38 found
Order:
See also
Ted Poston
University of Alabama
  1.  79
    Know How to Transmit Knowledge?Ted Poston - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):865-878.
    Intellectualism about knowledge-how is the view that practical knowledge is a species of propositional knowledge. I argue that this view is undermined by a difference in properties between knowledge-how and both knowledge-that and knowledge-wh. More specifically, I argue that both knowledge-that and knowledge-wh are easily transmitted via testimony while knowledge-how is not easily transmitted by testimony. This points to a crucial difference in states of knowledge. I also consider Jason Stanley's attempt to subsume knowledge-how under an account of de se (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  2. Know How to Be Gettiered?Ted Poston - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743 - 747.
    Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's influential article "Knowing How" argues that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. One objection to their view is that knowledge-how is significantly different than knowledge-that because Gettier cases afflict the latter but not the former. Stanley and Williamson argue that this objection fails. Their response, however, is not adequate. Moreover, I sketch a plausible argument that knowledge-how is not susceptible to Gettier cases. This suggests a significant distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  3. Why Explanatoriness Is Evidentially Relevant.Kevin McCain & Ted Poston - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):145-153.
    William Roche and Elliott Sober argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant. This conclusion is surprising since it conflicts with a plausible assumption—the fact that a hypothesis best explains a given set of data is evidence that the hypothesis is true. We argue that Roche and Sober's screening-off argument fails to account for a key aspect of evidential strength: the weight of a body of evidence. The weight of a body of evidence affects the resiliency of probabilities in the light of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  4.  47
    A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Ted Poston - 2018 - Bloomsbury Academic.
    We know facts, but we also know how to do things. To know a fact is to know that a proposition is true. But does knowing how to ride a bike amount to knowledge of propositions? This is a challenging question and one that deeply divides the contemporary landscape. A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How introduces, outlines, and critically evaluates various contemporary debates surrounding the nature of knowledge-how. Carter and Poston show that situating the debate over the nature of knowledge-how in (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. Divine Hiddenness and the Nature of Belief.Ted Poston & Trent Dougherty - 2007 - Religious Studies 43 (2):183 - 198.
    In this paper we argue that attention to the intricacies relating to belief illustrate crucial difficulties with Schellenberg's hiddenness argument. This issue has been only tangentially discussed in the literature to date. Yet we judge this aspect of Schellenberg's argument deeply significant. We claim that focus on the nature of belief manifests a central flaw in the hiddenness argument. Additionally, attention to doxastic subtleties provides important lessons about the nature of faith.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  6. Similarity and Acquaintance: A Dilemma.Ted Poston - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):369-378.
    There is an interesting and instructive problem with Richard Fumerton's acquaintance theory of noninferential justification. Fumerton's explicit account requires acquaintance with the truth-maker of one's belief and yet he admits that one can have noninferential justification when one is not acquainted with the truthmaker of one's belief but instead acquainted with a very similar truth-maker. On the face of it this problem calls for clarification. However, there are skeptical issues lurking in the background. This paper explores these issues by developing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  7. Acquaintance and the Problem of the Speckled Hen.Ted Poston - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):331-346.
    This paper responds to Ernest Sosa's recent criticism of Richard Fumerton's acquaintance theory. Sosa argues that Fumerton's account of non-inferential justification falls prey to the problem of the speckled hen. I argue that Sosa's criticisms are both illuminating and interesting but that Fumerton's theory can escape the problem of the speckled hen. More generally, the paper shows that an internalist account of non-inferential justification can survive the powerful objections of the Sellarsian dilemma and the problem of the speckled hen.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  8. Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology.Ted Poston - 2008 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  9.  84
    Basic Reasons and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of Reasons.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
    This paper develops and defends a coherentist account of reasons. I develop three core ideas for this defense: a distinction between basic reasons and noninferential justification, the plausibility of the neglected argument against first philosophy, and an emergent account of reasons. These three ideas form the backbone for a credible coherentist view of reasons. I work toward this account by formulating and explaining the basic reasons dilemma. This dilemma reveals a wavering attitude that coherentists have had toward basic reasons. More (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  10.  58
    Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation.Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    Twenty philosophers offer new essays examining the form of reasoning known as inference to the best explanation - widely used in science and in our everyday lives, yet still controversial. Best Explanations represents the state of the art when it comes to understanding, criticizing, and defending this form of reasoning.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11.  93
    Functionalism About Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Michael Horton & Ted Poston - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):13-27.
    Functionalism about truth is the view that truth is an explanatorily significant but multiply-realizable property. According to this view the properties that realize truth vary from domain to domain, but the property of truth is a single, higher-order, domain insensitive property. We argue that this view faces a challenge similar to the one that Jaegwon Kim laid out for the multiple realization thesis. The challenge is that the higher-order property of truth is equivalent to an explanatorily idle disjunction of its (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  12.  73
    Social Evil.Ted Poston - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 5:209-233.
