In Being and Time as well as in his later writings, Heidegger comes to distinguish between fundamental moods and everyday or inauthentic moods. He also claims that phenomenology, rather than psychology, is the appropriate method for examining moods. This article employs a schematic approach to investigate a phenomenology of fundamental moods in terms of its possibilities and limits. Since, in Being and Time, the distinction between fundamental moods and ordinary moods is tied to the division between authenticity and inauthenticity, the (...) latter concepts need to be addressed first. Guided by Klaus Held's article 'Fundamental Moods and Heidegger's Critique of Contemporary Culture', the second part of the article argues that Heidegger's phenomenology of moods is indeed one-sided, favouring anxiety at the expense of awe. Finally, I argue that, contrary to Held's claims, this one-sidedness cannot be amended by the means one finds in Heidegger's analyses. Instead, it is necessary to undertake closer examination of those moods which necessarily involve the other person. (shrink)

Interpreters generally agree that the Fifth Cartesian Meditation fails to achieve its task, but they do not agree on what that task is. In my essay, I attempt to formulate the question to which the Fifth Cartesian Meditation gives the answer. While it is usually assumed that the text poses a rather ambitious question, I suggest that the text asks, How is the Other given to me on the most basic level? The answer would be that the Other is given (...) as accessible in the mode of inaccessibility. Husserl’s failure to convey this question clearly seems rooted in ambiguities concerning the concepts of solipsism and the sphere of ownness. (shrink)

This article argues that social networks constitute an inauthentic form of sociality. The two component concepts of this claim, inauthenticity and sociality, are explored in order to avoid some widespread misinterpretations. Inauthenticity is examined on the basis of the relevant sections in Heidegger’s 'Being and Time', first with respect to its main characteristics, then in terms of what motivates it and its benefits, and finally with respect to its status as a non-normative concept. The second part of the paper explores (...) sociality. Here, a main emphasis is the way in which my body imposes constraints on my social relations in the here and now, which virtuality appears to overcome. Yet such an escape from corporeality is not ultimately possible. The third and final part takes the analysis to the wider level of world, that is, our current historical world which has given rise to such an understanding of sociality. (shrink)

Levinas’s comments on art appear contradictory. On the one hand, he criticizes art as being disengaged from ethical concerns and constituting a possibility of moral evasion; on the other hand, he engages quite closely and in a supportive fashion with some art, such as Paul Celan’s poetry. Interpreters commonly argue that only one of Levinas’s conceptions of art, either the affirmative or the negative, represents his true attitude towards art. In this article the author seeks to make both statements compatible (...) with each other and thus relevant to Levinas’s conception of art. She focuses on his essay ‘Reality and Its Shadow’, where art is diagnosed as an ambiguous phenomenon. She argues that full understanding of the ambiguity of art demands that Levinas’s different statements about art are considered together; only thus can the complete picture of the ambiguity emerge. Furthermore, it turns out that the very same feature which makes art open to misunderstanding – namely, its precarious materiality – also allows an artwork to sustain itself and to be revived. Art reveals a shadow, withdrawal, or resistance that belongs to reality itself. (shrink)

In "Unambiguous Calling? Authenticity and Ethics in Heidegger's Being and Time", Tanja Staeler revisits the concept of authenticity in order to investigate several assumptions often taken for granted in secondary literature. She argues that the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity should be read as a methodological and, more precisely, phenomenological distinction. Showing that authenticity cannot really be understood as a state one can be in, she argues that talk of a 'transition' to authenticity is, at best, unhelpful. Her argument, consequently, (...) moves to the notion of the 'call of conscience' in order to investigate the ethical implications of the notion of authenticity. She justifies the unambiguous character of the 'call of conscience' with the help of Lévinas' thought. (shrink)

