L’article examine la question philosophique de la fin du monde en comparant son traitement par Jacques Derrida et par Martin Heidegger. Nous résumons d’abord le concept heideggérien du monde. Après cela, nous présentons la pensée derridienne de la fin du monde comme sa déconstruction. Derrida oppose notamment à Heidegger l’idée de la mort de l’autre comme «fin du monde chaque fois unique». Dans «No apocalypse, not now», il examine également l’idée de la destruction sans reste du monde et de l’humanité, (...) qui ouvre la dimension de l’avenir autrement que chez Heidegger. Dans la dernière partie, en partant des termes Entweltlichung et Unwelt, nous présentons la pensée heideggérienne de la fin du monde: celle-ci n’est pas une figure de l’avenir mais une herméneutique de la désintégration du monde actuel. Pour finir, nous ouvrons la question de l’expression adéquate de la fin du monde. (shrink)

Omnipresent in popular culture, especially in film and literature, the theme of the 'end of the world' is often rejected from contemporary philosophy as hysterical apocalyptism. This volume attempts to show that it is vital that we address the motif of the 'end' in contemporary world – but that this cannot be done without thinking it anew.

Bernard Stiegler is known as a leading philosopher of technics. He has developed an original interpretation of technics as an externalized epiphylogenetic memory that remembers in the p...

I present Gilbert Simondon’s thinking of technics, that I take to be so compelling today because it articulates technological reality in ecological terms as a technogeography and life as being-with-the-machines. I will flesh out Simondon’s program for a being-with-the-machines, show how it corresponds to the essence of the technical objects described in terms of milieu and relation indicate how this is based on Simondon’s ontology of individuation suggest a criticism of Simondon, insofar as he would underestimate the technicality of the (...) human being him/herself and of his/her world. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la Revue philosophique de Louvain, 108, 2010, p. 527-548. Mon sujet sera le motif du « rythme » d'après des textes de Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. Bien sûr, j'aurais aimé parler du rythme de Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, du dictamen de sa phrase. Rythme admirable, oui, mais sujet pour moi intraitable dans le cadre d'un essai philosophique. Le rythme de la phrase de Lacoue-Labarthe se fait au creux d'autres rythmes et s'amplifie en chambre d'échos des voix qu'il met (...) en scène, - Philosophie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

This essay is a comparison between Schelling's and Blanchot's conceptions of the night of the imaginary. Schelling is the most romantic of the German idealist philosophers and Blanchot the most extreme of the French “deconstructionists.“ Their historical link is actually indirect, but they offer two complementary views on the “same“ impersonal nocturnal experience of the imaginary, the approach of which requires a certain self-overcoming of philosophy towards literature.

This paper is motivated by Heidegger’s invitation to think the essence of technics through a dialogue between technics and art. This dialogue is approached with the help of several artworks belonging to what can be called the “technological turn” in art. First, I draw a schematic picture of notions of instrumentality, rationality, totality, and teleology inherited from classical philosophy of art and technology and challenged by contemporary art. I underline the Romantic claim that art overcomes these features thanks to its (...) freedom and ask, referring to the work of Gilbert Simondon, whether technology could also be liberated from its subordination to utilitarian ends. Second, I look at how certain contemporary works of art attempt to solve some of these problems. Artists who seize technical objects generally seek to make their functioning visible and problematic by distorting, interrupting, or otherwise modifying the technical dispositif—this is when a machine becomes a work of art. I show how this happens in certain works of Rebecca Horn, Jean Tinguely, Anaïs Tondeur, Eduardo Kac, and Tomas Saraceno. In conclusion, I show how art can liberate technology by liberating it from utility and instrumentality and by exposing it as such in its functioning. On the other hand, I argue that technology can liberate art, both through artistic techniques and nonartistic technological processes. (shrink)

Is Heidegger’s theory of the era of technology a sufficent hermeneutics of contemporary globalization? It remains invaluable because it understands technology in terms of transcendence, and transcencence in terms of being-in-the-world. But should it nevertheless be revised in the context of contemporary social and technological environment? This article shows firstly how Heidegger’s general idea of being-in-the-world is specified in his theory of technology, and how technology reduces man and nature into “natural resources” and being into elemental techno-nature. Secondly, the article (...) presents two types of critique to Heidegger’s idea: on the one hand, Ihde, Latour and Stiegler question Heidegger’s understanding of technology as a total system; on the other hand, Foucault and Eldred question Heidegger’s understanding of technology independently of social and economical structures. The article suggests that re-interpreted through these critiques, the theory of technology gives a good basis for an ontology of contemporary “uprooted” existence. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 3, pp 369 - 389 The article’s aim is to measure the potential of Derrida’s work for a philosophy of technique. It shows why Derrida does not present a positive philosophy of technology but rather describes technique as a _quasi_-technique, _as if_ a technique. The article inquires into the potential of such a quasi-technique for a contemporary philosophy of technology: it is suggested that it can function as a salutary “deconstruction” of mainstream philosophy of technology (...) because it shows how to think technique _in_ the absence of essence and _as_ the absence of essence.The article begins with a survey of the machines that figure in Derrida’s texts. It then examines three propositions concerning technology in Derrida’s work:Derrida thinks technology as a metaphor of _writing_ and not the other way round.Derrida thinks technique as _prosthesis_, firstly of memory, then more generally of life.Derrida’s quasi-technique relies on his peculiar conception of the incorporal _materiality_ of technique. (shrink)

This essay is a broad overview of philosophy’s capacity of facing the historicity of nature. It shows why classical philosophy of history, especially Hegel, left nature outside of history, and also in what sense this kind of philosophy is outdated. Then it shows how natural sciences discovered historical phenomena since the invention of biology at the very end of the eighteenth century and especially since Darwinism, although these did not examine the philosophical presuppositions of their theories. Assuming that the challenge (...) of contemporary philosophy of history is to learn to include nature in history, the essay finally examines climatic change as a test case that allows us to see the problematics of nature’s historicity today. Climatic change cannot be explained if one holds onto the classical division into natural sciences and humanities, and this is because it is neither a natural nor a cultural phenomenon but manifests reality as a techno-nature, that has a singular, non-teleological and eventful historicity, the understanding of which is crucial today. (shrink)

Cet article présente la conception hégélienne de la vie naturelle comme limite : la nature est la limite de l’esprit, et le vivant est une limite en soi. Examiné surtout dans l’animal, « vivre » équivaut à tracer les limites du vivant, dont on voit ainsi la plasticité fondamentale. La finitude du vivant se traduit en une imagination purement sensible, qui se réalise dans la création d’un espace-temps singulier ; le sens qui dirige cette activité vise à reproduire une existence, (...) non une forme, ce qui en fait plus un terme qu’un but de la téléologie animale. Or, si la nature vivante est la limite de l’esprit, peut-elle « surprendre » celui-ci ? Si la « surprise » dit l’apparition de l’inouï depuis la création libre, elle ne le peut pas, car la plasticité naturelle ne produit que la contingence de l’existence et de l’entendement. Mais la contingence ne soumet pas pour autant la nature intégralement à l’idée : en ce sens, la nature reste pour Hegel l’ « énigme » qui tient l’esprit en éveil.The article presents Hegel’s conception of natural life as a limit : nature is the limit of spirit, and the living being is a limit as such. Examined above all in the animal, life is the tracing of the limits of the living being, whose fundamental plasticity becomes manifest. The living being’s finitude is conveyed in its purely sensible imagination, which realises itself in the creation of a singular space-time ; the sense directing this activity aims at reproducing an existence, not a form, and such a sense is rather the end than the aim of animal teleology. Now, if living nature is spirit’s limit, can it « surprise » the latter ? It cannot, if « surprise » means the apparition of an unprecedented possibility of a free creation, for natural plasticity can only produce the contingencies of existence and understanding. But neither does the contingency of nature subjugate it integrally to idea : in this sense, nature remains for Hegel the « enigma » that keeps spirit awake. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la Revue philosophique de Louvain, 108, 2010, p. 527-548. Mon sujet sera le motif du « rythme » d'après des textes de Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. Bien sûr, j'aurais aimé parler du rythme de Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, du dictamen de sa phrase. Rythme admirable, oui, mais sujet pour moi intraitable dans le cadre d'un essai philosophique. Le rythme de la phrase de Lacoue-Labarthe se fait au creux d'autres rythmes et s'amplifie en chambre d'échos des voix qu'il met (...) en scène, - Philosophie. (shrink)