Observations of animals engaging in apparently moral behavior have led academics and the public alike to ask whether morality is shared between humans and other animals. Some philosophers explicitly argue that morality is unique to humans, because moral agency requires capacities that are only demonstrated in our species. Other philosophers argue that some animals can participate in morality because they possess these capacities in a rudimentary form. Scientists have also joined the discussion, and their views are just as varied as (...) the philosophers’. Some research programs examine whether animals countenance specific human norms, such as fairness. Other research programs investigate the cognitive and affective capacities thought to be necessary for morality. There are two sets of concerns that can be raised by these debates. They sometimes suffer from there being no agreed upon theory of morality and no clear account of whether there is a demarcation between moral and social behavior; that is, they lack a proper philosophical foundation. They also sometimes suffer from there being disagreement about the psychological capacities evident in animals. Of these two sets of concerns—the nature of the moral and the scope of psychological capacities—we aim to take on only the second. In this chapter we defend the claim that animals have three sets of capacities that, on some views, are taken as necessary and foundational for moral judgment and action. These are capacities of care, capacities of autonomy, and normative capacities. Care, we argue, is widely found among social animals. Autonomy and normativity are more recent topics of empirical investigation, so while there is less evidence of these capacities at this point in our developing scientific knowledge, the current data is strongly suggestive. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Question of Whether There Is a Latin American Philosophy Is There Philosophy in Latin America? References Further Reading.

This comprehensive collection of original essays written by aninternational group of scholars addresses the central themes inLatin American philosophy. Represents the most comprehensive survey of historical andcontemporary Latin American philosophy available today Comprises a specially commissioned collection of essays, manyof them written by Latin American authors Examines the history of Latin American philosophy and itscurrent issues, traces the development of the discipline, andoffers biographical sketches of key Latin American thinkers Showcases the diversity of approaches, issues, and styles thatcharacterize the field.

These thirteen original essays, whose authors include some of the world's leading philosophers, examine themes from the work of the Cambridge philosopher G. E. Moore (1873-1958), and demonstrate his considerable continuing influence on philosophical debate. Part I bears on epistemological topics, such as skepticism about the external world, the significance of common sense, and theories of perception. Part II is devoted to themes in ethics, such as Moore's open question argument, his non-naturalism, utilitarianism, and his notion of organic unities.

While growing empirical evidence suggests a continuity between human and non-human psychology, many philosophers still think that only humans can act and form beliefs rationally. In this paper, we challenge this claim. We first clarify the notion of rationality. We then focus on the rationality of beliefs and argue that, in the relevant sense, humans are not the only rational animals. We do so by first distinguishing between unreflective and reflective responsiveness to epistemic reasons in belief formation and revision. We (...) argue that unreflective responsiveness is clearly within the reach of many animals. We then defend that a key demonstration of reflective responsiveness would be the ability to respond to undermining defeaters. We end by presenting some empirical evidence that suggests that some animal species are capable of processing these defeaters, which would entail that even by the strictest standards, humans are not the only rational animals. (shrink)

Under one particular reading of it, Anscombe's 'Modern Moral Philosophy' is considered a seminal text in the revival of virtue ethics. Seen thus, Anscombe is implying that it is possible to do ethics without using concepts such as 'moral ought' or 'moral obligation', the perfect example being Aristotelian ethics. On the other hand, Anscombe claims that it is not useful at present to engage in moral philosophy since she finds that 'philosophically there is a huge gap… which needs to be (...) filled by an account of human nature, human action, …and above all of human "flourishing"' (Anscombe, 1958: 18). The gap Anscombe refers to appears where there should be a 'proof that an unjust man is a bad man'. My aim in this paper is to discuss the various ways in which Anscombe's theses can be interpreted, recalling two other philosophers for whom Aristotelian virtue ethics was also essential: P. Foot and J. McDowell. I will argue that Anscombe did not expect Aristotelian ethics to answer the problems modern ethics poses. (shrink)

