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Teresa Kouri Kissel
Old Dominion University
  1.  69
    A New Interpretation of Carnap’s Logical Pluralism.Teresa Kouri - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):305-314.
    Rudolf Carnap’s logical pluralism is often held to be one in which corresponding connectives in different logics have different meanings. This paper presents an alternative view of Carnap’s position, in which connectives can and do share their meaning in some contexts. This re-interpretation depends crucially on extending Carnap’s linguistic framework system to include meta-linguistic frameworks, those frameworks which we use to talk about linguistic frameworks. I provide an example that shows how this is possible, and give some textual evidence that (...)
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  2.  47
    Restall’s Proof-Theoretic Pluralism and Relevance Logic.Teresa Kouri - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1243-1252.
    Restall :279–291, 2014) proposes a new, proof-theoretic, logical pluralism. This is in contrast to the model-theoretic pluralism he and Beall proposed in Beall and Restall :475–493, 2000) and in Beall and Restall. What I will show is that Restall has not described the conditions on being admissible to the proof-theoretic logical pluralism in such a way that relevance logic is one of the admissible logics. Though relevance logic is not hard to add formally, one critical component of Restall’s pluralism is (...)
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  3.  28
    Ante Rem Structuralism and the No-Naming Constraint.Teresa Kouri - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):117-128.
    Tim Räz has presented what he takes to be a new objection to Stewart Shapiro's ante rem structuralism. Räz claims that ARS conflicts with mathematical practice. I will explain why this is similar to an old problem, posed originally by John Burgess in 1999 and Jukka Keränen in 2001, and show that Shapiro can use the solution to the original problem in Räz's case. Additionally, I will suggest that Räz's proposed treatment of the situation does not provide an argument for (...)
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  4.  26
    A Reply to Heathcote's: On the Exhaustion of Mathematical Entities by Structures.Teresa Kouri - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (3):345-357.
    In this article I respond to Heathcote’s “On the Exhaustion of Mathematical Entities by Structures”. I show that his ontic exhaustion issue is not a problem for ante rem structuralists. First, I show that it is unlikely that mathematical objects can occur across structures. Second, I show that the properties that Heathcote suggests are underdetermined by structuralism are not so underdetermined. Finally, I suggest that even if Heathcote’s ontic exhaustion issue if thought of as a problem of reference, the structuralist (...)
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