“Partout et nulle part”. L’ambiguïté explorée à partir de la phénoménologie et de la danseOn ménage ici, à l’aide du concept d’ambiguïté, une rencontre entre le théâtre dansé de Pina Bausch et la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty. Le concept d’ambiguïté est au centre de la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty, qu’on a d’ailleurs pu considérer comme une « philosophie de l’ambiguïté ». Néanmoins, le concept phénoménologique d’ambiguïté n’a pas encore été discuté dans la littérature secondaire. Cette étude distingue plusieurs sens de l’ambiguïté dans (...) la Phénoménologie de la perception, avant de se tourner vers la différence entre bonne et mauvaise ambiguïté, telle que Merleau-Ponty a pu la proposer.Il apparaîtra que la chorégraphie de Pina Bausch et la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty sont deux voies d’approche complémentaires des différentes dimensions de l’ambiguïté :les dimensions corporelle, spatiale et culturelle. L’étude montre que l’approche merleau-pontienne de l’ambiguïté et l’approche par Pina Bausch du théâtre dansé parviennent toutes deux à instaurer un type de communication humaine ne s’évanouissant ni dans un relativisme vide ni dans un universalisme formel : « Ce qu’il faut comprendre, c’est que je suis présent ici et maintenant et, pour la même raison, présent ailleurs et toujours, et aussi que je m’absente d’ici et de maintenant, ainsi que de tout lieu et de tout temps. L’ambiguïté n’est pas une imperfection de la conscience ou de l’existence, c’est leur définition même ».“Ovunque e in nessun luogo”. Esplorare l’ambiguità con la fenomenologia e la danzaProponiamo qui, sul filo del concetto di ambiguità, un incontro tra il teatro danza di Pina Bausch e la fenomenologia di Merleau-Ponty. Il concetto fenomenologico di ambiguità, pur non essendo stato veramente discusso nella letteratura critica, risulta centrale nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty, che è stata appunto definita filosofia dell’ambiguità.Questo saggio individua i diversi significati di ambiguità contenuti in Fenomenologia della percezione, prima di rivolgersi alla differenza tra buona e cattiva ambiguità, così come viene proposta da Merleau-Ponty.Si scoprirà come il lavoro coreografi co di Pina Bausch e la filosofia merleaupontiana siano due modi complementari di approcciare le diverse dimensioni dell’ambiguità: ambiguità corporea, ambiguità spaziale, ambiguità culturale. Il saggio sostiene infatti la tesi che l’approccio merleaupontiano all’ambiguità e l’approccio di Pina Bausch al teatro-danza trovino entrambi delle modalità per stabilire un tipo di comunicazione umana che riesca a non collassare né in un vuoto relativismo né in un universalismo formalistico: “Dobbiamo comprendere che la medesima ragione mi rende presente qui ed ora e presente altrove e sempre, assente da qui e da ora e assente da ogni luogo e da ogni tempo. Questa ambiguità non è un’imperfezione della coscienza o dell’esistenza, ma ne è una definizione”. (shrink)

“Partout et nulle part”. L’ambiguïté explorée à partir de la phénoménologie et de la danseOn ménage ici, à l’aide du concept d’ambiguïté, une rencontre entre le théâtre dansé de Pina Bausch et la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty. Le concept d’ambiguïté est au centre de la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty, qu’on a d’ailleurs pu considérer comme une « philosophie de l’ambiguïté ». Néanmoins, le concept phénoménologique d’ambiguïté n’a pas encore été discuté dans la littérature secondaire. Cette étude distingue plusieurs sens de l’ambiguïté dans (...) la Phénoménologie de la perception, avant de se tourner vers la différence entre bonne et mauvaise ambiguïté, telle que Merleau-Ponty a pu la proposer.Il apparaîtra que la chorégraphie de Pina Bausch et la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty sont deux voies d’approche complémentaires des différentes dimensions de l’ambiguïté :les dimensions corporelle, spatiale et culturelle. L’étude montre que l’approche merleau-pontienne de l’ambiguïté et l’approche par Pina Bausch du théâtre dansé parviennent toutes deux à instaurer un type de communication humaine ne s’évanouissant ni dans un relativisme vide ni dans un universalisme formel : « Ce qu’il faut comprendre, c’est que je suis présent ici et maintenant et, pour la même raison, présent ailleurs et toujours, et aussi que je m’absente d’ici et de maintenant, ainsi que de tout lieu et de tout temps. L’ambiguïté n’est pas une imperfection de la conscience ou de l’existence, c’est leur définition même » (PhP).“Ovunque e in nessun luogo”. Esplorare l’ambiguità con la fenomenologia e la danzaProponiamo qui, sul filo del concetto di ambiguità, un incontro tra il teatro danza di Pina Bausch e la fenomenologia di Merleau-Ponty. Il concetto fenomenologico di ambiguità, pur non essendo stato veramente discusso nella letteratura critica, risulta centrale nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty, che è stata appunto definita filosofia dell’ambiguità.Questo saggio individua i diversi significati di ambiguità contenuti in Fenomenologia della percezione, prima di rivolgersi alla differenza tra buona e cattiva ambiguità, così come viene proposta da Merleau-Ponty.Si scoprirà come il lavoro coreografi co di Pina Bausch e la filosofia merleaupontiana siano due modi complementari di approcciare le diverse dimensioni dell’ambiguità: ambiguità corporea, ambiguità spaziale, ambiguità culturale. Il saggio sostiene infatti la tesi che l’approccio merleaupontiano all’ambiguità e l’approccio di Pina Bausch al teatro-danza trovino entrambi delle modalità per stabilire un tipo di comunicazione umana che riesca a non collassare né in un vuoto relativismo né in un universalismo formalistico: “Dobbiamo comprendere che la medesima ragione mi rende presente qui ed ora e presente altrove e sempre, assente da qui e da ora e assente da ogni luogo e da ogni tempo. Questa ambiguità non è un’imperfezione della coscienza o dell’esistenza, ma ne è una definizione” (Fenomenologia della percezione). (shrink)

