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T. Ryan Byerly
University of Sheffield
  1.  67
    From a Necessary Being to a Perfect Being.T. Ryan Byerly - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):10-17.
    Cosmological arguments for the existence of God face a gap problem. This is the problem of convincingly arguing that their intermediate conclusions that some first cause or necessary being exists provide evidence for their main conclusion that God exists. This paper develops a simple and innovative approach to solving this problem, applicable to many cosmological arguments. According to the proposal, the best explanation for why the necessary being is found to have necessary existence is that it is a perfect being. (...)
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  2.  18
    Teaching for Intellectual Virtue in Logic and Critical Thinking Classes.T. Ryan Byerly - 2019 - Teaching Philosophy 42 (1):1-27.
    Introductory-level undergraduate classes in Logic or Critical Thinking are a staple in the portfolio of many Philosophy programs. A standard approach to these classes is to include teaching and learning activities focused on formal deductive and inductive logic, sometimes accompanied by teaching and learning activities focused on informal fallacies or argument construction. In this article, I discuss a proposal to include an additional element within these classes—namely, teaching and learning activities focused on intellectual virtues. After clarifying the proposal, I identify (...)
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  3.  66
    Problems for Explanationism on Both Sides.T. Ryan Byerly & Kraig Martin - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):773-791.
    This paper continues a recent exchange in this journal concerning explanationist accounts of epistemic justification. In the first paper in this exchange, Byerly argues that explanationist views judge that certain beliefs about the future are unjustified when in fact they are justified. In the second paper, McCain defends a version of explanationism which he argues escapes Byerly’s criticism. Here we contribute to this exchange in two ways. In the first section, we argue that McCain’s defense of explanationism against Byerly’s objection (...)
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  4.  64
    Explanationism and Justified Beliefs About the Future.T. Ryan Byerly - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):229 - 243.
    Explanationism holds that a person's evidence supports a proposition just in case that proposition is part of the best available explanation for the person's evidence. I argue that explanationism faces a serious difficulty when it comes to justified beliefs about the future. Often, one's evidence supports some proposition about the future but that proposition is not part of the best available explanation for one's evidence. Attempts to defend explanationism against this charge are unattractive. Moving to a modified better contrastive explanation (...)
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  5.  51
    The Special Value of Epistemic Self‐Reliance.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Ratio 27 (1):53-67.
    Philosophers have long held that epistemic self-reliance has a special value. But, this view has recently been challenged by prominent epistemologist Linda Zagzebski. Zagzebski argues that potential sources of support for the claim that epistemic self-reliance has a special value fail. Here I provide a novel defense of the special value of epistemic self-reliance. Self-reliance has a special value because it is required for attaining certain valuable cognitive achievements. Further, practicing self-reliance may be all-things-considered worthwhile even when doing so is (...)
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  6.  50
    The Values and Varieties of Humility.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):889-910.
    This paper pursues a value-based evaluation of a variety of character traits which philosophers have identified with humility, and it proposes a novel account of a character trait not implausibly identified with humility which has a unique kind of value. I begin by explaining why a value-based evaluation of various traits identified with virtues is preferable to the more common contemporary counterexample-based evaluation of these traits. I then undertake a value-based evaluation of various traits which have been identified with humility, (...)
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  7. It Seems Like There Aren't Any Seemings.T. Ryan Byerly - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):771-782.
    Abstract I argue that the two primary motivations in the literature for positing seemings as sui generis mental states are insufficient to motivate this view. Because of this, epistemological views which attempt to put seemings to work don’t go far enough. It would be better to do the same work by appealing to what makes seeming talk true rather than simply appealing to seeming talk. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9363-8 Authors T. Ryan Byerly, Department of Philosophy, Baylor (...)
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  8. The All-Powerful, Perfectly Good and Free God.T. Ryan Byerly - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 8.
  9.  61
    Faith as an Epistemic Disposition.T. Ryan Byerly - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1):109-28.
    This paper presents and defends a model of religious faith as an epistemic disposition. According to the model, religious faith is a disposition to take certain doxastic attitudes toward propositions of religious significance upon entertaining certain mental states. Three distinct advantages of the model are advanced. First, the model allows for religious faith to explain the presence and epistemic appropriateness of religious belief. Second, the model accommodates a variety of historically significant perspectives concerning the relationships between faith and evidence, faith (...)
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  10.  25
    Collective Virtue.T. Ryan Byerly & Meghan Byerly - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):33-50.
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  11. The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account. [REVIEW]T. Ryan Byerly - 2016 - Philosophia Christi 18 (1):251-255.
