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  1.  15
    Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action.Theo C. Meyering (ed.) - 1998 - Berkeley (USA): Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.
    This collection of 21 essays explores the creative interaction among the cognitive neurosciences, philosophy, and theology. It is the result of an international research conference co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory, Rome, and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, Berkeley.
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  2. Physicalism and downward causation in psychology and the special sciences.Theo C. Meyering - 2000 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):181-202.
    Physicalism ? or roughly the view that the stuff that physics talks about is all the stuff there is ? has had a popular press in philosophical circles during the twentieth century. And yet, at the same time, it has become quite fashionable lately to believe that the mind matters in this world after all and that psychology is an autonomous science irreducible to physics. However, if (true, downward) mental causation implies non-reducibility and Physicalism implies the converse, it is hard (...)
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  3.  40
    Fodor's modularity: A new name for an old dilemma.Theo C. Meyering - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):39-62.
    This paper critically examines the argument structure of Fodor's theory of modularity. Fodor claims computational autonomy as the essential properly of modular processing. This property has profound consequences, burdening modularity theory with corollaries of rigidity, non-plasticity, nativism, and the old Cartesian dualism of sensing and thinking. However, it is argued that Fodor's argument for computational autonomy is crucially dependent on yet another postulate of Fodor's theory, viz. his thesis of strong modularity, ie. the view that functionally distinct modules must also (...)
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  4.  71
    Fodor's information semantics between naturalism and mentalism.Theo C. Meyering - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):187-207.
  5.  11
    Mind matters: Physicalism and the autonomy of the person.Theo C. Meyering - 1999 - In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.
    Theo C. Meyering, in “Mind Matters: Physicalism and the Autonomy of the Person,” takes yet a third approach to the issue of reduction. He states that “if (true, downward) mental causation implies nonreducibility [as Stoeger and Murphy argue] and physicalism implies the converse, it is hard to see how these two views could be compatible.” Meyering distinguishes three versions of reductionism: radical (industrial strength) physicalism; ideal (regular strength) physicalism, and mild or token physicalism. Radical physicalism asserts that all special sciences (...)
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  6. The causal powers of belief: A critique from practical realism.Theo C. Meyering - 2001 - In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. CSLI Publications.
     
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