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Teemu Toppinen
University of Helsinki
  1. Hybrid Accounts of Ethical Thought and Talk.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 243-259.
    This is a draft of a chapter for the Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, edited by David Plunkett and Tristram McPherson. I offer an overview of hybrid views in metaethics, with main focus on hybrid cognitivist views such as those defended by Daniel Boisvert and David Copp, and on hybrid expressivist views such as those defended by Michael Ridge and myself.
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  2.  59
    Expressivism and the Normativity of Attitudes.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):233-255.
    Many philosophers believe that judgments about propositional attitudes, or about which mental states are expressed by which sentences, are normative judgments. If this is so, then metanormative expressivism must be given expressivist treatment. This might seem to make expressivism self-defeating or worrisomely circular, or to frustrate the explanatory ambitions central to the view. I argue that recent objections along these lines to giving an expressivist account of expressivism are not successful. I shall also suggest that in order to deal with (...)
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  3.  37
    Is Irreducible Normativity Impossibly Queer?Teemu Toppinen - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):437-460.
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  4.  20
    Expressivism and Moore's Paradox.Teemu Toppinen - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-6.
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  5.  72
    Rule Consequentialism at Top Rates.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly:pqv065.
  6.  56
    How Norms (Might) Guide Belief.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):396-409.
    Belief normativism is roughly the view that judgments about beliefs are normative judgments. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss suggest that there are two ways one could defend this view: by appeal to what might be called ‘truth-norms’, or by appeal to what might be called ‘norms of rationality’ or ‘epistemic norms’. According to G&W, whichever way the normativist takes, she ends up being unable to account for the idea that the norms in question would guide belief formation. Plausibly, if belief (...)
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  7. Moral Fetishism Revisited.Teemu Toppinen - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):307-315.
    In this paper the 'moral fetishism' argument originally presented by Michael Smith against moral judgment externalism is defended. I argue that only the internalist views on the relation of moral judgment and motivation can combine two attractive theses: first, that the morally admirable are motivated to act on the reasons they take to ground actions' being right, and second, that their virtuousness need not be diminished by their acting on their thinking something right. Lastly, some possibilities are envisaged for internalists (...)
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  8.  5
    Non-Naturalism Gone Quasi: Explaining the Necessary Connections Between the Natural and the Normative.Teemu Toppinen - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
    Non-naturalism—roughly the view that normative properties and facts are sui generis—may be combined either with cognitivism or with non-cognitivism. The chapter starts by explaining how the metaphysically necessary connections between the natural and the normative raise an explanatory challenge for realist non-naturalism, and how it is not at all obvious that quasi-realism offers a way of escaping the challenge. Having briefly explored different kinds of accounts of what it is to have thoughts concerning metaphysical necessity, it then proceeds to argue (...)
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  9.  20
    Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):943-955.
    I explore the prospects of capturing and explaining, within a non-cognitivist framework, the enkratic principle of rationality, according to which rationality requires of N that, if N believes that she herself ought to perform an action, φ, N intends to φ. Capturing this principle involves making sense of both the possibility and irrationality of akrasia – of failing to intend in accordance with one’s ought thought. In the first section, I argue that the existing non-cognitivist treatments of enkrasia/akrasia by Allan (...)
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  10.  15
    Relational Expressivism and Moore's Paradox.Teemu Toppinen - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2):1-8.
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  11. Mahdollisuus.Ilkka Niiniluoto, Tuomas Tahko & Teemu Toppinen (eds.) - 2016 - Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland.
    Proceedings of the 2016 "one word" colloquium of the The Philosophical Society of Finland. The word was "Possibility".
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  12.  27
    Gibbard, Allan. Meaning and Normativity.New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 336. $55.00.Teemu Toppinen - 2014 - Ethics 124 (4):905-910.
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  13.  34
    Goading or Guiding? Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Practical Reasoning.Teemu Toppinen - 2013 - SATS 14 (2):119-141.
    Name der Zeitschrift: SATS Jahrgang: 14 Heft: 2 Seiten: 119-141.
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