13 found
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  1.  78
    No Reason for Identity: On the Relation Between Motivating and Normative Reasons.Susanne Mantel - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):49-62.
  2. Acting for Reasons, Apt Action, and Knowledge.Susanne Mantel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3865-3888.
    I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt belief is correct, this means that (...)
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  3.  94
    Worldly Reasons: An Ontological Inquiry Into Motivating Considerations and Normative Reasons.Susanne Mantel - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this article I advocate a worldly account of normative reasons according to which there is an ontological gap between these and the premises of practical thought, i.e. motivating considerations. While motivating considerations are individuated fine-grainedly, normative reasons should be classified as coarse-grained entities, e.g. as states of affairs, in order to explain certain necessary truths about them and to make sense of how we count and weigh them. As I briefly sketch, acting for normative reasons is nonetheless possible if (...)
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  4.  19
    Because There Is a Reason to Do It: How Normative Reasons Explain Action.Susanne Mantel - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (2):208-233.
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  5.  55
    Three Cheers for Dispositions: A Dispositional Approach to Acting for a Normative Reason.Susanne Mantel - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):561-582.
    Agents sometimes act for normative reasons—for reasons that objectively favor their actions. Jill, for instance, calls a doctor for the normative reason that Kate is injured. In this article I explore a dispositional approach to acting for a normative reason. I argue for the need of epistemic, motivational, and executional dispositional elements of a theory of acting for a normative reason. Dispositions play a mediating role between, on the one hand, the normative reason and its normative force, and the action (...)
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  6.  2
    Précis Zu Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason.Susanne Mantel - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (3):410-415.
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  7.  1
    Repliken.Susanne Mantel - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 72 (3):429-434.
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  8.  24
    Motivierende Gründe und praktische Überlegung.Susanne Mantel - 2009 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 63 (2):260-284.
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  9.  2
    Star, Daniel. Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. Xvii+147. $60.00. [REVIEW]Susanne Mantel - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):507-511.
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  10.  4
    Dispositionen: Segen oder Fluch für die kausale Theorie der epistemischen Stützungsbeziehung?Susanne Mantel - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (1):37-49.
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  11. Motivierende Gründe und praktische Überlegung Eine Verteidigung des Psychologismus.Susanne Mantel - 2009 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 63 (2).
    Der vorliegende Aufsatz prüft, unter welchen Bedingungen ein Psychologismus für motivierende Gründe der gegenwärtig wachsenden Kritik standhalten kann. Zwei zentrale antipsychologistische Argumente, das „Spezialfallargument“ und das „Idealfallargument“, werden rekonstruiert und zurückgewiesen. Sie werfen dem Psychologismus vor, unsere praktische Überlegung lediglich in Spezialfällen adäquat zu beschreiben und damit unvereinbar zu sein, dass Personen im Idealfall aus normativen Gründen handeln. Der Aufsatz zeigt auf, dass diese Argumente voraussetzen, dass der motivierende Grund identisch ist mit demjenigen, was aus der Sicht des Handelnden als (...)
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  12. Reasons without Rationalism. [REVIEW]Susanne Mantel - 2010 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (3).
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  13. Warum nach Wahrheit suchen?Susanne Mantel - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):292-301.
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