We sketch proofs of the theorems of Church-Turing and Trachtenbrot using a semi-monomorphic axiomatization.

In recent years, several remarkable results have shown that certain theorems of finite combinatorics are unprovable in certain logical systems. These developments have been instrumental in stimulating research in both areas, with the interface between logic and combinatorics being especially important because of its relation to crucial issues in the foundations of mathematics which were raised by the work of Kurt Godel. Because of the diversity of the lines of research that have begun to shed light on these issues, there (...) was a need for a comprehensive overview which would tie the lines together. This volume fills that need by presenting a balanced mixture of high quality expository and research articles that were presented at the August 1985 AMS-IMS-SIAM Joint Summer Research Conference, held at Humboldt State University in Arcata, California.With an introductory survey to put the works into an appropriate context, the collection consists of papers dealing with various aspects of 'unprovable theorems and fast-growing functions'. Among the topics addressed are: ordinal notations, the dynamical systems approach to Ramsey theory, Hindman's finite sums theorem and related ultrafilters, well quasiordering theory, uncountable combinatorics, nonstandard models of set theory, and a length-of-proof analysis of Godel's incompleteness theorem. Many of the articles bring the reader to the frontiers of research in this area, and most assume familiarity with combinatorics and/or mathematical logic only at the senior undergraduate or first-year graduate level. (shrink)

The theorem of convergence of opinions is an important theorem in the subjective theory of probability.It demonstrates that the subjectivity of a prior probability will be substituted with the objectivity of a posterior probability as evidences increase.The theorem of convergence of opinions is regarded as the dynamic principle of rationality concerning the subjective probability,and therefore is used to resolve Hume's problem,i.e.,the problem of inductive rationality.However,Hacking convincingly argues that the theorem of convergence of opinions is not about (...) the convergence of a posterior probability Pre(h),but about the convergence of a conditional probability Pr(h/e).The subjective theory of probability implies a tacit acceptance of an equation that is Pre(h)=Pr(h/e),usually called "the rule of conditionalisation".Thus,the problem of rationality of induction is converted into one concerning the rule of conditionalisation.In this paper a new principle of rationality(the principle of minimum number of initial probabilities)is put forward,which,in combination with the concept of "local rationality",offers a justification for the rule of conditionalisation. (shrink)

Theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis (THAs) occupy an unusual neighborhood in the realms of reverse mathematics and recursion theoretic complexity. They lie above all the fixed (recursive) iterations of the Turing Jump but below ATR $_{0}$ (and so $\Pi _{1}^{1}$ -CA $_{0}$ or the hyperjump). There is a long history of proof theoretic principles which are THAs. Until Barnes, Goh, and Shore [ta] revealed an array of theorems in graph theory living in this neighborhood, there was only one mathematical denizen. In (...) this paper we introduce a new neighborhood of theorems which are almost theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis (ATHAs). When combined with ACA $_{0}$ they are THAs but on their own they are very weak. We generalize several conservativity classes ( $\Pi _{1}^{1}$, r- $\Pi _{2}^{1}$, and Tanaka) and show that all our examples (and many others) are conservative over RCA $_{0}$ in all these senses and weak in other recursion theoretic ways as well. We provide denizens, both mathematical and logical. These results answer a question raised by Hirschfeldt and reported in Montalbán [2011] by providing a long list of pairs of principles one of which is very weak over RCA $_{0}$ but over ACA $_{0}$ is equivalent to the other which may be strong (THA) or very strong going up a standard hierarchy and at the end being stronger than full second order arithmetic. (shrink)

In 1957, Gödel proved that completeness for intuitionistic predicate logic HPL implies forms of Markov's Principle, MP. The result first appeared, with Kreisel's refinements and elaborations, in Kreisel. Featuring large in the Gödel-Kreisel proofs are applications of the axiom of dependent choice, DC. Also in play is a form of Herbrand's Theorem, one allowing a reduction of HPL derivations for negated prenex formulae to derivations of negations of conjunctions of suitable instances. First, we here show how to deduce Gödel's (...) results by alternative means, ones arguably more elementary than those of Kreisel. We avoid DC and Herbrand's Theorem by marshalling simple facts about negative translations and Markov's Rule. Second, the theorems of Gödel and Kreisel are commonly interpreted as demonstrating the unprovability of completeness for HPL, if means of proof are confined within strictly intuitionistic metamathematics. In the closing section, we assay some doubts about such interpretations. (shrink)

Theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis occupy an unusual neighborhood in the realms of reverse mathematics and recursion-theoretic complexity. They lie above all the fixed iterations of the Turing jump but below ATR $_{0}$. There is a long history of proof-theoretic principles which are THAs. Until the papers reported on in this communication, there was only one mathematical example. Barnes, Goh, and Shore [1] analyze an array of ubiquity theorems in graph theory descended from Halin’s [9] work on rays in graphs. They (...) seem to be typical applications of ACA $_{0}$ but are actually THAs. These results answer Question 30 of Montalbán’s Open Questions in Reverse Mathematics [19] and supply several other natural principles of different and unusual levels of complexity.This work led in [25] to a new neighborhood of the reverse mathematical zoo: almost theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis. When combined with ACA $_{0}$ they are THAs but on their own are very weak. Denizens both mathematical and logical are provided. Generalizations of several conservativity classes are defined and these ATHAs as well as many other principles are shown to be conservative over RCA $_{0}$ in all these senses and weak in other recursion-theoretic ways as well. These results answer a question raised by Hirschfeldt and reported in [19] by providing a long list of pairs of principles one of which is very weak over RCA $_{0}$ but over ACA $_{0}$ is equivalent to the other which may be strong or very strong going up a standard hierarchy and at the end being stronger than full second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

In the Lambek calculus of order 2 we allow only sequents in which the depth of nesting of implications is limited to 2. We prove that the decision problem of provability in the calculus can be solved in time polynomial in the length of the sequent. A normal form for proofs of second order sequents is defined. It is shown that for every proof there is a normal form proof with the same axioms. With this normal form we can give (...) an algorithm that decides provability of sequents in polynomial time. (shrink)

Using a recent result of Busch and Gudder, we reconsider a theorem of Ludwig which allows one to identify a class of effect automorphisms as the symmetry transformations in quantum mechanics.

The theorem that the arithmetic mean is greater than or equal to the geometric mean is investigated for cardinal and ordinal numbers. It is shown that whereas the theorem of the means can be proved for n pairwise comparable cardinal numbers without the axiom of choice, the inequality a2 + b2 ≥ 2ab is equivalent to the axiom of choice. For ordinal numbers, the inequality α2 + β2 ≥ 2αβ is established and the conditions for equality are derived; (...) stronger inequalities are obtained for finite and infinite sequences of ordinals under suitable monotonicity hypotheses. MSC: 03E10, 04A10, 03E25, 04A25. (shrink)

Suppose $D \subset M$ is a strongly minimal set definable in M with parameters from C. We say D is locally modular if for all $X, Y \subset D$ , with $X = \operatorname{acl}(X \cup C) \cap D, Y = \operatorname{acl}(Y \cup C) \cap D$ and $X \cap Y \neq \varnothing$ , dim(X ∪ Y) + dim(X ∩ Y) = dim(X) + dim(Y). We prove the following theorems. Theorem 1. Suppose M is stable and $D \subset M$ is strongly (...) minimal. If D is not locally modular then in M eq there is a definable pseudoplane. (For a discussion of M eq see [M, § A].) This is the main part of Theorem 1 of [Z2] and the trichotomy theorem of [Z3]. Theorem 2. Suppose M is stable and $D, D' \subset M$ are strongly minimal and nonorthogonal. Then D is locally modular if and only if D' is locally modular. (shrink)

The objective of the present edition of this monograph is the same as that of earlier editions, namely, to provide readers with some mathemati cal maturity a rigorous and modern introduction to the ideas and principal theorems of probabilistic information theory. It is not necessary that readers have any prior knowledge whatever of information theory. The rapid development of the subject has had the consequence that any one book can now cover only a fraction of the literature. The latter is (...) often written by engineers for engineers, and the mathematical reader may have some difficulty with it. The mathematician who understands the content and methods of this monograph should be able to read the literature and start on research of his own in a subject of mathematical beauty and interest. The present edition differs from the second in the following: Chapter 6 has been completely replaced by one on arbitrarily varying channels. Chapter 7 has been greatly enlarged. Chapter 8 on semi-continuous channels has been drastically shortened, and Chapter 11 on sequential decoding completely removed. The new Chapters 11-15 consist entirely of material which has been developed only in the last few years. The topics discussed are rate distortion, source coding, multiple access channels, and degraded broadcast channels. Even the specialist will find a new approach in the treatment of these subjects. Many of the proofs are new, more perspicuous, and considerably shorter than the original ones. (shrink)

We prove that every countable non-standard model of WKL0 has a proper initial part isomorphic to itself. This theorem enables us to carry out non-standard arguments over WKL0.

