Order:
  1.  44
    Lost in the System or Lost in Translation? The Exchanges Between Hart and Ross.Svein Eng - 2011 - Ratio Juris 24 (2):194-246.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  2.  61
    Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: Reflexivity of Justification.Svein Eng - 2014 - Ratio Juris 27 (1):138-154.
    In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3.  51
    Why Reflective Equilibrium? III: Reflective Equilibrium as a Heuristic Tool.Svein Eng - 2014 - Ratio Juris 27 (3):440-459.
    In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4.  47
    Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach.Svein Eng - 2014 - Ratio Juris 27 (2):288-310.
    In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of “reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5.  42
    Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions. The Concepts of 'Descriptive Proposition' and 'Normative Proposition' as Concepts of Degree.Svein Eng - 2000 - Ratio Juris 13 (3):236-260.
  6. Legislative Inflation and the Quality of Law.Svein Eng - 2002 - In Luc Wintgens (ed.), Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation. Hart. pp. 65--80.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  18
    Criteria That Are Used in the Setting Up of and Choice Between Descriptive Characterisations.Svein Eng - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (5):475-495.
    This paper investigates the actual use of truth as a criterion in the setting up of and choice between descriptive characterisations. The consideration for truth is often weighed against other considerations. This weighing character is illuminated through examples from everyday life, politics, law, and science. In everyday life the weighing character shows itself inter alia through the categories of 'white lies' and 'great questions', and in politics, inter alia through the categories of 'personal character' versus 'the party'. In law there (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  32
    Fused Modality. An Integral Part of Lawyers’ Form of Life.Svein Eng - 2005 - Ratio Juris 18 (4):429-433.
    . In this reply to Dahlman, the focus is on aspects that I take to be of general interest. The point to be emphasised is the absence of a critically reflexive mode of questioning on the part of Dahlman and, in general, on the part of the position he represents, namely, an empiricist and logical paradigm of atemporal cognition and control. It is argued that lawyers’ thinking de lege lata—with its distinctive connection to normativity and morals, through the unity of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark