Most of the issues in the philosophy of mind were formulated long before Charles Darwin produced a scientific theory of biological evolution. That theory had an immediate impact on issues in many areas. But on the philosophy of mind its impact was delayed, and discussions continued for some time as though Darwin had never existed. Even today this is largely true. Yet a theory whose consequences are so far-reaching, and which has radically altered ideas about living things, was bound, sooner (...) or later, to affect discussions of mental phenomena. The pragmatists were the first group of philosophers to work out in detail a philosophy of mind based on evolutionary principles. Moreover, since they were familiar with classical ideas in the field, they were able to assess the kinds of changes in those ideas which evolutionary principles required. My aim in this paper is to review the main features of their enterprise, and to offer some assessment of it. (shrink)

The model provided by the organismic point of view is quite different. Without having recourse to any transcendent vital force or immanent teleology, it nevertheless rejects the basic ideas of mechanism. More specifically, it replaces the analytical- summative conception by the idea of biological organisms as wholes or systems which have unique system-properties and obey irreducible system-laws. The machine-theoretical conception is replaced by a dynamic interpretation of living things, wherein organic structures are due to a continuous flow of processes combining (...) to produce patterns of immense intricacy. The reaction-theoretical conception is jettisoned in favour of the view that the organism is primarily a center of activity which is autonomous and not a mere response to external stimuli. Finally, the organismic model considers that biological systems are stratified, so that, e.g., viruses, genes, chromosomes, cells, multicellular individuals, supra-individual aggregates, etc., form a hierarchy of "levels" exhibiting an increasing degree of complexity. The whole of nature, indeed, contains "a tremendous architecture, in which subordinate systems are united at successive levels into ever higher and larger systems.". (shrink)

For more than forty years Gilbert Ryle has been a unique figure on the skyline of British philosophy, and for at least half that time an influential one. No philosopher since James has written in such a vivid, racy, down-to-earth style. No philosopher since Russell in his heyday has used epigrams and sallies more devastatingly to expose “grave conceptual bosh.” Little wonder then, that for large numbers of students Ryle is a delight to read, or that many of his coinages (...) are a familiar part of the currency of our era. Yet his philosophical influence comes, I think, not from the charms of his person or his style, but from the vigour of his ideas and arguments. Whether he is unravelling a particular knot of problems, as in The Concept of Mind, or dealing with a whole series of problems, as in these Collected Papers, his ideas and arguments rarely fail to stimulate and provoke. I cannot imagine how anyone could study Ryle and remain intellectually motionless. Moreover, just because the pieces reprinted here have such an impressive range, they set off motions along a multitude of fronts, even in the case of those who have read the pieces before. Their publication is thus a most welcome philosophical event. (shrink)

Biologists have recently found it useful to give a prominent place in their theories to the concept of a plant or animal population. Genetics, ecology, paleontology, and especially the theory of evolution have been able to make notable advances as a result of employing the concept in their interpretations and inferences. The concept has not, however, first been rigorously defined and then put to work. That is rarely the way fruitful scientific notions develop. On the contrary, in most discussions the (...) term “population” has a large degree of vagueness about it. This is due in part to the fact that the term has been taken over from ordinary language and employed in a number of novel contexts. But some of the vagueness also seems to be an unavoidable consequence of the immensely intricate phenomena to which the term refers. In any case, the role played by the concept of a population in evolutionary theory makes even a brief inquiry into its meaning worthwhile. The present paper is concerned with such an inquiry. What I wish to do is, first, to review the major ways in which the concept has been used by biologists in connection with recent formulations of the theory of evolution; and secondly, to comment on a few misleading issues which may arise if care is not taken to observe certain logical and linguistic distinctions. (shrink)

Philosophers of existentialist outlook, although obsessed with the human condition, have neglected the fact that men have bodies and arc members of the animal kingdom. Because of this neglect, two opportunities have been missed. Existentialists have failed to draw upon the knowledge amassed by biology about living things and about man's place in the organic world. They have also failed to take a look at biological phenomena in the light of their own conceptual scheme. As a result, they have had (...) a one-sided view of what the human condition is and have misconstrued the nature of man. It is therefore an event worthy of notice when a philosopher sympathetic to existentialism deals seriously with these matters, as Professor Jonas does in his interesting book. (shrink)

Several features of cosmology are of striking philosophical interest. Unlike other branches of physics which deal with kinds of occurrences and relations, cosmology investigates only one unique entity, the physical universe. Hence the science cannot avail itself of standard inductive procedures which depend on the assembling of samples. Cosmologists are therefore obliged to choose between two other procedures. Mr. Bondi calls them the "extrapolative" and the "axiomatic-deductive" lines of thought. The former starts from physical laws known to hold of terrestrial (...) or near-terrestrial phenomena. It then tries to frame an answer to the question: "What is the largest set of phenomena to which these laws can be applied consistently and successfully?" The result of this approach has been the construction of a number of "models" of the universe at large, each patterned on verified laws of physics. The axiomatic-deductive approach starts from certain a priori assumptions which are held to underlie any physical science whatever and which are equivalent to certain suppositions about the structure of the universe. From these assumptions, together with special axioms adopted for the purpose, the laws of cosmology are deduced. Then the deductions are checked with the observational data. Here again, various models of the cosmos have resulted. (shrink)