  12.  80
    Infallible Divine Foreknowledge Cannot Uniquely Threaten Human Freedom, but its Mechanics Might.T. Ryan Byerly - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):73-94.
    It is not uncommon to think that the existence of exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge uniquely threatens the existence of human freedom. This paper shows that this cannot be so. For, to uniquely threaten human freedom, infallible divine foreknowledge would have to make an essential contribution to an explanation for why our actions are not up to us. And infallible divine foreknowledge cannot do this. There remains, however, an important question about the compatibility of freedom and foreknowledge. It is a (...)
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  13.  45
    Ockhamism Vs Molinism, Round 2: A Reply to Warfield.T. Ryan Byerly - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (4):503 - 511.
    Ted Warfield has argued that if Ockhamism and Molinism offer different responses to the problems of foreknowledge and prophecy, it is the Molinist who is in trouble. I show here that this is not so -indeed, things may be quite the reverse.
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  14.  32
    Moral Property Eliminativism.T. Ryan Byerly - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2695-2713.
    This paper argues that there is significant motivation for contemporary ethicists to affirm a view I call “moral property eliminativism.” On this eliminativist view, there are no moral properties, but there are moral truths that are made true by only nonmoral entities. Moral property eliminativism parallels eliminativist views defended in other domains of philosophical inquiry, but has gone nearly entirely overlooked by contemporary ethicists. I argue that moral property eliminativism is motivated by the claim that there cannot be differences in (...)
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  15.  3
    Do God's Beliefs About the Future Depend on the Future?T. Ryan Byerly - 2015 - Journal of Analytic Theology 3:124-9.
    Trenton Merricks, among others, has recently championed in a series of papers what he takes to be a novel and simple solution to an age-old problem concerning the compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom. The solution crucially involves the thesis that God’s beliefs about the future actions of human persons asymmetrically depend on the future actions of those persons. I show that Merricks’s defense of this thesis is inadequate and that the prospects for improving his defense of it would (...)
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  16.  12
    Ockhamism Vs Molinism, Round 2: A Reply to Warfield: T. Ryan Byerly.T. Ryan Byerly - 2011 - Religious Studies 47 (4):503-511.
    Ted Warfield has argued that if Ockhamism and Molinism offer different responses to the problems of foreknowledge and prophecy, it is the Molinist who is in trouble. I show here that this is not so – indeed, things may be quite the reverse.
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  17.  68
    Wisdom and Appropriate Risk-Taking.T. Ryan Byerly - 2013 - Philosophy and Theology 25 (1):109-127.
    In this paper, I argue for an account of wisdom according to which wisdom is a disposition to take appropriate risks. I show why this account should be attractive generally, and also why it should be especially attractive for someone from within the Christian Aristotelian tradition. Finally, I show why the account has certain advantages over an account of wisdom from within the Christian Platonist tradition defended recently by C. Stephen Evans.
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  18.  48
    Why Persons Cannot Be Properties.T. Ryan Byerly - 2012 - Philosophy and Theology 24 (1):67-83.
    This paper strengthens an argument from Alvin Plantinga against versions of the doctrine of divine simplicity which identify God with each of his properties. Plantinga shows that if properties are causally inefficacious abstracta, then God cannot be one of them—since God is surely causally efficacious. Here I argue that God cannot be even a causally efficacious property. The argument is an important complement to Plantinga’s work, since in the years following the publication of his essay many metaphysicians began to think (...)
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  19. God Knows the Future by Ordering the Times.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 5.
  20.  25
    A Dispositional, Internalist, Evidentialist Virtue Epistemology.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (4):399-424.
    This paper articulates and defends a novel version of internalist evidentialism which employs dispositions to account for the relation of evidentialsupport. In section one, I explain internalist evidentialist views generally, highlighting the way in which the relation of evidential support stands at the heart of these views. I then discuss two leading ways in which evidential support has been understood by evidentialists, and argue that an account of support which employs what I call epistemic dispositions remedies difficulties arguably faced by (...)
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  21.  39
    The Special Value of Others-Centeredness.T. Ryan Byerly & Meghan Byerly - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (1):63-78.
    Suppose you confront a situation in which you can either promote a good for yourself or a good for someone else, but not both. The present paper argues that it is valuable for your conduct in such circumstances to be regulated by a character trait the possession of which constitutes one way of having one’s life be centered upon others as opposed to centered upon oneself. The trait in question, which we shall call “others-centeredness,” is a disposition to promote goods (...)
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  22.  22
    Ordinary Morality Does Not Imply Atheism.T. Ryan Byerly - 2018 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 83 (1):85-96.
    Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these arguments all rest on a common mistake. Defenders of these arguments overlook the role of merely potential instances of suffering in determining our moral obligations toward suffering.
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  23.  32
    Reconstituting Ersatzer Presentism.Daniel Padgett & T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):491-502.
    Presentists claim that only presently existing objects exist. One version of presentism is ersatzer presentism, according to which times are a kind of abstract object. Such a view is appealing because it affords the presentist an answer to the grounding objection—a potentially lethal objection to presentism. Despite this advantage, available versions of ersatzer presentism suffer from a heretofore unappreciated shortcoming: they cannot account for the truth of certain counterfactual claims about the past. We argue for this claim by considering two (...)
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  24.  29
    Intentions, Intentionally Permitting, and the Problem of Evil.T. Ryan Byerly - 2011 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:223-236.
    Some of the most persuasive contemporary statements of the problem of evil rely on premises concerning God’s intentionally permitting certain things to occur and premises concerning the moral wrongness of intentionally permitting such things. In this paper, I want to pose a dilemma for the defender of such arguments from evil. Either intentionally permitting p implies intending p or it does not. If it does, then the theist may plausibly resist these arguments from evil by insisting that the key claims (...)
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  25.  27
    Foreknowledge, Accidental Necessity, and Uncausability.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):137-154.
    Foreknowledge arguments attempt to show that infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely freedom. One particularly powerful foreknowledge argument employs the concept of accidental necessity. But an opponent of this argument might challenge it precisely because it employs the concept of accidental necessity. Indeed, Merricks (Philos Rev 118:29–57, 2009, Philos Rev 120:567–586, 2011a) and Zagzebski (Faith Philos 19(4):503–519, 2002, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011) have each written favorably of such a response. In this paper, I aim to show that (...)
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  26.  20
    The Evidential Support Relation.T. Ryan Byerly - unknown
    Evidentialist views in epistemology, like that of Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, define epistemic justification at least partially in terms of evidential support. According to these views, a person is justified in believing a proposition p just when her evidence supports p. The subject of this dissertation is the evidential support relation at the heart of these views—viz., the relation which obtains between a person’s evidence e and a proposition p just when e supports p in the sense required by (...)
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  27.  5
    The Indirect Response To The Foreknowledge Argument.T. Ryan Byerly - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):3-12.
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  28.  43
    The Ontomystical Argument Revisited.T. Ryan Byerly - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2):95 - 105.
    I argue that Alexander Pruss's ontomystical arguments should not be endorsed without further argumentative support of their premises. My specific targets are his claims that (i) Śamkara's principle is true and (ii) the high mystics had phenomenal experiences of radical dependence and as of a maximally great being. Against (i), I urge a host of counterexamples. The only ways I can see for Pruss to respond to these counterexamples end up falsifying (ii). The key problem which leads to this conclusion (...)
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  29.  18
    Restricted Omniscience and Ways of Knowing.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Sophia 53 (4):427-434.
    Recently, several philosophers have moved from a classical account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all truths to a restricted account of divine omniscience according to which God knows all knowable truths. But an important objection offered by Alexander Pruss threatens to show that if God knows all knowable truths, God must also know all truths. In this paper, I show that there is a way out of Pruss’s objection for the advocate of restricted omniscience if she will (...)
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  30.  6
    Intentions, Intentionally Permitting, and the Problem of Evil.T. Ryan Byerly - 2011 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 85:223-236.
    Some of the most persuasive contemporary statements of the problem of evil rely on premises concerning God’s intentionally permitting certain things to occur and premises concerning the moral wrongness of intentionally permitting such things. In this paper, I want to pose a dilemma for the defender of such arguments from evil. Either intentionally permitting p implies intending p or it does not. If it does, then the theist may plausibly resist these arguments from evil by insisting that the key claims (...)
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  31.  9
    Putting Others First: The Christian Ideal of Others-Centeredness.T. Ryan Byerly - forthcoming - New York: Routledge Press.
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  32. Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays About Heaven.T. Ryan Byerly & Eric J. Silverman (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press UK.
    A collection of seventeen philosophical essays that systematically investigate heaven, or paradise, as conceived within theistic religious traditions.
     
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  33. Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays About Heaven.T. Ryan Byerly & Eric J. Silverman (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    A collection of seventeen philosophical essays that systematically investigate heaven, or paradise, as conceived within theistic religious traditions.
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  34. The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account.T. Ryan Byerly - 2014 - Bloomsbury Academic.
  35. What's Wrong with Satanic Temptation?T. Ryan Byerly - 2015 - In Benjamin McCraw & Robert Arp (eds.), Philosophical Approaches to the Devil. Routledge. pp. 159-68.
     
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