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Terence Horgan [104]Terence E. Horgan [52]Terence Edward Horgan [2]
  1. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 520--533.
  2. From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - Mind 102 (408):555-86.
  3. What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism.Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson - 2005 - In Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
     
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  4. Folk Psychology is Here to Stay.Terence Horgan & James Woodward - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (April):197-225.
  5. Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness.Terence Horgan, John Tienson & Graham George - 2006 - In Kriegel Uriah & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness. Bradford.
  6.  43
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1996 - MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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  7. New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:447-465.
    There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to moral questions, and the possibility of (...)
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  8. Supervenience and Microphysics.Terence E. Horgan - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):29-43.
     
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  9. Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather (...)
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  10. Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
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  11. Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The 'Open Question Argument' Revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (3):153-175.
    (1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380.
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  12.  59
    Mental Quausation.Terence Horgan - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74.
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  13.  81
    Deconstructing New Wave Materialism.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 307--318.
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  14. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
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  15. Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality.Terence Horgan - 2013 - The Monist 96 (2):232-251.
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  16.  43
    The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis.David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Henderson and Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology. They defend the roles of the a priori and conceptual analysis, but with an essential empirical dimension. 'Transglobal reliability' is the key to epistemic justification. The question of which cognitive processes are reliable depends on contingent facts about human capacities.
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  17. Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion.Terence E. Horgan - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):165-84.
  18.  14
    Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology.Terence E. Horgan & Matjaž Potrc - 2008 - MIT Press.
    The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz [hacek over z] Potrc [hacek over c] argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and (...)
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  19.  7
    Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.David Henderson, Terence Horgan, Matjaž Potrč & Hannah Tierney - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):194-225.
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  20.  9
    Evidentially Embedded Epistemic Entitlement.David Henderson & Terence Horgan - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    Some hold that beliefs arising out of certain sources such as perceptual experience enjoy a kind of entitlement—as one is entitled to believe what is thereby presented as true, at least unless further evidence undermines that entitlement. This is commonly understood to require that default epistemic entitlement is a non-evidential kind of epistemic warrant. Our project here is to challenge this common, non-evidential, conception of epistemic entitlement. We will argue that although there are indeed basic beliefs with default entitlement status, (...)
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  21.  63
    Consciousness and Intentionality.George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 468--484.
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    Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox.Terence Horgan - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):159-188.
    I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign rather than malignant. I describe some implications for (...)
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  23. Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem.Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - Theoria 16 (40):95-116.
    Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discussions in various (...)
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  24.  61
    The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 323.
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  25.  25
    Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II.Terence Horgan - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    In “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Anna Mahtani and I offer a new argument for thirdism that relies on what we call “generalized conditionalization.” Generalized conditionalization goes beyond conventional conditionalization in two respects: first, by sometimes deploying a space of synchronic, essentially temporal, candidate-possibilities that are not “prior” possibilities; and second, by allowing for the use of preliminary probabilities that arise by first bracketing, and then conditionalizing upon, “old evidence.” In “Beauty and Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani,” (...)
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  26. Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia.Terence E. Horgan - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April):147-83.
  27.  27
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.) - 1991 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
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  28. Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.
  29. Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Problem.Terence Horgan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (6):331-356.
  30. Mary Mary, Quite Contrary.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.
  31.  56
    Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics.Terence Horgan - 1991 - Erkenntnis 34 (3):297--322.
    I propose a metaphysical position I call 'limited metaphysical realism', and I link it to a position in the philosophy of language I call 'psychologistic semantics'. Limited metaphysical realism asserts that there is a mind-independent, discourse-independent world, but posits a sparse ontology. Psychologistic semantics construes truth not as direct word/world correspondence, and not as warranted assertibility (or Putnam's "ideal" warranted assertibility), but rather as 'correct assertibility'. I argue that virtues of this package deal over each of the two broad positions (...)
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  32.  24
    Soft Laws.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):256-279.
  33. Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum.Terence Horgan - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.
  34.  81
    The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness.Terence Horgan - 1998 - The Monist 81 (2):313-330.
    Transvaluationism makes two fundamental claims concerning vagueness. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: vague discourse is governed by semantic standards that are mutually unsatisfiable. But second, vagueness is viable and legitimate nonetheless; its logical incoherence is benign.
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  35. Truth as Mediated Correspondence.Robert Barnard & Terence Horgan - 2006 - The Monist 89 (1):28-49.
    We will here describe a conception of truth that is robust rather than deflationist, and that differs in important ways from the most familiar robust conceptions.' We will argue that this approach to truth is intrinsically and intuitively plausible, and fares very well relative to other conceptions of truth in terms of comparative theoretical benefits and costs.
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  36.  50
    Practicing Safe Epistemology.David Henderson & Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):227 - 258.
    Reliablists have argued that the important evaluative epistemic concept of being justified in holding a belief, at least to the extent that that concept is associated with knowledge, is best understood as concerned with the objective appropriateness of the processes by which a given belief is generated and sustained. In particular, they hold that a belief is justified only when it is fostered by processes that are reliable (at least minimally so) in the believer’s actual world.[1] Of course, reliablists typically (...)
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  37.  82
    A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1994 - Synthese 101 (3):305-45.
    David Marr provided a useful framework for theorizing about cognition within classical, AI-style cognitive science, in terms of three levels of description: the levels of (i) cognitive function, (ii) algorithm and (iii) physical implementation. We generalize this framework: (i) cognitive state transitions, (ii) mathematical/functional design and (iii) physical implementation or realization. Specifying the middle, design level to be the theory of dynamical systems yields a nonclassical, alternative framework that suits (but is not committed to) connectionism. We consider how a brain's (...)
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  38.  14
    Transglobal Reliabilism.David Henderson & Terence Edward Horgan - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17:171-195.
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  39.  29
    Representations Without Rules.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):147-174.
  40.  67
    Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics.Terence E. Horgan - 1984 - Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22 (S1):19-38.
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  41. Supervenient Qualia.Terence Horgan - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (October):491-520.
  42.  72
    Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:219-247.
  43.  53
    Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence.Terence Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2000 - Facta Philosophica 2 (2):249-270.
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  44. Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind.George Graham, Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 512--537.
     
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  45.  77
    Cognitive Systems as Dynamic Systems.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1992 - Topoi 11 (1):27-43.
  46.  9
    The Synthetic Unity of Truth.Robert Barnard & Terence Horgan - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 180.
  47.  56
    'Could', Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility.Terence Horgan - 1979 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):345-358.
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  48.  74
    On What There Isn't. [REVIEW]Terence Horgan - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):693-700.
  49.  24
    Truth and Ontology.Terence Horgan - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 15 (1):1-21.
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  50. Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content.Terence E. Horgan - 1991 - In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics. Blackwell.
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