More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute ethical naturalism by offering the so-called open question argument (OQA), also charging that all varieties of ethical naturalism commit the naturalistic fallacy. Although there is consensus that OQA and the naturalistic-fallacy charge both fail, OQA is sometimes vindicated, but only as an argument against naturalistic semantic analyses. The naturalistic-fallacy charge, by contrast, usually finds no takers at all. This paper provides new grounds for an OQA thus restricted. But (...) it aims chiefly at vindicating a version of the naturalistic fallacy, „the semantic-naturalist fallacy‟ (SNF), that we think defensible. We first argue that the openness of the question OQA raises against such analyses hinges on self-ascriptive, comparative judgments of content, which may be considered a priori warranted. We then provide independent reasons for the claim that the sort of mistake committed by naturalistic analyses in fact amounts to a pragmatic fallacy of a kind familiar in petitio principii and other forms of viciously circular inference. Of interest here are naturalistic analyses of ethical terms or concepts, not of properties. Our OQA (OQA*) raises an objection to the former. For no such semantic analyses can get off the ground unless moral terms are content-equivalent to purely descriptive terms, which amounts to saying that they must instantiate the same semantic types. Suppose „good‟ is the analysandum and „pleasure maximizing‟ the analysans (whichever purely descriptive term or terms would turn out to be the correct descriptive analysis of the target analysandum) of a certain semantic analysis. The claim that such terms are content-equivalent appears to be open to doubt on a priori grounds. After 1 all, whether one‟s own tokens of „good‟ and „pleasure maximizing‟ have/don‟t have the same content is a first-person, comparative judgment of content. Evaluating the proposed analysis requires, then, a self-ascriptive, comparative judgment of content.1 Judgments of this sort are thought to have a special epistemic status, since they seem grounded in neither evidence nor inference.. (shrink)

In this paper we study symmetric inference systems (that is, pairs of inference systems) as refutation systems characterizing maximal logics with certain properties. In particular, the method is applied to paraconsistent logics, which are natural examples of such logics.

The purpose of the paper is to study syntactic refutation systems as a way of characterizing normal modal propositional logics. In particular it is shown that there is a decidable modal logic without the finite model property that has a simple finite refutation system.

Ethics . . . [is] partly analysis of what’s meant by ‘good’, ‘ought’, ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘valuable’, etc. And if certain analyses of these are right, then other ethical propositions, ones which aren’t analytic, wouldn’t be philosophical at all, but belong to psychology, sociology, and the theory of evolution.

This chapter contains sections titled: Names or Predicates? The Semantics of Ethnic‐Group Terms Nihilism about Ethnic‐Group Terms The Political Pragmatics of Ethnic‐Group Terms References Further Reading.

Modern management reporting on its company''s performance is influenced by individuals ethical considerations. Stakeholders philosophies have continued to change over the last 75 years affecting reporting systems for companies reporting information internally and externally. These fundamental changes in philosophy have affected how information is conveyed. We are not claiming that only one philosophical viewpoint dominates companies reporting practices, but there does appear to be a changing trend of philosophies building on one another. We use resource dependence theory in relationship to (...) a decision-making model to explain changing stakeholders positions over time. This paper argues that six dominant philosophical theories have influenced the way individuals and organizations report financial and other information. Further, these philosophies then are depicted in a model that helps us to understand what influences companies to present themselves to the outside world. A vignette is used to depict changing philosophical views for several companies management report over 75 years. (shrink)

Rationale, aims and objectives Given the increasing prevalence of cataract and demand for cataract extraction surgery, patients must often wait to undergo this procedure. We validated a previously developed priority scoring system in terms of clinical variables, pre-intervention health status, appropriateness of surgery and gain in visual acuity (VA) and health-related quality of life (HRQoL).Methods Explicit prioritization criteria for cataract extraction created by a variation of the Research and Development (RAND) and University of California Los Angeles appropriateness methodology were retrospectively (...) applied to a prospective cohort of 5257 patients on waiting lists to undergo cataract by phacoemulsification at 17 hospitals in Spain. Demographic data, clinical data and data related to surgical technique were collected by trained ophthalmologists. Patients were evaluated by their ophthalmologist before the intervention and 6 weeks afterward. They also completed, by mail, the Visual Function Index (VF-14) before the intervention and 3 months afterward.Results High-priority patients experienced greater improvement in VA and HRQoL than those classified as intermediate or low-priority (P < 0.0001), even after adjusting by VA and the VF-14 score at baseline. The time to intervention was the same for high-priority patients as it was for intermediate and low-priority patients.Conclusions The priority score we developed identified patients most likely to experience the greatest improvements from cataract extraction. Use of this tool could provide a fairer and more rational way to prioritize patients for cataract extraction. (shrink)

Under one particular reading of it, Anscombe's 'Modern Moral Philosophy' is considered a seminal text in the revival of virtue ethics. Seen thus, Anscombe is implying that it is possible to do ethics without using concepts such as 'moral ought' or 'moral obligation', the perfect example being Aristotelian ethics. On the other hand, Anscombe claims that it is not useful at present to engage in moral philosophy since she finds that 'philosophically there is a huge gap… which needs to be (...) filled by an account of human nature, human action, …and above all of human "flourishing"' (Anscombe, 1958: 18). The gap Anscombe refers to appears where there should be a 'proof that an unjust man is a bad man'. My aim in this paper is to discuss the various ways in which Anscombe's theses can be interpreted, recalling two other philosophers for whom Aristotelian virtue ethics was also essential: P. Foot and J. McDowell. I will argue that Anscombe did not expect Aristotelian ethics to answer the problems modern ethics poses. (shrink)

