The quantum theoretical concepts of modular momentum and dynamical non-locality, which were introduced four decades ago, have recently been used to explain single particle quantum interference phenomena. Although the non-local exchange of modular momentum associated with such phenomena cannot be directly observed, it has been suggested that effects induced by this exchange can be measured experimentally using weak measurements of pre- and post-selected ensembles of particles. This paper reports on such an optical experiment that yielded measured weak values that were (...) consistent with the theoretical prediction of an effect induced by a non-local exchange of modular momentum. (shrink)
While from a late twentieth- and early twenty-first century perspective, the ideologies of eugenics (controlled reproduction to eliminate the genetically unfit and promote the reproduction of the genetically fit) and environmental conservation and preservation, may seem incompatible, they were promoted simultaneously by a number of figures in the progressive era in the decades between 1900 and 1950. Common to the two movements were the desire to preserve the “best” in both the germ plasm of the human population and natural environments (...) (including not only natural resources, but also undisturbed nature preserves such as state and national parks and forests). In both cases advocates sought to use the latest advances in science to bolster and promote their plans, which in good progressive style, involved governmental planning and social control. This article explores the interaction of eugenic and conservationist ideologies in the careers of Sacramento banker and developer Charles M. Goethe and his friend and mentor, wealthy New York lawyer Madison Grant. In particular, the article suggests how metaphors of nature supported active work in both arenas. (shrink)
Resumo: Neste artigo, propõe-se uma confrontação entre a teoria dos signos de Gotthold E. Lessing, tal como exposta em Laocoonte ou sobre as fronteiras da pintura e da poesia, e os dois ensaios de Theodor W. Adorno sobre as relações entre música e pintura. Pretende-se, com isso, demonstrar a presença decisiva de elementos da estética clássica alemã no pensamento adorniano do pós-guerra; em particular, observa-se o modo pelo qual a teoria racionalista de Lessing atua na abordagem dialética adorniana a respeito (...) da irredutibilidade formal dos meios artísticos e das possibilidades de sua convergência. À luz de tal confrontação, discutem-se, em um segundo momento do artigo, os temas da conferência de Adorno de 1966, A arte e as artes, que, em certa medida, consubstancia a discussão dos ensaios anteriores sobre música e pintura. Assinala-se, nesse contexto, a continuidade da posição teórica de Adorno e se apresentam as diferenças entre o processo de pseudomorfose e o de imbricação dos meios artísticos, segundo o filósofo.s: This article presents a comparison of Gotthold E. Lessing’s theory of signs, as found in his Laocoön: an essay on the limits of painting and poetry, and Theodore W. Adorno’s two essays on the relationship between music and painting. Our aim is to point out the decisive influence of German classical aesthetics on Adorno’s post-war aesthetics. Specifically, we discuss how Lessing’s theory functions as a framework for Adorno’s dialectical assessment of the formal specificity of artistic media and their possibilities of convergence in the context of the 1960’s avant-garde. In this context, we discuss the main implications of Adorno’s famous lecture of 1966, Art and the arts, which concerned the process of media convergence that intensified during the 1960’s, as well as the concepts of “overlapping” between artistic media and of “pseudomorphosis”. (shrink)
We study the global properties of [Formula: see text], the Turing degrees of the n-r.e. sets. In Theorem 1.5, we show that the first order of [Formula: see text] is not decidable. In Theorem 1.6, we show that for any two n and m with n < m, [Formula: see text] is not a Σ1-substructure of [Formula: see text].
In recent years a growing number of philosophers in the analytic tradition have focused their attention on the significance of human sociality. An older point of departure of analysis, which actually precedes this current tide of accounts of sociality, has revolved around the debate between “holism” and “individualism” in the philosophy of the human or social sciences and social theory. The more recent point of departure for various accounts of sociality has centered on the nature of conventions, social groups, shared (...) intentions, or collective intentionality. Putting aside the disagreements among these accounts, they all take for granted an antecedently intelligible notion of individual agency as explanatorily primitive and seek to explain the possibility of plural or collective agency in terms of the former. By contrast, other philosophers who have worked at the intersection of analytic and "continental" philosophy have emphasized the primacy of practice as the proper starting point for philosophical reflections on the nature of human sociality. In the analytic tradition this emphasis is typically framed in terms of the possibility of rule-following, a topic put on the philosophical agenda by the later Wittgenstein. Peter Winch’s and Saul Kripke’s influential but controversial readings of Wittgenstein explicitly thematize the issue of rule-following, readings which have in turn generated critical reflection in various disciplines for which this issue is relevant. -/- I begin by briefly explicating the positions of Pettit and Brandom on the issue of rule-following (putting aside any specific differences between them for the moment). Next I connect Pettit’s and Brandom’s views on rule-following, and more generally on normativity and its necessarily social basis, with the views of Theodore Schatzki and Joseph Rouse, whose conceptions of the significance of practice and its inherent sociality are indebted as much to the early Heidegger as well as the later Wittgenstein. I suggest that Pettit’s and Brandom’s views of the necessarily social nature of rule-following (i.e., practice) ought to acknowledge and integrate the shared insight of Schatzki and Rouse that practices are not only modes of activity, but constitute more basically the concrete setting or world within which practices qua modes of activity are intelligible (verständlich) at all. I conclude the paper by suggesting how an integrated account of the significance of the necessarily social nature of practice undermines the assumptions of those philosophers who seek to analyze human sociality solely on the basis of modes of interactions among individual agents. (shrink)