It might seem that three of Godel’s results - the Completeness and the First and Second Incompleteness Theorems - assume so little that they are reasonably indisputable. A version of the Completeness Theorem, for instance, can be proven in RCA0, which is the weakest system studied extensively in Simpson’s encyclopaedic Subsystems of Second Order Arithmetic. And it often seems that the minimum requirements for a system just to express the Incompleteness Theorems are sufficient to prove them. However, it will (...) be shown that a particular sub-system of Peano Arithmetic is powerful enough to express assertions about syntax, provability, consistency, and models, while being too weak to allow the standard proofs of the theorems to go through. An alternative proof is available for the First Incompleteness Theorem, but is of such a different nature that the import of the theorem changes. And there are no alternative proofs for (certainly) the Completeness and (apparently) the Second Incompleteness Theorems. It is therefore perfectly rational for someone to be skeptical about Godel’s results. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the ongoing controversy surrounding R.A. Fisher's famous ‘fundamental theorem’ of natural selection. The difference between the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ interpretations of the theorem is explained. I argue that proponents of the modern interpretation have captured Fisher's intended meaning correctly and shown that the theorem is mathematically correct, pace the traditional consensus. However, whether the theorem has any real biological significance remains an unresolved issue. I argue that the answer depends (...) on whether we accept Fisher's non-standard notion of environmental change, on which the theorem rests; arguments for and against this notion are explored. I suggest that there is a close link between Fisher's fundamental theorem and the modern ‘gene's eye’ view of evolution. Introduction What Does the Fundamental Theorem Say? Key Concepts Explained Alleged Significance of the FTNS Traditional versus Modern Interpretations of the FTNS The Modern Interpretation Illustrated Fisher's Concept of ‘Environmental Change’ Causality and the Modern Interpretation The Significance of the FTNS Re-considered Appendix CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The no-free-lunch theorems promote a skeptical conclusion that all possible machine learning algorithms equally lack justification. But how could this leave room for a learning theory, that shows that some algorithms are better than others? Drawing parallels to the philosophy of induction, we point out that the no-free-lunch results presuppose a conception of learning algorithms as purely data-driven. On this conception, every algorithm must have an inherent inductive bias, that wants justification. We argue that many standard learning algorithms should rather (...) be understood as model-dependent: in each application they also require for input a model, representing a bias. Generic algorithms themselves, they can be given a model-relative justification. (shrink)

x1. This paper is a contribution to matrix semantics for sentential logics as presented in Los and Suszko [1] and Wojcicki [3], [4]. A generalization of Lindenbaum completeness lemma says that for each sentential logic there is a class K of matrices of the form such that the class is adequate for the logic, i.e., C = CnK.

Following a long-standing philosophical tradition, impartiality is a distinctive and determining feature of moral judgments, especially in matters of distributive justice. This broad ethical tradition was revived in welfare economics by Vickrey, and above all, Harsanyi, under the form of the so-called Impartial Observer Theorem. The paper offers an analytical reconstruction of this argument and a step-wise philosophical critique of its premisses. It eventually provides a new formal version of the theorem based on subjective probability.

Working in a fixed Grothendieck topos Sh(C, J C ) we generalize \({\mathcal{L}_{{\infty},\omega}}\) to allow our languages and formulas to make explicit reference to Sh(C, J C ). We likewise generalize the notion of model. We then show how to encode these generalized structures by models of a related sentence of \({\mathcal{L}_{{\infty},\omega}}\) in the category of sets and functions. Using this encoding we prove analogs of several results concerning \({\mathcal{L}_{{\infty},\omega}}\) , such as the downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, the completeness (...) class='Hi'>theorem and Barwise compactness. (shrink)

In [This Zeitschrift 25 , 45-52, 119-134, 447-464], Pavelka systematically discussed propositional calculi with values in enriched residuated lattices and developed a general framework for approximate reasoning. In the first part of this paper we introduce the concept of generalized quantifiers into Pavelka's logic and establish the fundamental theorem of ultraproduct in first order Pavelka's logic with generalized quantifiers. In the second part of this paper we show that the fundamental theorem of ultraproduct in first order Pavelka's logic (...) is preserved under some direct product of lattices of truth values. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Feferman's theorem does not signify the existence of skeptic-satisfying consistency proofs. However, my argument for this is much different than other arguments (most particularly Resnik's) for the same claim. The argument that I give arises form an analysis of the notion of 'expression', according to which the specific character of that notion is seen as varying from one context of application (of a result of arithmetic metamathematics) to another.

Leslie Tharp proves three theorems concerning epistemic and metaphysical modality for conventional modal predicate logic: every truth is a priori equivalent to a necessary truth, every truth is necessarily equivalent to an a priori truth, and every truth is a priori equivalent to a contingent truth. Lloyd Humberstone has shown that these theorems also hold in the modal system Actuality Modal Logic, the logic that results from the addition of the actuality operator to conventional modal logic. We show that Tharp’s (...) theorems fail for the expressively equivalent Subjunctive Modal Logic, the logic that was developed by Kai Wehmeier as an alternative to AML. We then argue that the existence of Tharp’s theorems for AML is due to a faulty interpretation of the notion of necessary truth, a feature that is not shared by SML. The paper concludes with an argument for the thesis that the existence of the distinction between truth at all worlds w and truth at all worlds w from the point of view of w as the actual world is an artifact owing to the interaction of the necessity and actuality operator. (shrink)

We show that the respective oversights in the von Neumann's general theorem against all hidden variable theories and Bell's theorem against their local-realistic counterparts are homologous. When latter oversight is rectified, the bounds on the CHSH correlator work out to be ±2√2 instead of ±2.

A new formulation of what may be called the “fundamental theorem of the theory of relativity” is presented and proved in -space-time, based on the full classification of special transformations and the corresponding velocity addition laws. A system of axioms is introduced and discussed leading to the result, and a study is made of several variants of that system. In particular the status of the group axiom is investigated with respect to the condition of the two-way isotropy of light. (...) Several issues which are ignored or misunderstood in the literature are emphasized. (shrink)

We show that if $$ satisfies the first-order Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms of set theory when the membership relation is ${ \in _1}$ and also when the membership relation is ${ \in _2}$, and in both cases the formulas are allowed to contain both ${ \in _1}$ and ${ \in _2}$, then $\left \cong \left$, and the isomorphism is definable in $$. This extends Zermelo’s 1930 theorem in [6].

Ronald Dworkin has long criticized legal positivists for their efforts to distinguish between legal and non-legal standards of conduct that are incumbent on people. Recently, Dworkin has broached this criticism in his hostile account of the debates between Incorporationist Legal Positivists and Exclusive Legal Positivists. Specifically, he has maintained that Incorporationists cannot avoid the unpalatable conclusion that the axioms and theorems of arithmetic are legal norms. This article shows why such a conclusion is indeed avoidable and why Dworkin's criticism is (...) therefore wide of the mark. (shrink)

It is shown that the 3-stratifiable sentences are equivalent in $\mathit{NFU}$ to truth-functional combinations of sentences about objects, sets of objects, sets of sets of objects, and sentences stating that there are at least $n$ urelements. This is then used to characterize the closed 3-stratifiable theorems of $\mathit{NFU}$ with an externally infinite number of urelements, as those that can be nearly proved in $\mathit{TTU}$ with an externally infinite number of urelements. As a byproduct we obtain a rather simple demonstration of (...) the consistency of 3-stratifiable extensions of $\mathit{NFU}$. (shrink)

The Jordan decomposition theorem states that every function $f \colon \, [0,1] \to \mathbb {R}$ of bounded variation can be written as the difference of two non-decreasing functions. Combining this fact with a result of Lebesgue, every function of bounded variation is differentiable almost everywhere in the sense of Lebesgue measure. We analyze the strength of these theorems in the setting of reverse mathematics. Over $\mathsf {RCA}_{0}$, a stronger version of Jordan’s result where all functions are continuous is equivalent (...) to $\mathsf {ACA}_0$, while the version stated is equivalent to ${\textsf {WKL}}_{0}$. The result that every function on $[0,1]$ of bounded variation is almost everywhere differentiable is equivalent to ${\textsf {WWKL}}_{0}$. To state this equivalence in a meaningful way, we develop a theory of Martin–Löf randomness over $\mathsf {RCA}_0$. (shrink)

The fundamental principle of the theory of possible worlds is that a proposition p is possible if and only if there is a possible world at which p is true. In this paper we present a valid derivation of this principle from a more general theory in which possible worlds are defined rather than taken as primitive. The general theory uses a primitive modality and axiomatizes abstract objects, properties, and propositions. We then show that this general theory has very small (...) models and hence that its ontological commitments—and, therefore, those of the fundamental principle of world theory—are minimal. (shrink)

Work on how to axiomatize the subtheories of a first-order theory in which only a proper subset of their extra-logical vocabulary is being used led to a theorem on recursive axiomatizability and to an interpolation theorem for first-order logic. There were some fortuitous events and several logicians played a helpful role.

We give a short proof of a theorem of Kanovei on separating induction and collection schemes for Σ n formulas using families of subsets of countable models of arithmetic coded in elementary end extensions.

We prove that the existence of atomic models for countable atomic theories does not hold for Ln the first order logic restricted to n variables for finite n > 2. Our proof is algebraic, via polyadic algebras. We note that Lnhas been studied in recent times as a multi-modal logic with applications in computer science. 2000 MATHEMATICS SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION. 03C07, 03G15.

It is shown that the 3-stratifiable sentences are equivalent in to truth-functional combinations of sentences about objects, sets of objects, sets of sets of objects, and sentences stating that there are at least urelements. This is then used to characterize the closed 3-stratifiable theorems of with an externally infinite number of urelements, as those that can be nearly proved in with an externally infinite number of urelements. As a byproduct we obtain a rather simple demonstration of the consistency of 3-stratifiable (...) extensions of. (shrink)