American polygenism was a provocative scientific movement whose controversial claim that humankind did not share a common ancestor caused a firestorm among naturalists and the lay public beginning in the 1830s. This article gives specific attention to the largely overlooked religious ideas marshaled by American polygenists in their effort to construct race as a unit of analysis. I focus specifically on the thought of the American polygenist and renowned surgeon Dr Josiah Clark Nott (1804–73) of Mobile, Alabama. Scholars have claimed (...) that in his effort to establish a properly modern scientific view of race Nott was one of the first American naturalists to publicly denounce the notion of common human descent (monogenesis) as proclaimed in the Bible. I argue that despite his rejection of monogenesis, Nott’s racial theory remained squarely within the tradition of Christian ideas about the natural world. American polygenism provides an example of how scientific and religious ideas worked together in the minds of American antebellum thinkers in the development of novel theories about race and human origins. (shrink)

In his recent book, The Moral Problem , Michael Smith presents a number of arguments designed to expose the difficulties with so-called 'extcrnalist' theories of motivation. This essay endeavors to defend externalism from Smith's attacks. I attempt three tasks in the essay. First, I try to clarify and reformulate Smith's distinction between internalism and externalism. Second, I formulate two of Smith's arguments- what I call the 'reliability argument' and 'the rationalist argument' -and attempt to show that these arguments fail to (...) damage externalism. Third, I undertake to expose and question some of the motivations that drive internalism. (shrink)

In his recent book, The Moral Problem (Basil Blackwell, 1994), Michael Smith presents a number of arguments designed to expose the difficulties with so-called 'extcrnalist' theories of motivation. This essay endeavors to defend externalism from Smith's attacks. I attempt three tasks in the essay. First, I try to clarify and reformulate Smith's distinction between internalism and externalism. Second, I formulate two of Smith's arguments- what I call the 'reliability argument' and 'the rationalist argument' -and attempt to show that these arguments (...) fail to damage externalism. Third, I undertake to expose and question some of the motivations that drive internalism. (shrink)

In his recent book, The Moral Problem, Michael Smith presents a number of arguments designed to expose the difficulties with so-called `externalist' theories of motivation. This essay endeavors to defend externalism from Smith's attacks. I attempt three tasks in the essay. First, I try to clarify and reformulate Smith's distinction between internalism and externalism. Second, I formulate two of Smith's arguments-what I call the `reliability argument' and `the rationalist argument'-and attempt to show that these arguments fail to damage externalism. Third, (...) I undertake to expose and question some of the motivations that drive internalism. (shrink)

In what follows, I first deal with some of the major philosophical objections raised against my claim that Christian thought has given us racial science. Then, I take on points of dispute surrounding my use of Hans Blumenberg's notion of reoccupation to explain the recurrence of Christian forms within modern scientific thinking. Finally, I address some historiographic issues surrounding my assessment of Johann Blumenbach and the origins of racial science.

The view that science and religion are necessarily in conflict has increasingly lost favor among scholars who have sought more nuanced theoretical frameworks for evaluating the configurations of these two bodies of knowledge in modern life. This article situates, for the first time, the modern study of race into scholarly assessments on the relations between religion and science. I argue that the formation of the race concept in the minds of Western European and American scientists grew out of and remained (...) indebted to Christian intellectual history. Religion was not subtracted from nor stood in conflict with constructions of race developed across the modern life and health sciences. (shrink)

This chapter sketches an argument for moral non‐naturalism. The argument begins by noting that naturalist positions must be reductionist. It then canvasses two prominent defenses of reductionist naturalism: Frank Jackson's and Mark Schroeder's. Both defenses suffer from serious problems. Because they do, we have good reason to carefully consider rival realist positions, such as non‐naturalism. When we do, we find that some moral facts, such as the fundamental moral standards, do not bear the marks of the natural. This provides prima (...) facie reason to hold that they are as non‐naturalists believe. (shrink)

Human cooperation is held to be an evolutionary puzzle because people voluntarily engage in costly cooperation, and costly punishment of non-cooperators, even among anonymous strangers they will never meet again. The costs of such cooperation cannot be recovered through kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, or costly signaling. A number of recent authors label this behavior ‘strong reciprocity’, and argue that it is: (a) a newly documented aspect of human nature, (b) adaptive, and (c) evolved by group selection. We argue exactly (...) the opposite; that the phenomenon is: (a) not new, (b) maladaptive, and (c) evolved by individual selection. In our perspective, the apparent puzzle disappears to reveal a biological and evolutionary logic to human cooperation. Group selection may play a role in theory, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain human cooperation. Our alternative solution is simpler, makes fewer assumptions, and is more parsimonious with the empirical data. (shrink)

This review analyzes Chomsky’s rationale for devising a theory of generative grammar to replace the “standard theory” of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965) by one that shifts responsibility for the semantic interpretation of sentences from the forms generated in deep structure to those generated by the entire syntactic apparatus of generative grammar. The shift was very much a work in progress when this review was written, and the outcome it predicted occurred only a few years later with the (...) publication of Lectures on Government and Binding: The Pisa Lectures (1981). (shrink)

Features four case studies that include 'Scripted Teaching', 'Accountability and Merit', 'What is the Value of Caring Relationships?' and 'School Funding'. Using these and other realistic case studies, this book explores the strengths and weaknesses of each approach so that teachers can assess their own philosophical positions on teaching.

The goals of linguistic theory are to answer such questions as “What is language?” and “What properties must something (an organism or a machine) have in order for it to learn and use language?” Different theories provide different answers to these questions, and there is at present no general consensus as to what theory gives the best answers. Moreover, most linguists, when pressed, would say that these questions have not yet been answered satisfactorily by any theory.

The article presents the author's perspectives regarding the book "The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory," by Terence Wilmot Hutchison. He emphasizes two important general themes that emerge from the symposium in total, the great breadth of Hutchison's contribution to economic methodology and a brief introduction on the four individual papers. He mentions some people including Roger Backhouse, John Hart and Ross Emmett as well as the comments of each about Hutchison's works.

Terence Wilmot Hutchison, a Fellow of the British Academy, was a historian of economics, methodologist, and acerbic critic of hubris and pretension amongst economists. He was born at Bournemouth and grew up in London. Hutchison's father was the flamboyant and much married Robert Langton Douglas, while his mother was Grace Hutchison. It was as a classicist that he went to the University of Cambridge in 1931. But Hutchison quickly lost interest in a subject that seemed to him to have (...) little relevance to the economic turmoil of the world, and switched to economics, graduating in 1934 with a First. He left Cambridge in 1934 and registered as an occasional student at the London School of Economics. This chapter presents a biography of Hutchison and also narrates his trips to Germany, Iraq, and India, as well as his stints at the University of Hull, LSE, and the University of Birmingham. (shrink)