In the Platonic dialogues, the enigmatic concept of the good tends to retreat at those very moments when it is supposed to show itself. This paper examines the relation between the beautiful and the good as the good takes refuge in the beautiful. Hans-Georg Gadamer holds a particular interest in these retreats since they show that there is actually an emphasis on appearances and the human good in Plato. In contrast, Emmanuel Levinas is critical of the primacy of vision and (...) the beautiful from an ethical perspective. The relevant passages in the dialogues will be interpreted with respect to this divergence. (shrink)

v. 1. Key figures and definitions -- v. 2. Basic themes and concepts -- v. 3. Existentialist aesthetics and philosophy of religion -- v. 4. Horizons of existentialism.

This book offers the first study that relates the works of Hegel and Husserl. It also offers a timely philosophical description of the Western world in crisis. The author explores how Husserl radicalises Hegel's philosophy by providing an account of historical movement as open.

In the second half of the twentieth century, ethics has gained considerable prominence within philosophy. In contrast to other scholars, Levinas proposed that it be not one philosophical discipline among many, but the most fundamental and essential one. Before philosophy became divided into disciplines, Plato also treated the question of the Good as the most important philosophical question. Levinas's approach to ethics begins in the encounter with the other as the most basic experience of responsibility. He acknowledges the necessity to (...) move beyond this initial, dyadic encounter, but has problems extending his approach to a larger dimension, such as community. To shed light on this dilemma, Tanja Staehler examines broader dimensions which are linked to the political realm, and the problems they pose for ethics. Staehler demonstrates that both Plato and Levinas come to identify three realms as ambiguous: the erotic, the artistic, and the political. In each case, there is a precarious position in relation to ethics. However, neither Plato nor Levinas explores ambiguity in itself. Staehler argues that these ambiguous dimensions can contribute to revealing the Other’s vulnerability without diminishing the fundamental role of unambiguous ethical responsibility. (shrink)

In the second half of the twentieth century, ethics has gained considerable prominence within philosophy. In contrast to other scholars, Levinas proposed that it be not one philosophical discipline among many, but the most fundamental and essential one. Before philosophy became divided into disciplines, Plato also treated the question of the Good as the most important philosophical question. Levinas's approach to ethics begins in the encounter with the other as the most basic experience of responsibility. He acknowledges the necessity to (...) move beyond this initial, dyadic encounter, but has problems extending his approach to a larger dimension, such as community. To shed light on this dilemma, Tanja Staehler examines broader dimensions which are linked to the political realm, and the problems they pose for ethics. Staehler demonstrates that both Plato and Levinas come to identify three realms as ambiguous: the erotic, the artistic, and the political. In each case, there is a precarious position in relation to ethics. However, neither Plato nor Levinas explores ambiguity in itself. Staehler argues that these ambiguous dimensions can contribute to revealing the Other’s vulnerability without diminishing the fundamental role of unambiguous ethical responsibility. (shrink)