    Social evil is any pain or suffering brought about by game-theoretic interactions of many individuals. This paper introduces and discusses the problem of social evil. I begin by focusing on social evil brought about by game-theoretic interactions of rational moral individuals. The problem social evil poses for theism is distinct from problems posed by natural and moral evils. Social evil is not a natural evil because it is brought about by the choices of individuals. But social evil is not a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  13. Hell, Vagueness, and Justice: A Reply to Sider.Ted Poston - 2008 - Faith and Philosophy 25 (3):322-328.
    Ted Sider’s paper “Hell and Vagueness” challenges a certain conception of Hell by arguing that it is inconsistent with God’s justice. Sider’s inconsistencyargument works only when supplemented by additional premises. Key to Sider’s case is a premise that the properties upon which eternal destinies superveneare “a smear,” i.e., they are distributed continuously among individuals in the world. We question this premise and provide reasons to doubt it. The doubts come from two sources. The first is based on evidential considerations borrowed (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  14. BonJour and the Myth of the Given.Ted Poston - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):185-201.
    The Sellarsian dilemma is a powerful argument against internalistic foundationalist views that aim to end the regress of reasons in experiential states. LaurenceBonJour once defended the soundness of this dilemma as part of a larger argument for epistemic coherentism. BonJour has now renounced his earlier conclusions about the dilemma and has offered an account of internalistic foundationalism aimed, in part, at showing the errors of his former ways. I contend that BonJour’s early concerns about the Sellarsian dilemma are correct, and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. A User's Guide to Design Arguments.Trent Dougherty & Ted Poston - 2008 - Religious Studies 44 (1):99-110.
    We argue that there is a tension between two types of design arguments-the fine-tuning argument (FTA) and the biological design argument (BDA). The tension arises because the strength of each argument is inversely proportional to the value of a certain currently unknown probability. Since the value of that probability is currently unknown, we investigate the properties of the FTA and BDA on different hypothetical values of this probability. If our central claim is correct this suggests three results: 1. It is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16.  42
    Explanationist Plasticity and the Problem of the Criterion.Ted Poston - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (3):395-419.
    Abstract This paper develops an explanationist treatment of the problem of the criterion. Explanationism is the view that all justified reasoning is justified in virtue of the explanatory virtues: simplicity, fruitfulness, testability, scope, and conservativeness. A crucial part of the explanationist framework is achieving wide reflective equilibrium. I argue that explanationism offers a plausible solution to the problem of the criterion. Furthermore, I argue that a key feature of explanationism is the plasticity of epistemic judgments and epistemic methods. The explanationist (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17.  83
    Review: John Bishop: Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief. [REVIEW]Ted Poston - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):151-155.
  18.  87
    Direct Phenomenal Beliefs, Cognitive Significance, and the Specious Present.Ted Poston - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):483-489.
    Chalmers (The character of consciousness, 2010) argues for an acquaintance theory of the justification of direct phenomenal beliefs. A central part of this defense is the claim that direct phenomenal beliefs are cognitively significant. I argue against this. Direct phenomenal beliefs are justified within the specious present, and yet the resources available with the present ‘now’ are so impoverished that it barely constrains the content of a direct phenomenal belief. I argue that Chalmers’s account does not have the resources for (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Is There an 'I' in Epistemology?Ted Poston - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):517-541.
    Epistemic conservatism is the thesis that the mere holding of a belief confers some positive epistemic status on its content. Conservatism is widely criticized on the grounds that it conflicts with the main goal in epistemology to believe truths and disbelieve falsehoods. In this paper I argue for conservatism and defend it from objections. First, I argue that the objection to conservatism from the truth goal in epistemology fails. Second, I develop and defend an argument for conservatism from the perspectival (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20.  74
    Justification Without Awareness. [REVIEW]Ted Poston - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):570-573.
  21.  94
    Skeptics Without Borders.Kevin Meeker & Ted Poston - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):223.
    Timothy Williamson’s anti luminosity argument has received considerable attention. Escaping unnoticed, though, is a strikingly similar argument from David Hume. This paper highlights some of the arresting parallels between Williamson’s reasoning and Hume’s that will allow us to appreciate more deeply the plausibility of Williamson’s reasoning and to understand how, following Hume, we can extend this reasoning to undermine the “luminosity” of simple necessary truths. More broadly the parallels help us to identify a common skeptical predicament underlying both arguments, which (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. How Do Medical Researchers Make Causal Inferences?Olaf Dammann, Ted Poston & Paul Thagard - forthcoming - In What is scientific knowledge? An introduction to contemporary epistemology of science. London, UK:
    Bradford Hill (1965) highlighted nine aspects of the complex evidential situation a medical researcher faces when determining whether a causal relation exists between a disease and various conditions associated with it. These aspects are widely cited in the literature on epidemiological inference as justifying an inference to a causal claim, but the epistemological basis of the Hill aspects is not understood. We offer an explanatory coherentist interpretation, explicated by Thagard's ECHO model of explanatory coherence. The ECHO model captures the complexity (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  38
    Dispelling the Disjunction Objection to Explanatory Inference.Kevin McCain & Ted Poston - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.
    Although inference to the best explanation is ubiquitous in science and our everyday lives, there are numerous objections to the viability of IBE. Many of these objections have been thoroughly discussed, however, at least one objection to IBE has not received adequate treatment. We term this objection the “Disjunction Objection”. This objection challenges IBE on the grounds that it seems that even if H is the best explanation, it could be that the disjunction of its rivals is more likely to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  15
    The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations.Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.) - 2018 - Brill.
    The thirteen newly commissioned essays in _The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations_ represent the cutting-edge of research on underexplored skeptical challenges, dimensions of the skeptical problematic, and responses to various kinds of skepticism.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  36
    Coherence & Confirmation: The Epistemic Limitations to the Impossibility Theorems.Ted Poston - forthcoming - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy.
    It is a widespread intuition that the coherence of independent reports provides a powerful reason to believe that the reports are true. Formal results by Huemer (1997), Olsson (2002, 2005), and Bovens and Hartmann (2003) prove that, under certain conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These formal results, known as ‘the impossibility theorems’ have been widely discussed in the literature. They are taken to have significant epistemic upshot. In particular, they are taken to show that reports (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  70
    Explanatory Coherence and the Impossibility of Confirmation by Coherence.Ted Poston - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science 88 (5).
    The coherence of independent reports provides a strong reason to believe that the reports are true. This plausible claim has come under attack from recent results in Bayesian epistemology. Huemer (1997), Olsson (2002, 2005), and Bovens and Hartmann (2003) prove that, under certain probabilistic conditions, coherence cannot increase the probability of the target claim. These results are taken to demonstrate that epistemic coherentism is untenable. To date no one has investigated how these Bayesian results bear on different conceptions of coherence. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Foundational Evidentialism and the Problem of Scatter.Ted Poston - 2007 - Abstracta 3 (2):89-106.
    This paper addresses the scatter problem for foundational evidentialism. Reflection on the scatter problem uncovers significant epistemological lessons. The scatter problem is evaluated in connection with Ernest Sosa’s use of the problem as an argument against foundational evidentialism. Sosa’s strategy is to consider a strong intuition in favor of internalism—the new evil demon problem, and then illustrate how a foundational evidentialist account of the new evil demon problem succumbs to the scatter problem. The goal in this paper is to evaluate (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  47
    Finite Reasons Without Foundations.Ted Poston - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):182-191.
    This article develops a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to Peter Klein's infinitism. The view it develops, Framework Reasons, upholds Klein's principles of avoiding arbitrariness (PAA) and avoiding circularity (PAC) without requiring an infinite regress of reasons. A view of reasons that holds that the “reason for” relation is constrained by PAA and that PAC can avoid an infinite regress if the “reason for” relation is contextual. Moreover, such a view of reasons can maintain that skepticism is false (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  46
    Introduction: “Epistemic Coherentism”.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):1-4.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  58
    Is Foundational a Priori Justification Indispensable?Ted Poston - 2013 - Episteme 10 (3):317-331.
    Laurence BonJour's (1985) coherence theory of empirical knowledge relies heavily on a traditional foundationalist theory of a priori knowledge. He argues that a foundationalist, rationalist theory of a priori justification is indispensable for a coherence theory. BonJour (1998) continues this theme, arguing that a traditional account of a priori justification is indispensable for the justification of putative a priori truths, the justification of any non-observational belief and the justification of reasoning itself. While BonJour's indispensability arguments have received some critical discussion (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  14
    Is There an ‘I’ in Epistemology?Ted Poston - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):517-541.
    Epistemic conservatism is the thesis that the mere holding of a belief confers some positive epistemic status on its content. Conservatism is widely criticized on the grounds that it conflicts with the main goal in epistemology to believe truths and disbelieve falsehoods. In this paper I argue for conservatism and defend it from objections. First, I argue that the objection to conservatism from the truth goal in epistemology fails. Second, I develop and defend an argument for conservatism from the perspectival (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  52
    Kelly James Clark and Raymond VanArragon , Evidence and Religious Belief, Oxford University Press, 2011.Ted Poston - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (3):177-183.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  35
    Nicholas Rescher: Common-Sense: A New Look at an Old Philosophical Tradition. [REVIEW]Ted Poston - 2007 - Faith and Philosophy 24 (3):361-363.
  34.  30
    Review of Paul J. Weithman (Ed.), Liberal Faith: Essays in Honor of Philip Quinn[REVIEW]Ted Poston - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (2).
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  10
    Richard Swinburne, Mind, Brain, & Free Will[REVIEW]Ted Poston - 2016 - Journal of Analytic Theology 4:480-484.
  36. The Intrinsic Probability of Grand Explanatory Theories.Ted Poston - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (4):401-420.
    This paper articulates a way to ground a relatively high prior probability for grand explanatory theories apart from an appeal to simplicity. I explore the possibility of enumerating the space of plausible grand theories of the universe by using the explanatory properties of possible views to limit the number of plausible theories. I motivate this alternative grounding by showing that Swinburne’s appeal to simplicity is problematic along several dimensions. I then argue that there are three plausible grand views—theism, atheism, and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Cognitive Abilities and the Conceptualist/Nonconceptualist Debate (Long Version).Ted Poston - manuscript
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  31
    Skepticism and Perceptual Justification, Edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini. [REVIEW]Ted Poston - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (3):250-255.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark