Results for 'Terence E. Horgan'

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  1.  20
    Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology.Terence E. Horgan & Matjaž Potrc - 2008 - MIT Press.
    The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz [hacek over z] Potrc [hacek over c] argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to (...)
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  2. From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - Mind 102 (408):555-86.
  3. Supervenience and Microphysics.Terence E. Horgan - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):29-43.
     
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  4. Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia.Terence E. Horgan - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April):147-52.
  5. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
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  6. Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion.Terence E. Horgan - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:165-84.
  7.  36
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.) - 1991 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
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  8. Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.
  9.  93
    The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 323.
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  10.  96
    Deconstructing New Wave Materialism.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 307--318.
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  11. A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1994 - Synthese 101 (3):305-45.
    David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (...)
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  12.  87
    Consciousness and Intentionality.George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 468--484.
  13. Mary Mary, Quite Contrary.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.
  14. Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics.Terence E. Horgan - 1981 - Synthese 49 (December):395-413.
  15.  44
    Supervenient Bridge Laws.Terence E. Horgan - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (2):227-249.
    I invoke the conceptual machinery of contemporary possible-world semantics to provide an account of the metaphysical status of "bridge laws" in intertheoretic reductions. I argue that although bridge laws are not definitions, and although they do not necessarily reflect attribute-identities, they are supervenient. I.e., they are true in all possible worlds in which the reducing theory is true.
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  16. Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:219-247.
  17.  31
    Settling Into a New Paradigm.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1):97-113.
  18.  70
    Practicing Safe Epistemology.David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically (...)
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  19. Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-Presentation.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 41-61.
  20.  30
    Lehrer on 'Could'-Statements.Terence E. Horgan - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (4):403 - 411.
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  21. Against the Token Identity Theory.Terence E. Horgan & Michael Tye - 1985 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell.
  22. Cognition is Real.Terence E. Horgan - 1987 - Behaviorism 15 (1):13-25.
  23.  20
    Modelling the Noncomputational Mind: Reply to Litch.Terence E. Horgan - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):365-371.
    I explain why, within the nonclassical framework for cognitive science we describe in the book, cognitive-state transitions can fail to be tractably computable even if they are subserved by a discrete dynamical system whose mathematical-state transitions are tractably computable. I distinguish two ways that cognitive processing might conform to programmable rules in which all operations that apply to representation-level structure are primitive, and two corresponding constraints on models of cognition. Although Litch is correct in maintaining that classical cognitive science is (...)
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  24. Simulation and Epistemic Competence.David K. Henderson & Terence E. Horgan - 2000 - In H. Kobler & K. Steuber (eds.), Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences. Westview.
    Epistemology has recently come to more and more take the articulate form of an investigation into how we do, and perhaps might better, manage the cognitive chores of producing, modifying, and generally maintaining belief-sets with a view to having a true and systematic understanding of the world. While this approach has continuities with earlier philosophy, it admittedly makes a departure from the tradition of epistemology as first philosophy.
     
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  25.  86
    Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession.Terence E. Horgan - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:27-33.
  26.  91
    Themes in My Philosophical Work.Terence E. Horgan - 2002 - In Johannes L. Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi. pp. 1-26.
    I invoked the notion of supervenience in my doctoral disseration, Microreduction and the Mind-Body Problem, completed at the University of Michigan in 1974 under the direction of Jaegwon Kim. I had been struck by the appeal to supervenience in Hare (1952), a classic work in twentieth century metaethics that I studied at Michigan in a course on metaethics taught by William Frankena; and I also had been struck by the brief appeal to supervenience in Davidson (1970). Kim was already, in (...)
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  27. Authors' Replies.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1999 - Acta Analytica 144:275-287.
  28. Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content.Terence E. Horgan - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
  29.  87
    Cognition Needs Syntax but Not Rules.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell. pp. 147--158.
    Human cognition is rich, varied, and complex. In this Chapter we argue that because of the richness of human cognition (and human mental life generally), there must be a syntax of cognitive states, but because of this very richness, cognitive processes cannot be describable by exceptionless rules. The argument for syntax, in Section 1, has to do with being able to get around in any number of possible environments in a complex world. Since nature did not know where in the (...)
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  30.  39
    Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1992 - Philosophy 34:159-188.
    David Marr provided an influential account of levels of description in classical cognitive science. In this paper we contrast Marr'ent with some alternatives that are suggested by the recent emergence of connectionism. Marr's account is interesting and important both because of the levels of description it distinguishes, and because of the way his presentation reflects some of the most basic, foundational, assumptions of classical AI-style cognitive science . Thus, by focusing on levels of description, one can sharpen foundational differences between (...)
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  31. Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind.Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - In Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
  32. Nonreductive Materialism.Terence E. Horgan - 1994 - In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.
     
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  33. Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis.Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
    Reality and Humean Supervenience confronts the reader with central aspects in the philosophy of David Lewis, whose work in ontology, metaphysics, logic, probability, philosophy of mind, and language articulates a unique and systematic foundation for modern physicalism.
     
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  34.  46
    Review of Levine's Purple Haze[REVIEW]Terence E. Horgan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3).
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  35. Short Prcis of Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.Terence E. Horgan - 1999 - Acta Analytica 144:9-21.
  36. Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems?Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1991 - In S. Davis (ed.), Connectionism: Theorye and Practice. Oxford University Press.
  37. What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism.Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson - 2005 - In Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
     
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  38.  78
    Sensations and Grain Processes.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 1998 - In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins.
  39. Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem.Terence Horgan - 2001 - Theoria 16 (40):95-116.
    Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discussions in (...)
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  40. Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox.Terence Horgan - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:159-188.
    I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign rather than malignant. I describe some implications for (...)
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  41. Themes From G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics • by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay.Terence Cuneo - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):167-169.
    G.E. Moore's philosophical legacy is ambiguous. On the one hand, Moore has a special place in the hearts of many contemporary analytic philosophers. He is, after all, one of the fathers of the movement, his broadly commonsensical methodology informing how many contemporary analytic philosophers practise their craft. On the other hand, many contemporary philosophers keep Moore's own substantive positions at arm's distance. According to many epistemologists, one can find no finer example of how to beg the question than Moore's case (...)
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  42.  12
    A Theory of Resonance.Terence E. McDonnell, Christopher A. Bail & Iddo Tavory - 2017 - Sociological Theory 35 (1):1-14.
    The metaphor of resonance often describes the fit between a message and an audience’s worldviews. Yet scholars have largely ignored the cognitive processes audiences use to interpret messages and interactions that determine why certain messages and other cultural objects appeal to some but not others. Drawing on pragmatism, we argue that resonance occurs as cultural objects help people puzzle through practical challenges they face or construct. We discuss how cognitive distance and the process of emotional reasoning shape the likelihood of (...)
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  43.  29
    Drawing Out Culture: Productive Methods to Measure Cognition and Resonance.Terence E. McDonnell - 2014 - Theory and Society 43 (3-4):247-274.
  44.  57
    Ontological Commitment and Contextual Semantics.Maria E. Reicher - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):141-155.
    Terence Horgan's "contextual semantics" is supposed to be a means to avoid unwanted ontological commitments, in particular commitments to non-physical objects, such as institutions, theories and symphonies. The core of contextual semantics is the claim that truth is correct assertibility, and that there are various standards of correct assertibility, the standards of "referential semantics" being only one among others. I am investigating the notions of correct assertibility,assertibility norms and indirect reference. I argue that closer inspection reveals that contextual (...)
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  45.  6
    Minds, Brains And People.Terence E. Wilkerson - 1974 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.
  46. Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
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  47. Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The 'Open Question Argument' Revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (3):153-175.
    (1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380.
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  48. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 520--533.
  49.  32
    Xenophobia and Other Reasons to Wonder About the Domain Specificity of Folk-Biological Classification.Terence E. Hays - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):575-576.
    Atran adds a synthesis of much of the literature on folk-biological classification to important new experimental data relevant to long-standing inferences about the structure of folk taxonomies. What we know about such systems is somewhat overstated, and key issues remain unresolved, especially concerning the centrality of “generic species,” the primacy of “general purpose” taxonomies, and domain specificity.
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  50.  62
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1996 - MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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