)
More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously offered his own version of nonnaturalism in opposition to what are, in effect, analytic versions of reductive naturalism in ethics. Although Moore himself did not clearly distinguish the analysis of predicates from that of properties, he plainly denied that the evaluative predicate, good , could be analyzed in terms of any purely descriptive predicate, and took this to show that the property of goodness could not be identical to any natural property (...) or properties. In support of this, he offered an extended inference, which begins with the so−called open question argument (hereafter, OQA ') and concludes that any such attempted analysis would commit a naturalistic fallacy.' There is now consensus that this extended inference faces a number of problems. Not only does it conflate properties and predicates, it also rests on a notion of philosophical analysis that is at best paradoxical. Moreover, it misconstrues ethical naturalism, taking it to consist in a single reductivist program. Here we propose a Moore−inspired, yet more modest, extended inference that we think can at once avoid these shortcomings and also show that evaluative predicates are not analyzable into purely descriptive predicates. Given our inference, any attempt at such an analysis would commit the naturalistic fallacy, for it would sanction a semantic equivalence between predicates that is at least debatable − for example, between good' and pleasure−maximizing.' The objection is leveled, not against metaphysical varieties of reductive naturalism, but only against semantic versions of this position. (shrink)
For undergraduate/graduate courses in Latin American Philosophy, Latin American Thought, Multicultural Philosophy, Latino Culture and Civilization, and Hispanic Culture and Civilization in the Departments of Philosophy, Latin American Studies, Political Science, Romance Languages, and Chicano Studies. The most comprehensive anthology in its field, 'Latin American philosophy' offers the reflections of Latin American thinkers on the nature of philosophy, justice, human rights, cultural identity, and other issues that have faced them from the colonial period to the present day. Most of the (...) essays are short and easy to read making them accessible to students with little or no philosophical background. (shrink)