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Tamaz Tokhadze
University of Sussex
  1.  78
    EXTREME PERMISSIVISM REVISITED.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A1)5-26.
    Extreme Permissivism is the view that a body of evidence could rationally permit both the attitude of belief and disbelief towards a proposition. This paper puts forward a new argument against Extreme Permissivism, which improves on a similar style of argument due to Roger White (2005, 2014). White’s argument is built around the principle that the support relation between evidence and a hypothesis is objective: so that if evidence E makes it rational for an agent to believe a hypothesis H, (...)
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  2. Fine‐Tuning, Weird Sorts of Atheism and Evidential Favouring.Tamaz Tokhadze - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    This paper defends a novel sceptical response to the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God (FTA). According to this response, even if FTA can establish, what I call, the confirmation proposition: ‘fine-tuning confirms the God hypothesis’, there is no reason to think that a strengthening of FTA can establish the evidence-favouring proposition: ‘fine-tuning favours the God hypothesis over its competitors’. My argument is that, any criteria for the explanation of fine-tuning that permit us to take the God hypothesis seriously (...)
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  3.  30
    Steadfast Views of Disagreement Are Incoherent.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):33-52.
    In this paper, I argue that Steadfast Views of peer disagreement – a family of views according to which standing firm in the face of peer disagreement can be rationally permissible -- are incoherent. First, I articulate two constraints that any Steadfast Views of disagreement should endorse: (i) Steadfastness’s Core (ii) The Deference Principle. I show that (i) and (ii) are inconsistent: they cannot both be true. My argument, briefly put, is that one cannot rationally treat one’s peer’s opinion as (...)
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