18 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Tamar Schapiro [18]Tamar Bacia Schapiro [1]
See also
Tamar Schapiro
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  1. What is a Child?Tamar Schapiro - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4):715–738.
  2. Compliance, Complicity, and the Nature of Nonideal Conditions.Tamar Schapiro - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (7):329-355.
  3. The Nature of Inclination.Tamar Schapiro - 2009 - Ethics 119 (2):229–256.
    There is a puzzle in the very notion of passive motivation ("passion" or "inclination"). To be motivated is not simply to be moved from the outside. Motivation is in some sense self-movement. But how can an agent be passive with respect to her own motivation? How is passive motivation possible? In this paper I defend the ancient view that inclination stems from a motivational source independent of reason, a motivational source that is both agential and nonrational.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  4. Childhood and Personhood.Tamar Schapiro - 2003 - Arizona Law Review 575 45:575-594.
  5.  47
    Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning.Tamar Schapiro & Onora O'Neill - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):97.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  6. Foregrounding Desire: A Defense of Kant's Incorporation Thesis.Tamar Schapiro - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (3):147-167.
    In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  7. What Are Theories of Desire Theories Of?Tamar Schapiro - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):131-150.
    In this paper I try to undermine complacency with a predominant conception of desire, for the sake of refocusing attention on a philosophical problem. The predominant conception holds that to have a desire is to occupy an evaluative outlook, a perspective from which the agent 'sees' the world in practically salient terms. I argue that it is not clear what this theory is a theory of, because the concept of desire at its center is deeply ambiguous. Understood as a theory (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Three Conceptions of Action in Moral Theory.Tamar Schapiro - 2001 - Noûs 35 (1):93–117.
    The utilitarian conception, which I call “action as production,” holds that action is a way of making use of the world, conceived as a causal mechanism. According to the rational intuitionist conception, which I call “action as assertion,” action is a way of acknowledging the value in the world, conceived as a realm of status. On the Kantian constructivist conception, which I call “action as participation,” action is a way of making the world, qua causal mechanism, come to count as (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  9. Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances.Tamar Schapiro - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1):32–57.
    A task of any moral theory is to account for both the rigidity and the flexibility of moral rules. Utilitarianism faces the problem of building rigidity into a framework that tends towards objectionable flexibility. Kantianism faces the problem of building flexibility into a framework that tends towards objectionable rigidity. I offer an argument on this front on behalf of Kantians. I show how Kantians can maintain that actions are right and wrong "in themselves," while still maintaining that such actions can (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  10. 10. Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason (Pp. 917-919). [REVIEW]Tamar Schapiro, A. John Simmons, Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Sarah Buss, Julia Driver, G. F. Schueler, James Montmarquet, Mark van Roojen & Samantha Brennan - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4).
  11. Desires as Demands: How the Second-Person Standpoint Might Be Internal to Reflective Agency. [REVIEW]Tamar Schapiro - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):229-236.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. 10. Kwong‐Loi Shun and David Wong, Eds., Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community Kwong‐Loi Shun and David Wong, Eds., Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community (Pp. 156-160). [REVIEW]James Lenman, Tamar Schapiro, Daniel Statman, Harry Brighouse, Adam Swift & John Martin Fischer - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1).
  13. On the Relation Between Wanting and Willing.Tamar Schapiro - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):334-350.
    In this paper I develop an analogy between an interpersonal hierarchy and an intrapersonal hierarchy. The analogy is between the authority of adults over children, and the authority of our willing selves over our wanting selves. The analogy allows us to see how each hierarchy is rooted in an asymmetry that is natural and not merely conventional.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14.  52
    Empathy as a Moral Concept: Comments on John Deigh's "Empathy, Justice, and Jurisprudence".Tamar Schapiro - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):91-98.
    In these brief comments, I explore some ambiguities concerning John Deigh's notion of empathy in relation to morality and justice. First, does Deigh conceive of empathy as a morally neutral capacity that can be used for good or bad purposes or, rather, as a capacity that presupposes a moral orientation? I look to his previous work and find evidence supporting both readings. I suggest that the right way to understand empathy is as a moral notion. Empathy is the product of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15.  57
    On Christine Korsgaard’s “Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value”.Tamar Schapiro - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):1123-1126.
  16.  42
    “Let’s J!”: On the Practical Character of Shared Agency.Tamar Schapiro - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3399-3407.
    Drawing on parallels in Hutcheson and Hume, I raise two worries about Bratman’s theory of shared agency. First, has Bratman captured the interpersonal character of shared agency? Second, has he captured its practical character? By “its practical character,” I mean the sense in which shared agency is something we can undertake under that description, and not just a condition we might happen to find ourselves in? I argue that Bratman’s theory falls short of answering this second worry. The source of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  6
    Velleman on the Work of Human Agency.Tamar Schapiro - 2014 - Abstracta 8 (S7):17-21.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  52
    Review of Talbot Brewer, The Retrieval of Ethics[REVIEW]Tamar Schapiro - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (12).
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark