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  1.  44
    Do Infants Really Understand False Belief?Ted Ruffman & Josef Perner - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (10):462-463.
  2.  41
    Do Children Understand the Mind by Means of a Simulation or a Theory? Evidence From Their Understanding of Inference.Ted Ruffman - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (4):388-414.
  3.  14
    Age-Related Similarities and Differences in First Impressions of Trustworthiness.Phoebe E. Bailey, Paulina Szczap, Skye N. McLennan, Gillian Slessor, Ted Ruffman & Peter G. Rendell - 2016 - Cognition and Emotion 30 (5).
  4.  5
    Young Infants' Expectations About Hidden Objects.Ted Ruffman, Lance Slade & Jessica Redman - 2005 - Cognition 97 (2):B35-B43.
  5.  7
    Exploring Own-Age Biases in Deception Detection.Gillian Slessor, Louise H. Phillips, Ted Ruffman, Phoebe E. Bailey & Pauline Insch - 2014 - Cognition and Emotion 28 (3):493-506.
  6. Young Children's Understanding of the Implications of Ambiguous Perceptual Information Relation to False Belief and a Developing Theory of Mind.Ted Ruffman - 1990
     
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  7.  26
    Applying the Implicit-Explicit Distinction to Development in Children.Ted Ruffman - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):783-783.
    This commentary focuses on how Dienes & Perner's (D&P's) claims relate to aspects of development. First, I discuss recent research that supports D&P's claim that anticipatory looking in a false belief task is guided by implicit knowledge. Second, I argue that implicit knowledge may be based on exposure to regularities in the world as D&P argue, but equally, it may sometimes be based on theories that conflict with real world regularities. Third, I discuss Munakata et al.'s notion of graded representations (...)
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  8.  24
    Children's Understanding of Mind: Constructivist but Theory-Like.Ted Ruffman - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):120-121.
    Although in general agreement with Carpendale & Lewis's (C&L's) claims, I argue that (1) gradual development is better supported by within-task eye gaze/verbal comparisons; (2) gradual development and social construction do not contradict the theory-theory view; (3) there is good evidence for an early developing self-other distinction; and (4) the language–false belief link could be mediated by parental talk.
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  9.  10
    Understanding a-Not-B Errors as a Function of Object Representation and Deficits in Attention Rather Than Motor Memories.Ted Ruffman - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):61-61.
    In this commentary, I raise several points. First, I argue that non-search tasks show that the A-not-B task is about object representation, even if perseveration can occur without objects. Second, I provide an alternative interpretation for the finding that changing body posture reduces A-not-B errors. Third, I provide an alternative interpretation for the finding of convergence in reaching behavior in two-target tasks. Fourth, I suggest attention deficits can explain the A-not-B error on their own with no necessity for motor memories.
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