Presentism is usually understood as the thesis that only the present exists whereas the rival theory of eternalism is usually understood as the thesis that past, present, and future things are all equally real. The significance of this debate has been threatened by the so-called triviality objection, which allegedly shows that the presentist thesis is either trivially true or obviously false: Presentism is trivially true if it is read as saying that everything that exists now is present, and it is (...) obviously false if read as saying that everything that has existed, exits or will exist is present. If eternalism is taken as the negation of presentism, it is also either trivially false or obviously true. In this paper, I try to respond to the triviality objection on behalf of presentism. In second section, I will examine how the argument proceeds. In third section, I will reflect on three possible ways to respond but will argue that none of them succeeds in giving a satisfactory solution. I will then try to clarify the core idea of presentism and to suggest that if we characterise presentism accurately, the problem will disappear. In fourth section, I will offer a plausible definition of presentism and will show how it can avoid the triviality objection and demonstrate why it is advantageous to accept the version of presentism I offer. (shrink)
This article provides a critical introduction to, and the first English translation of, the dialogue held between Nishida Kitarō and Miki Kiyoshi in October 1935. The topic of their discussion was the question of the particular character of Japanese culture and philosophy. In the introductory sections of this article, I will reflect on some of the main points that Nishida proposes in response to Miki’s questions, and clarify what these insights mean for a culture or a historical framework of thought, (...) including Japanese culture and philosophy. In light of this expository reflection on Nishida’s take on the nature of Japanese culture and philosophy, I will reflect on the significance of scholarly work in the field of Japanese studies and Japanese philosophy beyond the Japanese cultural milieu. The text concludes with a translation of the Miki-Nishida dialogue. (shrink)
We investigate several fluctuation effects in high-energy hadronic and nuclear collisions through the analysis of different observables. To introduce fluctuations in the initial stage of collisions, we use the interacting gluon model (IGM) modified by the inclusion of the impact parameter. The inelasticity and leading-particle distributions follow directly from this model. The fluctuation effects on rapidity distributions are then studied using Landau's hydrodynamic model in one dimension. To investigage further the effects of the multiplicity fluctuation, we use the longitudinal phase-space (...) model, with the multiplicity distribution calculated within the hydrodynamic model, and the initial conditions given by the IGM. Forward-backward correlation is obtained in this way. (shrink)
In this paper, we discuss uniform versions of some axioms of second order arithmetic in the context of higher order arithmetic. We prove that uniform versions of weak weak König's lemma WWKL and Σ01 separation are equivalent to over a suitable base theory of higher order arithmetic, where is the assertion that there exists Φ2 such that Φf1 = 0 if and only if ∃x0 for all f. We also prove that uniform versions of some well-known theorems are equivalent to (...) or the axiom of the existence of the Suslin operator. (shrink)
By , we denote the system of second-order arithmetic based on recursive comprehension axioms and Σ10 induction. is defined to be plus weak König's lemma: every infinite tree of sequences of 0's and 1's has an infinite path. In this paper, we first show that for any countable model M of , there exists a countable model M′ of whose first-order part is the same as that of M, and whose second-order part consists of the M-recursive sets and sets not (...) in the second-order part of M. By combining this fact with a certain forcing argument over universal trees, we obtain the following result : if proves X!Y with arithmetical, so does . We also discuss several improvements of this results. (shrink)
There is a lingering objection to the idea of the passage of time. Roughly speaking, the argument runs as follows: if time passes, its passage must occur at some rate, but there is no such rate; hence, the passage of time is a myth. While some philosophers try to reject premise, I wish to challenge the first premise by arguing that time may pass with or without a rate. My argument addresses two cases, one that identifies the passage of time (...) with changes in things and one that does not. I call the former view ‘the Priorian passage theory’, and the latter view ‘the pure passage theory’. I argue that each dynamic view of time is immune to the rate argument. Further, I suggest a possible extension of the Priorian passage theory, in which the passage of time is identified with the pure persistence of things. (shrink)
In this paper, we show within RCA 0 that weak Konig's lemma is necessary and sufficient to prove that any (separable) compact group has a Haar measure. Within WKL 0 , a Haar measure is constructed by a non-standard method based on a fact that every countable non-standard model of WKL 0 has a proper initial part isomorphic to itself .
