-/- The philosophical activity of modern Germany represents a peak in the history of philosophy beginning from Thales in ancient Greece. This book attempts to reconsider the conventional image of 19th-century German philosophy. To this end, it illuminates a forgotten philosophical stream contemporaneous with so-called "German idealism." -/- From this perspective, this book examines the philosophy of Jakob Friedrich Fries, a philosopher contemporaneous and in confrontation with Hegel. By examining Fries’ standpoint, the book attempts to reconstruct the picture of 19th-century (...) German philosophy. In the 19th and 20th centuries, philosophers other than Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel – especially Fries – had a significant influence on the history of philosophy, constituting an alternative genealogy to Hegel’s. One might say that the conventional history of philosophy conceals Fries’ influence. Accordingly, this book will examine Fries’ philosophy, the Friesian school established by E.F. Apelt, and the Neo-Friesian school formed by Leonard Nelson. -/- This approach reveals the factiousness of the history of philosophy that starts from Kant, passes through German idealism and flows into the Neo-Kantian movement. It will provide a new viewpoint from which to reconsider the history of German philosophy. (shrink)

Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843) was a nineteenth-century German philosopher, contemporaneous with so-called “German Idealism,” who is best known for his main work, New Critique of Reason (1807/1828–1831).¹ Fries regards Kant’s philosophy as incomplete and tries to revise and renew it. Since he adopts Kant’s spirit of criticism, he emphasises the finitude of human cognition and in this respect he criticises his contemporaneous opponents: Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. Fries criticises Kant’s conception of transcendental cognition as follows: Although transcendental cognition concerns cognitions (...) a priori, transcendental cognition itself can be acquired only in an empirical way because human cognition always begins with experience. Hence Kant was in error to regard it as a priori. German Idealists elaborated on Kant’s mistake and interpreted mere inner perception as cognition a priori, which led them to adopt the “synthetic method” as a means of philosophising. Fries corrects them by assuming the “analytical method,” whereby he starts from the standpoint of ordinary experience by analysing “the ordinary opinions (Beurtheilungen) in daily life” in order to reveal the philosophical cognitions constructing the general presuppositions of opinions. He calls such a project “Critique of Reason.” Kuno Fischer (1824–1907), however, contradicts Fries’s approach by defending German Idealists, arguing that the cognition a priori can never be acquired in an empirical way. Otto Liebmann (1840 –1912) also follows Fischer and criticises Fries’s approach as a “retrogression to Locke.” In this article I deal with Fries’s conception of the “Critique of Reason” and respond to the objections above. Fries’s method is an analysis of opinions, which are neither mere experience nor logical judging (urtheilen). The philosophical cognitions constructing the presuppositions of opinions belong to “reason,” which is to be distinguished from “understanding,” which conducts the “analysing” operation by relying on arbitrary reflection. (shrink)

Japanese translation of ""Schopenhauers Gebrauchstheorie der Bedeutung und das Kontextprinzip. Eine Parallele zu Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen". In: 97. Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch (2016), S. 29–51" by Tadahiro Oota (太田 匡洋 [訳]).