In this paper, I examine Plato’s and Aristotle’s contrasted treatment of the “Good itself ” and its relation to the human good. Contrary to a common view, Aristotle does not attack the very concept of a Good itself, but rather Plato’s interpretation of it as the Idea of the Good. One of his central criticisms is that such an Idea would have no practical use. By an analysis of the Philebus, I try to show why and how this Idea does (...) have such a use in Plato, but in a way which could not satisfy his pupil, because for Aristotle, the Good itself must be an ultimate end which must have a direct efficiency on the whole world, without any need of the mediation of knowledge. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle shows that such an end can be identified with a purely active intelligence, which he names God. Although this Good itself is absolutely necessary and thus cannot be a “practical good” in Aristotle’s terms, its contemplation by human intelligence can be, because it is for its part contingent. I conclude in assessing the main consequences of Plato’s and Aristotle’s different views of the Good itself on their philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

This paper examines the discussion about false pleasures in the "Philebus" (36 c3-44 a11). After stressing the crucial importance of this discussion in the economy of the dialogue, it attempts to identify the problematic locus of the possibility of true or false pleasures. Socrates points to it by means of an analogy between pleasure and doxa. Against traditional interpretations, which reduce the distinction drawn in this passage to a distinction between doxa and pleasure on the one hand and their object (...) on the other, it is argued that, rather, Socrates distinguishes between the mere fact of having a doxa or a pleasure, on the one hand, and the content of these acts, on the other hand. Consequently, the possibility for a pleasure to be false does not concern its relation to an object, but the affective content which defines it. In order to show how the affective content of a pleasure can be false, it is necessary to examine the three species of false pleasures described by Socrates in their relation to appearance and imagination. Appearance is not identical with perception for Plato: it consists in a mixture of perception and doxa. As for imagination, it consists in "illustrating" a doxa present in the soul by means of a "quasi-perception". It is the presence of a doxa in each of these processes which makes it possible for them to be true or false, while mere perception cannot be either true or false. It is then argued that according to the "Philebus" pleasure can be false precisely because its affective content is not a mere perception, but either an appearance or an imagination. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive commentary of the Philebus designed to shed light on the nature and function of the good in Plato’s philosophy as a whole. Topics discussed include dialectic, pleasure, epistemology, and the relations between metaphysics and ethics.

This paper examines the discussion about false pleasures in the "Philebus" (36 c3-44 a11). After stressing the crucial importance of this discussion in the economy of the dialogue, it attempts to identify the problematic locus of the possibility of true or false pleasures. Socrates points to it by means of an analogy between pleasure and doxa. Against traditional interpretations, which reduce the distinction drawn in this passage to a distinction between doxa and pleasure on the one hand and their object (...) on the other, it is argued that, rather, Socrates distinguishes between the mere fact of having a doxa or a pleasure, on the one hand, and the content of these acts, on the other hand. Consequently, the possibility for a pleasure to be false does not concern its relation to an object, but the affective content which defines it. In order to show how the affective content of a pleasure can be false, it is necessary to examine the three species of false pleasures described by Socrates in their relation to appearance and imagination. Appearance is not identical with perception for Plato: it consists in a mixture of perception and doxa. As for imagination, it consists in "illustrating" a doxa present in the soul by means of a "quasi-perception". It is the presence of a doxa in each of these processes which makes it possible for them to be true or false, while mere perception cannot be either true or false. It is then argued that according to the "Philebus" pleasure can be false precisely because its affective content is not a mere perception, but either an appearance or an imagination. (shrink)

J’examine dans cet article le double aspect sous lequel la loi se trouve discutée par l’Étranger dans le Politique : si elle fait tout d’abord l’objet d’une critique sévère au nom d’une science idéale, elle est ensuite réhabilitée à titre de substitut à l’idéal défaillant. Cette réhabilitation est complexe : elle passe par un étrange récit de politique-fiction qui fait écho sans le dire à Thucydide et qui permet à l’Étranger de lier dans un même procès écriture juridique et écriture (...) spéculative ; elle se développe ensuite moyennant une série d’arguments qui insistent sur le nécessaire respect de la loi indépendamment de son contenu et de sa pertinence, mais qui indiquent aussi implicitement la nécessité de lui attribuer une origine mythique dans une connaissance divine devenue inaccessible. Le Politique signe l’acte de naissance de la fiction théologico-politique.I explore in this paper the dual aspect of the Eleatic Visitor’s discussion of law in the Statesman. Although it is at first severely criticized on behalf of an ideal science, it is then rehabilitated as a substitute for the failing ideal. But this rehabilitation is a complex one : it is made via a very peculiar account of political fiction echoing implicitly Thucydides and allowing the Eleatic Visitor to put on the same trial legal and speculative writing. Then it develops by using several arguments, insisting on the necessary respect due to the law, whatever content and relevance it may have, but yet implicitly pointing out the need to confer a mythic origin to law within the context of divine knowledge now impervious to men. Thus Plato’s Statesman pioneers theological political fiction. (shrink)

Unlike the _Phaedo_ itself, its reception in Antiquity remains little studied. By examining the extant commentaries, their sources, and the dialogue’s presence in the reflections of ancient thinkers both inside and outside the Platonic tradition, this volume aims to reconstruct its ancient history.