Resumen Los textos televisivos interpretan y analizan la realidad circundante e influyen en la visión que la audiencia tiene del mundo. Es más, los programas cómicos basados en la burla y el sarcasmo hacia grupos étnicos minoritarios refuerzan estereotipos negativos y promueven la discriminación cultural. En este artículo se estudia el humor étnico en La paisana Jacinta. Esta serie peruana ha sido acusada de racista por diversas personas y grupos, entre ellos, la excongresista indígena Hilaria Supa, LUNDU y CHIRAPAQ. Primero, (...) se analizan las estrategias pragmático-lingüísticas empleadas en la construcción del humor étnico en una selección de diálogos y monólogos de Jacinta, el personaje principal de la serie. Para ello, se utiliza la Teoría General del Humor Verbal. Asimismo, dado que todo texto es multimodal, se tiene también en cuenta cómo imágenes, gestos, y elementos musicales y prosódicos en la serie contribuyen en la producción de la comicidad. Finalmente, a partir de estos resultados, se examina el contenido cómico del programa desde una perspectiva crítica para determinar si este es discriminatorio. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo principal, analizar parte del discurso filosófico, así como también, el expresado en la música popular con respecto, a las mujeres e indirectamente a las diversidades sexuales.Filosofía y versos contenidos en las letras de canciones populares, se emparentan en la discriminación que se traduce en conductas implícitas reconocidas como micromachismos y en otras explícitas que vendrían siendo macroconsecuencias, como son todos los tipos de violencia, que tras una espiral culminan en femicidios. Tratar de comprender la (...) estructura discursiva que guardan estos actos, adquiere relevancia, por cuanto la población aludida, vive bajo permanente amenaza, durante siglos. (shrink)

It has been argued that some animals are moral subjects, that is, beings who are capable of behaving on the basis of moral motivations. In this paper, we do not challenge this claim. Instead, we presuppose its plausibility in order to explore what ethical consequences follow from it. Using the capabilities approach, we argue that beings who are moral subjects are entitled to enjoy positive opportunities for the flourishing of their moral capabilities, and that the thwarting of these capabilities entails (...) a harm that cannot be fully explained in terms of hedonistic welfare. We explore the implications of this idea for the assessment of current practices involving animals. (shrink)

A general theory of refutation systems is given. Some applications (concerning maximality and minimality in lattices of logics) are also discussed.

En este escrito, 1) hago una presentación del tipo de análisis conceptual quehace Wittgenstein en algunas obras posteriores al Tractaus; me refiero,específicamente, a una cierta manera de proceder que consiste en ladescripción de los diferentes usos de un concepto, y que tiene como finarrojar luz sobre las condiciones de funcionamiento de nuestro lenguaje para,así, llegar a la solución de un determinado problema filosófico. 2) Examinoalgunos pasajes de las Investigaciones en los que que Wittgenstein analizaconceptos psicológicos y señalo lo que considero (...) son algunas fallas de lasinterpretaciones naturalistas, externalistas y mentalistas de esos pasajes. 3)Presento una interpretación de la perspectiva de Wittgenstein en torno alproblema de la existencia y naturaleza de los estados y procesos psicológicos,que tiene en cuenta, tanto el tipo de análisis que Wittgenstein hace, comoalgunas afirmaciones suyas extraídas de las Investigaciones y de LosCuadernos Azul y Marrón. (shrink)

The suitability of the artificial grammar learning paradigm to capture relevant aspects of the acquisition of linguistic structures has been empirically tested in a number of EEG studies. Some have shown a syntax-related P600 component, but it has not been ruled out that the AGL P600 effect is a response to surface features rather than the underlying syntax structure. Therefore, in this study, we controlled for the surface characteristics of the test sequences and recorded the EEG before and after exposure (...) to a grammar. After exposure, a typical, centroparietal P600 effect was elicited by grammatical violations and not by unfamiliar subsequences, suggesting that the AGL P600 effect signals a response to structural irregularities. Moreover, preference and grammaticality classification showed a qualitatively similar ERP profile, strengthening the idea that the implicit structural mere-exposure paradigm in combination with preference classification is a suitable alternative to the traditional grammaticality classification test. (shrink)

Despite the strength of arguments for veganism in the animal rights literature, alongside environmental and other anthropocentric concerns posed by industrialised animal agriculture, veganism remains only a minority standpoint. In this paper, I explore the moral motivational problem of veganism from the perspectives of moral psychology and political false consciousness. I argue that a novel interpretation of the post-Marxist notion of political false consciousness may help to make sense of the widespread refusal to shift towards veganism. Specifically, the notion of (...) false consciousness fills some explanatory gaps left by the moral psychological notion of akrasia, often understood to refer to a weakness of will. Central to my approach is the idea that animal exploitation is largely systemic and the assumption that moral motivation is inseparable from moral thinking. In this light, the primary obstacle to the adoption of veganism arises not so much from a failure to put genuine beliefs into action, but rather in a shared, distorted way of thinking about animals. Thus, common unreflective objections to veganism may be said to be manifestations of false consciousness. (shrink)

This book shows that the debate over the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge has led to the investigation of a variety of topics, including the a...

When conflicts regarding industrial operations erupt between countries, relationships between corporations and stakeholders may be affected. We combine insights from stakeholder theory and studies on government and corporate social responsibility to investigate how intergovernmental politics shapes stakeholder engagement. Relying on attribution theory and a qualitative analysis of the Finnish Metsä-Botnia (hereafter Botnia) company during the intergovernmental conflict between Uruguay and Argentina, we explore the mediating role of _political attributions_—defined as the stakeholder network actors’ inferences regarding governmental motives—in the process by (...) which intergovernmental politics shapes stakeholder engagement. We induce three types of political attributions: _instrumentalizing_, which points to the undeclared instrumental motives of governments; _radicalizing_, which refers to the beliefs that governments immoderately intensify confrontation; and _acting in bad faith_, which relates to the perceptions that governments act in inconsistent and/or morally inappropriate ways. Our results show how these attributions combine in specific configurations to explain how intergovernmental politics shapes stakeholder engagement throughout the conflict. Our study theorizes the role of governments as stakeholders in stakeholder engagement and expands organizational studies of attribution to the stakeholder and global levels. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that humans are the only animals who can possess a concept of death. However, the ubiquity of death in nature and the evolutionary advantages that would come with an understanding of death provide two prima facie reasons for doubting this assumption. In this paper, my intention is not to defend that animals of this or that nonhuman species possess a concept of death, but rather to examine how we could go about empirically determining whether animals can (...) have a concept of death. In order to answer this question, I begin by sketching an account of concept possession that favours intensional classification rather than mere extensional discrimination. Further, I argue that the concept of death should be construed as neither binary nor universal. I then present a proposal for a set of minimal conditions that must be met to have a concept of death. I argue that having a minimal understanding of death entails first expecting a dead individual to be alive, and then grasping its non-functionality and irreversibility. Lastly, I lay out the sort of observational and experimental evidence that we should look for to determine whether animals have the capacity for a minimal comprehension of death. (shrink)

La inteligencia artificial (IA) no es sólo una moda, sino un conjunto de sistemastecnológicos que han adquirido en los últimos años un enorme desarrollo con aplicaciones a múltiples aspectos de la vida cotidiana de los ciudadanos, tanto por parte de particulares (empresas) como de los propios Estados.La Unión Europea ha apostado siempre por compatibilizar los avances tecnológicos con el respeto de los principios y valores de la democracia, el Estado de Derecho y los derechos y libertades fundamentales. Desde tales premisas, (...) actualmente se enfrenta a la búsqueda de un modelo regulatorio de la IA ante las carencias del Reglamento General de Protección de Datos (RGPD) en este ámbito.A través de la Propuesta de Reglamento (UE) sobre IA, se pretende adoptar una regulación marco del uso de la IA que suponga una “tercera vía” inspirada en los principios y valores de la Unión y se contraponga a las actuales fórmulas regulatorias “abstencionistas” (EE.UU) e “hiperreguladoras” (China), proporcionando un modelo que consiga el efecto imitador o “efecto Bruselas” de una IA “confiable” para los ciudadanos y las empresas a nivel mundial. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show how modern genetics reached Spain through the Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas (JAE) during the decade of 1920s, the role played by key persons, and the level of development this discipline achieved from its different points of inception and under the conditions of financial scarcity and political turmoil that prevailed during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). In addition, the effect of the war on the continuity of the lines (...) of research already began is outlined, identifying the main area in which genetics first reappeared: agronomy. (shrink)

In the paper we study the method of Socratic proofs in the intuitionistic propositional logic as a reduction procedure. Our approach consists in constructing for a given sequent α a finite tree of sets of sequents by using invertible reduction rules of the kind: ? is valid if and only if ?1 is valid or... or ?n is valid. From such a tree either a Gentzen-style proof of α or an Aristotle-style refutation of α can also be extracted.

In this paper we study the method of refutation rules in the modal logic K4. We introduce refutation rules with certain normal forms that provide a new syntactic decision procedure for this logic. As corollaries we obtain such results for the following important extensions: S4, the provability logic G, and Grzegorczyk''s logic. We also show that tree-type models can be constructed from syntactic refutations of this kind.