It is sometimes argued that there is an analogy between time and modality: What is true of time, mutatis mutandis, should be true of modality, and vice versa. However, I think that the importance of this analogy has not been truly appreciated in the literature. In this paper, I try to offer a plausible account of the relationship between time and modality based on what is known as presentist ersatzism. If the attempt succeeds, it will be shown that ersatzists about (...) time are better able to explain what possible worlds are. (shrink)
This essay criticizes David Held's proposal of cosmopolitan democracy. Held argues that cosmopolitan realities are emerging, which help to open up the possibility of a cosmopolitan democracy. However, the author argues that Held tends to exaggerate cosmopolitan realities. What Held sees as cosmopolitan realities are international realities rather than cosmopolitan, and what he calls 'transnational civil society' is in fact the product of nation-states. Held endorses 'the institutionalization of cosmopolitan principles', which implies two different institutionalizations, though Held does not explicitly (...) recognize this difference: the global and national institutionalization. However, the global institutionalization of cosmopolitan principles would not only fail to work but also cause undesirable consequences, in particular, global cultural homogenization, while the national one does not deserve the name of cosmopolitanism. Instead of introducing a cosmopolitan democracy, the author proposes that we should utilize and enhance the capacities of nation-states and develop the existing international order so as to cope with global problems. (shrink)
According to the “truthmaker maximalism”, every true contingent proposition is made true by something in the world, called its truthmaker. Although at first sight the maximalism seems to be a natural position, it has serious difficulties, especially concerning negative truths. In view of this, many truthmaker theorists adopt some non-maximalist position. It is not clear, however, whether these non-maximalists are justified, since existing reasons to justify the non-maximalism are not good enough. In this paper, then, I shall propose a new (...) reason for the non-maximalism, which consists in the observation that the maximalism cannot acknowledge the widely accepted view that certain inferences involving logical constants are valid in the properly logical sense. (shrink)
A robot that is easy to teach not only has to be able to adapt to humans but also has to be easily adaptable to. In order to develop a robot with mutual adaptation ability, we believe that it will be beneficial to first observe the mutual adaptation behaviors that occur in humanâhuman communication. In this paper, we propose a humanâhuman WOZ (Wizard-of-Oz) experiment setting that can help us to observe and understand how the mutual adaptation procedure occurs between human (...) beings in nonverbal communication. By analyzing the experimental results, we obtained three important findings: alignment-based action, symbol-emergent learning, and environmental learning. (shrink)
To investigate the cognitive processes underlying creative inspiration, we tested the extent to which viewing or copying prior examples impacted creative output in art. In Experiment 1, undergraduates made drawings under three conditions: copying an artist's drawing, then producing an original drawing; producing an original drawing without having seen another's work; and copying another artist's work, then reproducing that artist's style independently. We discovered that through copying unfamiliar abstract drawings, participants were able to produce creative drawings qualitatively different from the (...) model drawings. Process analyses suggested that participants' cognitive constraints became relaxed, and new perspectives were formed from copying another's artwork. Experiment 2 showed that exposure to styles of artwork considered unfamiliar facilitated creativity in drawing, while styles considered familiar did not do so. Experiment 3 showed that both copying and thoroughly viewing artwork executed using an unfamiliar style facilitated creativity in drawing, whereas merely thinking about alternative styles of artistic representation did not do so. These experiments revealed that deep encounters with unfamiliar artworks—whether through copying or prolonged observation—change people's cognitive representations of the act of drawing to produce novel artwork. (shrink)
A number of philosophers today endorse the view thatmaterial substances (ex. cats, stones, atoms) can be analyzed asbundles of “particular properties” or “tropes”. Among severaldevelopments, the theory that P. Simons proposed is seen as themost successful one. Simons’ theory seems to owe its high reputationto mainly two advantages which he claims for his theory: thecapacity for avoiding infinite regress, and the explanatory adequacyfor phenomenon of change. In this paper, however, I try to object tothis high appraisal, by showing that the (...) two alleged advantagesindeed cannot be simultaneously secured by Simons’ position. Tothis aim, I proceed as follows: First, I present Simons’ theory andexplain its alleged two advantages. Next, I take up A. Denkel’scriticism and show that the explanatory adequacy will be lost unlessSimons admits a certain revision of his theory. Finally, I show that asa result of the revision needed, Simons’ position comes to lose thecapacity for avoiding regress in turn. (shrink)
Science and technology are on trial due to the rapid changes — neither university nor science lead developments in technology, the most advanced military technology has lost linkages with industries, the widened North-South gaps — they are all sources of crisis in the global ecological balance. The Euro-centric universalism is useless to solve the global technology problems.
In our former works, for a given concept of reduction, we study the following hypothesis: “For a random oracle A, with probability one, the degree of the one-query tautologies with respect to A is strictly higher than the degree of A.” In our former works (Suzuki in Kobe J. Math. 15, 91–102, 1998; in Inf. Comput. 176, 66–87, 2002; in Arch. Math. Logic 44, 751–762), the following three results are shown: The hypothesis for p-T (polynomial-time Turing) reduction is equivalent to (...) the assertion that the probabilistic complexity class R is not equal to NP; The hypothesis for p-tt (polynomial-time truth-table) reduction implies that P is not NP; The hypothesis holds for each of the following: disjunctive reduction, conjunctive reduction, and p-btt (polynomial-time bounded-truth-table) reduction. In this paper, we show the following three results: (1) Let c be a positive real number. We consider a concept of truth-table reduction whose norm is at most c times size of input, where for a relativized propositional formula F, the size of F denotes the total number of occurrences of propositional variables, constants and propositional connectives. Then, our main result is that the hypothesis holds for such tt-reduction, provided that c is small enough. How small c can we take so that the above holds? It depends on our syntactic convention on one-query tautologies. In our setting, the statement holds for all c < 1. (2) The hypothesis holds for monotone truth-table reduction (also called positive reduction). (3) Dowd (in Inf. Comput. 96, 65–76, 1992) shows a polynomial upper bound for the minimum sizes of forcing conditions associated with a random oracle. We apply the above result (1), and get a linear lower bound for the sizes. (shrink)