Results for 'Terence E. Horgan'

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  1.  20
    Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology.Terence E. Horgan & Matjaž Potrc - 2008 - MIT Press.
    The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz [hacek over z] Potrc [hacek over c] argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to (...)
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  2.  88
    Themes in My Philosophical Work.Terence E. Horgan - 2002 - In Johannes L. Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi. pp. 1-26.
    I invoked the notion of supervenience in my doctoral disseration, Microreduction and the Mind-Body Problem, completed at the University of Michigan in 1974 under the direction of Jaegwon Kim. I had been struck by the appeal to supervenience in Hare (1952), a classic work in twentieth century metaethics that I studied at Michigan in a course on metaethics taught by William Frankena; and I also had been struck by the brief appeal to supervenience in Davidson (1970). Kim was already, in (...)
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  3. Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem.Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - Theoria 16 (40):95-116.
    Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discussions in (...)
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  4.  57
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1996 - MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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  5.  95
    Deconstructing New Wave Materialism.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 307--318.
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  6. From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - Mind 102 (408):555-86.
  7.  43
    Supervenient Bridge Laws.Terence E. Horgan - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (2):227-249.
    I invoke the conceptual machinery of contemporary possible-world semantics to provide an account of the metaphysical status of "bridge laws" in intertheoretic reductions. I argue that although bridge laws are not definitions, and although they do not necessarily reflect attribute-identities, they are supervenient. I.e., they are true in all possible worlds in which the reducing theory is true.
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  8. What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism.Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson - 2005 - In Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
  9. Supervenience and Microphysics.Terence E. Horgan - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):29-43.
     
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  10. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
  11.  83
    Consciousness and Intentionality.George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 468--484.
  12.  87
    The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 323.
  13. Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion.Terence E. Horgan - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:165-84.
  14. Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia.Terence E. Horgan - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April):147-52.
  15. Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.
  16. Mary Mary, Quite Contrary.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.
  17.  35
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.) - 1991 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
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  18. A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1994 - Synthese 101 (3):305-45.
    David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (...)
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  19.  83
    Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics.Terence E. Horgan - 1984 - Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1):19-38.
  20.  67
    Practicing Safe Epistemology.David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically (...)
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  21.  98
    Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:219-247.
  22. Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content.Terence E. Horgan - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
  23.  77
    Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science.Terence E. Horgan - 1997 - Metaphilosophy 28 (1-2):1-30.
    This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: the classical computation conception in cognitive science; a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call “non‐sentential computationalism”; and an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call “dynamical cognition.” Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to enlist connectionism in (...)
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  24. Materialism: Matters of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction.Terence E. Horgan - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):157-83.
    How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.
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  25. Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics.Terence E. Horgan - 1981 - Synthese 49 (December):395-413.
  26.  55
    The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (2):282-297.
  27. Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 41-61.
  28.  29
    Settling Into a New Paradigm.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1):97-113.
  29. Simulation and Epistemic Competence.David K. Henderson & Terence E. Horgan - 2000 - In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview.
    Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy.
     
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  30. Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind.Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - In Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
  31. Cognition is Real.Terence E. Horgan - 1987 - Behaviorism 15 (1):13-25.
  32.  30
    Lehrer on 'Could'-Statements.Terence E. Horgan - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (4):403 - 411.
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  33. Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems?Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1991 - In S. Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theorye and Practice. Oxford University Press.
  34.  19
    Modelling the Noncomputational Mind: Reply to Litch.Terence E. Horgan - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):365-371.
    I explain why, within the nonclassical framework for cognitive science we describe in the book, cognitive-state transitions can fail to be tractably computable even if they are subserved by a discrete dynamical system whose mathematical-state transitions are tractably computable. I distinguish two ways that cognitive processing might conform to programmable rules in which all operations that apply to representation-level structure are primitive, and two corresponding constraints on models of cognition. Although Litch is correct in maintaining that classical cognitive science is (...)
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  35.  83
    Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession.Terence E. Horgan - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:27-33.
  36. Against the Token Identity Theory.Terence E. Horgan & Michael Tye - 1985 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell.
     
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  37.  83
    Cognition Needs Syntax but Not Rules.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell. pp. 147--158.
    Human cognition is rich, varied, and complex. In this Chapter we argue that because of the richness of human cognition (and human mental life generally), there must be a syntax of cognitive states, but because of this very richness, cognitive processes cannot be describable by exceptionless rules. The argument for syntax, in Section 1, has to do with being able to get around in any number of possible environments in a complex world. Since nature did not know where in the (...)
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  38. Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis.Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
    Reality and Humean Supervenience confronts the reader with central aspects in the philosophy of David Lewis, whose work in ontology, metaphysics, logic, probability, philosophy of mind, and language articulates a unique and systematic foundation for modern physicalism.
     
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  39.  76
    Sensations and Grain Processes.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 1998 - In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins.
  40.  38
    Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1992 - Philosophy 34:159-188.
    David Marr provided an influential account of levels of description in classical cognitive science. In this paper we contrast Marr'ent with some alternatives that are suggested by the recent emergence of connectionism. Marr's account is interesting and important both because of the levels of description it distinguishes, and because of the way his presentation reflects some of the most basic, foundational, assumptions of classical AI-style cognitive science . Thus, by focusing on levels of description, one can sharpen foundational differences between (...)
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  41.  45
    Review of Levine's Purple Haze[REVIEW]Terence E. Horgan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3).
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  42. Nonreductive Materialism.Terence E. Horgan - 1994 - In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.
     
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  43. Authors' Replies.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1999 - Acta Analytica 22 (22):275-287.
  44. Short Prcis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.Terence E. Horgan - 1999 - Acta Analytica 22 (22):9-21.
  45. Essays on Paradoxes.Terence Horgan - 2016 - Oup Usa.
    This volume brings together Terence Horgan's essays on paradoxes, both published and new. A common theme unifying these essays is that philosophically interesting paradoxes typically resist either easy solutions or solutions that are formally/mathematically highly technical. Another unifying theme is that such paradoxes often have deep-sometimes disturbing-philosophical morals.
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  46. Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox.Terence Horgan - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:159-188.
    I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign rather than malignant. I describe some implications for (...)
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  47.  56
    The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis.David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Henderson and Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology. They defend the roles of the a priori and conceptual analysis, but with an essential empirical dimension. 'Transglobal reliability' is the key to epistemic justification. The question of which cognitive processes are reliable depends on contingent facts about human capacities.
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  48. Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism.David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account (...)
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  49.  35
    Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II.Terence Horgan - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    In “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Anna Mahtani and I offer a new argument for thirdism that relies on what we call “generalized conditionalization.” Generalized conditionalization goes beyond conventional conditionalization in two respects: first, by sometimes deploying a space of synchronic, essentially temporal, candidate-possibilities that are not “prior” possibilities; and second, by allowing for the use of preliminary probabilities that arise by first bracketing, and then conditionalizing upon, “old evidence.” In “Beauty and Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and (...)
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  50.  28
    Evidentially Embedded Epistemic Entitlement.David Henderson & Terence Horgan - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    Some hold that beliefs arising out of certain sources such as perceptual experience enjoy a kind of entitlement—as one is entitled to believe what is thereby presented as true, at least unless further evidence undermines that entitlement. This is commonly understood to require that default epistemic entitlement is a non-evidential kind of epistemic warrant. Our project here is to challenge this common, non-evidential, conception of epistemic entitlement. We will argue that although there are indeed basic beliefs with default entitlement status, (...)
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